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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of Franco-American relations from 1828 to
1860 presents an intriguing paradox to the student of
international affairs.

Only one issue during that period

led to formal negotiations between French and American
diplomats:

the question of an indemnity for American

spoliation claims resulting from French efforts to deprive
Great Britain of the benefits of neutral trade during the
Napoleonic Wars.

But that dispute was minor,

and in spite

of Andrew Jackson'-s belligerency a settlement was reached
in 1836.

An issue of far greater importance to Franco-

American relations existed beneath the surface of inter
national affairs during the eighteen-thirties, and steadily
developed until reaching a climax in the episode involving
Maximilian and Carlotta during the eighteen-sixties.

That

issue centered around the connection between the Monroe
Doctrine and American expansionism.

As Americans began to

view the west coast of North America and the Rio Grande
as within the destiny of the United States, the government
of Louis Philippe determined that the expansion of A m e r 
ican republicanism was inimical to the interests of France
in the New World.

But at the same time, the ardent

expansionists of the forties and the "Manifest Destiny"

1
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advocates of the fifties were adamant that the United States
could not allow a monarchial nation to prevent American
dominance of the New World.

Although Great Britain was

the only nation capable of effectively challenging
American power in the Western Hemisphere, France, in the
view of many Americans, typified the contrast between the
principles of the Old World and those of the New.

Through

historiographical analysis, this writer shall endeavor to
shed some light upon Franco-American relations from the
administration of Jackson to the eve of the American Civil
War.

From the outset, it will be apparent that French

policy in the New World, as well as American attitudes
towards France, were governed more by ideological consid
erations than by economic

and strategic guidelines.

In

order to better understand this theme, it will be necessary
to discuss its relation to the organization of this thesis.
The second chapter deals solely with the influence of
various ideological precepts upon Franco-American relations.
True, this topic will reappear throughout this work,

for

what the policy-makers of France and the United States
viewed as the national interest was intimately related to
ideological predilections.

But a nation's commitment to

a certain set of ideological principles is subject to
change.

Because France between 1828 and 1860 offers

three examples of such a change--the revolution of 1830
and 1848, and the coup d 1etat of Louis Napoleon--the

primary purpose of this chapter will be to review the
historiographical interpretations of the impact of these
ideological transitions upon Franco-American relations.
The subject of the third chapter is the dispute
between France and the United States that developed when
Jackson set out to settle the long-standing question of
the American spoliation claims.

Because of the nature of

Ja cks on’s presidency, this writer will be concerned most
with the effect of "Old Hi ck ory’s" diplomacy upon American
opinion of France,
The next three chapters center around the one develop
ment that most hindered Franco-American amity prior to the
Civil War--American expansionism.

Of these, the fourth

chapter is the most vital to the thesis.

For it is in that

chapter that the historiography of Franco-American relations
with respect to American continental expansion is discussed.
With the annexation of Texas, and the acquisition of
California, Oregon, and the great Southwest by the United
States, it became clear that the interests of France in
the New World, as expressed by the government of Louis
Philippe, clashed with the doctrine of American expansionism,
as expressed so clearly by President James K. Polk.
ing to Albert K. Weinberg,

Accor d

this clash signified more than a

competition for economic and strategic advantage.

French

attempts to establish sovereignty or political influence
in adjacent countries seemed to many Americans to threaten

the very security of democracy.

As he writes:

The expansionism of the ’forties arose as a
defensive effort to forestall the encroachment
of Europe in North America.
So too, as one can
see in the most numerous utterances, the c o n 
ception of an "extension of the area of freedom"
became general as an ideal of preventing
absolutistic Europe from lessening the area
open to American democracy; extension of the
area of "freedom" was the defiant answer to
extension of the area of "absolutism."1
Weinberg has defined a basic issue in the historiography of
Franco-American relations during the era of American con
tinental expansion.

Can the historian rely upon the

accusations of French designs in the New World to evaluate
Franco-American relations?

In short, how accurate were

the authors of those "numerous utterances" when they credited
the government of Louis Napoleon with pursuing a policy
inimical to the natural rights of the United States?
During the eighteen-fifties, French and American
interests collided over the issues of the annexation of
Hawaii and Cuba by the United States.
the annexation movement reach fruition.

In neither case did
Hence the primary

concern for historians is not whether accusations of French
perfidy by advocates of the "Manifest Destiny" doctrine are
to be believed, but whether French protests against the
annexation of Cuba and Hawaii had any impact upon American
policy-makers.

These questions will be the topics of the

fifth and sixth chapters.

1 Alb err K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of
Nationalist Expansionism in ArnerTcan History (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p . T09.
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Civil War between the Dominican Republic and Haiti,
as well as the question of a Central American canal route,
presented further difficulties to French and American
statesmen during the fifties.

In Santo Domingo, Washing

ton both competed with France for territorial concessions
and cooperated with Paris and London in a joint effort at
mediation.

But never did the United States accuse either

France or Britain of violating the Monroe Doctrine.

The

contrast between Cuba and Santo Domingo is obvious, and it
presents an important issue to historians of Franco-American
diplomatic relations.

Although Napoleon III avoided

involvement in the matter of a canal route, his attitudes
toward the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and its aftermath displayed
a definite policy towards the United States.

Both Santo

Domingo and the canal question will be the concern of the
seventh chapter.
Throughout the period from 1828 to 1860, France often
expressed her opposition to unlimited American expansion.
The extension of American democracy especially offended
the sensibilities of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III, but
it was not until 1861 that France directly challenged the
authority and predominance of the United States in the
Western Hemisphere.

Although the episode of Maximilian

and Carlotta is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is
clear that the roots of Napoleon's ill-considered venture
are to be found in the evolution of Franco-American

-6-

relations from 1828 to 1860.

A notable historian has

attempted to define this evolution within the framework
of the Monroe Doctrine,

According to Dexter Perkins,

the real meaning of Monroe's principles is to be found
in the nineteenth-century struggle between democracy and
older governmental forms.

"The intervention of the

French in Mexico," he writes,

"is an episode of the first

significance in the clash between the system of the Old
World and the system of the New."

Perkins regards the

intervention in Mexico as inevitable--sooner or later,
circumstances would permit the Monroe Doctrine to be
challenged.2

It is the purpose of this writer, then,

to determine whether Perkins's interpretation can be
used to explain Franco-American relations from 1828 to
1860.

2Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine
(2nd ed.: Boston: Little, Brown, and C o ., 1955), pp. 108109.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM AND THE FRENCH
REVOLUTIONS OF 1830 AND 1848

Three years after President James K. Polk had accused
French Premier Francois Guizot of advocating the applica
tion of the reactionary Old World principle of a balance
of power to the New World, the July Monarchy fell.

Soon

after the success of the February revolution became known
in the United States, Congress began debate on a congratula
tory resolution.

Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, a

Democrat, urged his colleagues to approve the measure as
an expression of international republicanism.• He suggested
that the United States should congratulate the French people
for the liberty they had recently acquired, and for the
democratic principles they had established as the founda
tion of their new government.

"We believe," Cass continued,

"that our congratulations at this time will not only be
acceptable to them, but useful to the great cause of
freedom throughout the world."

In response to skeptics

who doubted the ability of the provisional government to
establish a stable republic, Cass maintained that the
United States must not ignore the bonds that united all
those who resist oppression.

The French people, he

asserted,
-7-

have overturned the late Government and estab
lished one of their own, and with a spirit of
wisdom and moderation which, under all the
circumstances, has been rarely equalled in the
World,
The act of the Provisional Government-the temporary Fourth of July declaration, I
may call it--of the French people lays down
many of the just principles of human freedom,
which will find a responsive echo in this
country.1
Cass was not mistaken when he claimed that the American
people would react enthusiastically to the events in
France.

Most Americans, confident of their n a t i o n ’s

reputation as the foremost example of the virtues of
representative democracy--the sanctuary of liberty in an
oppressed world--believed that the French revolutionaries
had been inspired by the accomplishments of their republic
and would try to emulate it.
But the Second Republic did not survive.

Only three

years after the February revolution, France had again
become an empire.

This hasty transition from constitu

tional monarchy to republic to empire points out a central
problem in Franco-American relations between 1828 and 1860.
During all but three of those years, France was governed
by a centralized leadership opposed to democratic reforms.

l-U.S. Congress, Senate, "Remarks by Cass on the Revolu
tion in France," April 6, 1848, Congressional Glo be , 30th
Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, p. 465.
2
John Gerow Gazley, American Opinion of German Unifica
ti o n , 1848-1871, Studies in History, Economics^ and Rublie
Law, Vol. CXXI (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926).
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Only during the brief interludes of the revolutions of 1830
and 1848 could Americans see a bond between their fundamental
ideological precepts and those currently being professed by
the French government.

For most of period under discussion,

then, there existed as ideological gap between the p r e 
dominantly autocratic governments of France and the buoyant
republicanism of the United States.

As a result, the early

days of the July Monarchy and the short life of the Second
Republic are especially significant to the historian.

The

primary purpose of this chapter will be to examine the h i s 
toriography of Franco'•American relations at the times when
the ideological differences between the two countries seemed
to lessen.

And because the revolutions of 1830 and 1848

failed to establish a permanent republic, it will also be
necessary to determine what effect the defeat of French
liberalism had upon American opinion of France.
Although this writer will be most concerned with
American opinion of the July Monarchy and the Second Empire
and how this was related to the failure of the 1830 and
1848 attempts at republicanism, he will also attempt to
characterize briefly the sentiments of Louis Philippe and
Napoleon III with respect to the United States.

Unfortunately,

there are only two authors who attempt a general review of
the relation of ideology to French attitudes toward the
United States.

Hence, it is the intention of this writer

to provide a background to French foreign policy that will

•

10

*

be useful in the succeeding chapters.
Historians are in general agreement regarding the
initial American reaction to the February revolution.
The numerous professions of American sympathy for that
event attracted the attentions of four early historians
and, for the most part, their descriptions of the public
response within the United States towards the establish
ment of the Second Republic have stood intact.

Explaining

the enthusiastic welcome given the Hungarian patriot,
Louis Kossuth, when he arrived in the United States in
1852, all four historians point to the French revolution
of 1848 and its impact upon American opinion.

James Ford

Rhodes offers a typical explanation of Kossuth's popularity.
The splendid testimonial given Kossuth, Rhodes writes,
"was not so much to the man as to the principle of which
he was the incarnation."

Rhodes notes that the various

revolutions that swept Europe during 1848 had been followed
with deep interest in the United States--American newspapers
had been replete with accounts of the downfall of the hated
monarchies.

As a result, he continues, Americans

. . .of this time had correct knowledge of contem
porary events in Europe.
These revolutionary m o v e 
ments seemed to them due to American example; the
contemplation of the free, united, and happy
country created a yearning, they thought, for the
like, and this yearning stirred up the people on
the European continent to rebel against the tyrants.
Never had there been a more unquestioned faith in
our institutions, a greater desire to propagate
the principles underlying them, or a more sublime

-

11*

confidence in their virtue.^
According to Rhodes, who is representative of his contem
poraries, Americans embraced the cause of the February
revolution not only because they too detested monarchy,
but also out of pride.

They saw in the uprisings against

oppression a fervent desire to imitate American institu
tions.

It should be noted that although Rhodes presents

sufficient evidence to establish that Americans did assume
that the revolutionaries of 1848 sought to utilize the
United States as a model for their new governments, he
neglects to demonstrate that this assumption was accurate.
By means of an impressive statistical analysis of the
French Assembly of 1848, Eugene N. Curtis demonstrates that
the American example did not provide a model for the new
French constitution.

To be sure, Curtis notes, Minister

Richard Rush's early recognition of the new government made
a favorable impression on the French rebels.

Polk's

official expression of sympathy, as well as offers of
assistance from Congress, further enhanced the United States

^James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States From
the Compromise of 1 8 5 0 . Vol. I (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1893), p. 233.
Rhodes's contemporaries who also noted the
keen American response to the February revolution were H. Von
Holst, The Constitutional and Political History of the United
States. Vol. IV (Chicago: Callaghan, 1885), p. 65; James
Schouler, History of the United States of America Under the
Constitution. Vol. V: Free Soil Controversy. 1847-1861 (New
York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1891), pp. 226-234; John Bach
McMaster, History of the People of the United Sta te s. Vol.
VIII (New York: Appleton and Co., 1913), pp. 143-157.
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in the eyes of the French,^

But contrary to the beliefs

of the enthusiastic Americans, Curtis asserts that the
United States presented an imperfect example of democratic
government to French republicans, radical democrats, and
socialists--the most crucial elements within the 1848
assembly.
It is significant, Curtis states, that only the deposed
Orleanists endorsed the American example wholeheartedly.
Because they were equally hostile to an absolute king and
absolute democracy, ”they sought support for their p lu t o 
cratic interests in an upper chamber, of non-hereditary
character.

Their strength lay in the upper middle-class,

the great financial interests which had dominated the late
regime; they had prospered by economic individualism and
were willing to show enthusiasm for any political system
that would protect and leave them alone.”5

The Orleanists,

Curtis continues, received support from French liberals,
the best example being Alexis de Tocqueville.

In his

Democratie en Am erique, Tocqueville had expressed his
admiration for the American system of checks and balances,
local self-government, the independent authority of the
judiciary, and the federal scheme in general--all the more

^Eugene N. Curtis, The French Assembly of 1848 and
American Constitutional Doctrine. Columbia University
Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. LXXIX
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1918), pp. 75-96.
5Ibid., pp. 329-330.
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conservative and orderly aspects of American society.

In

the preface to an 1848 edition of his famous work, To c
queville reaffirmed his adherence to a "'tranquil republic*'"
In essence, the liberals, although desirous of reform,
abhorred revolution and sought orderly legal political
change.^

But the admiration expressed by the Orleanists

and the liberals for the American example failed to guide
the French Assembly in its search for a new constitution.
According to Curtis, this was primarily due to the contrast
between the ideals and realities of American life.
Although the Assembly expressed nearly unanimous
admiration for the American ideal, French attitudes towards
the American example were at first ambivalent, and as the
revolution progressed toward the fateful June Days, became
increasingly hostile.

The American ideal, epitomized in

the French mind by George Washington, received broad approval
and adulation.

Nearly all Frenchmen, Curtis maintains, had

a deep respect for the accomplishments of the early repubn

lie.

But when viewed as a model for France, the American

political system as it had evolved by 1848 seemed to many,
especially the more radical, to be far from the ideal.

^Ibid.. pp. 9 7-99.
A good recent description of French
liberalism during the July Monarchy and the Revolution of
1848 is found in George Fasel's Europe in Uphe av al: The
Revolutions of 1848 (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1970)
pp. 20-26.
^Curtis, The French Ass embly, p. 106.
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Critics of the United States pointed to the Mexican War
and to the presidential election of 1848 as examples of
the pervasiveness of American militarism.
Slavery and
Q
materialism were also assailed.
As the influence of
the French left in the Assembly increased, the persuasive
ness of the American example declined.®

Americans began

to become aware of this when the provisional government
established its experimental workshops.

It became obvious

during the socialist upheaval of June.
In a later article, Curtis maintains that most A m e r 
icans responded with praise not only to the February
revolution, but to the Revolution of 1830 as well.
Although there were reservations, primarily from experienced
statesmen overwhelmingly voiced approval of the downfalls
of Charles X and Louis Philippe.

He adds, however, that in

both instances this initial euphoria soon disappeared.
Five years after the establishment of the constitutional
monarchy of Louis Philippe, the United States and France
seemed on the verge of war over the claims controversy.
It had become apparent to most Americans that Orleanist
France, in spite of its republican format, differed greatly
from the revolutionary promise of 1830 .

It took even less

^Ibid., pp. 110-114,
Both Lewis Cass, the Democratic
nominee, and Zachary Taylor, the Whig, were former generals.
9 Ibid., pp.

326-328.
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time for Americans to become disillusioned with the Second
Republic.

The tendency of the new government toward

socialistic experiment affronted American sensibilities.
And when later the revolutionary assembly abolished slavery
in French colonies, the tone of American criticism became
more embittered, Curtis concludes.

Nevertheless, the

Second Republic soon cast off its socialist associations
and settled down to a bourgeois conservatism, quieting
somewhat its American critics;

Only with the coup d 1etat

of Louis Napoleon did Americans, according to Curtis,
finally resign themselves to the failure of French liberalism.
The replacement of the imperfect but tolerable Second Repub
lic by an empire seemed needless to Americans and ran
counter to their traditional sympathy for the republican
form of g o v e r n m e n t . ^
Cu rt is ’s article is important in that he suggests the
general nature of American opinion toward the transitory
French political scene.

His dependence upon a few of the

more articulate expressions of American opinion, such as
the correspondence of intellectuals, official statements,
and prominent newspapers, can be excused since he has
confined himself to a brief article.

A more complete

review of the broad spectrum of American opinion is found

lOCurtis, "American Opinion of the French Nineteenth
Century Revolutions," American Historical Review, XXIX
(January, 1921), pp. 254-255^.
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in John Gerow Gazley's study of the American attitude
toward the unification of Germany,

Impressed by the

lack of American sympathy for France in 1871, Gazley
devotes a long chapter to American opinion of France
from 1848 to 18 71.
Gazley agrees with Curtis that the abolition of
slavery and the socialistic tendencies of the Second
Republic were somewhat offset by the restoration of order
in the summer of 1848,

"Many Americans believed that the

republic had been greatly strengthened by the defeat of
the rebels," Gazley writes, "and that henceforth its
chances for success were vastly i m p r o v e d , " H

But unlike

Curtis, Gazley maintains that on the eve of Napoleon's
coup,

widespread skepticism toward the Second Republic

had developed in the United States.

By then, Americans

had come to believe that the revolution was the "work of
idealists, socialists, and radicals, whose impracticable
ideas very naturally culminated in the bloody June
uprisings in Paris."

Hence, Gazley writes, "it came to

be. thought that the French people were unfit for republican
institutions."

The election of Louis Napoleon to the

presidency further demonstrated the incapacity of the
French people for self-government.

Following an extensive

review of newspapers and a variety of personal memoirs,

-^Gazley, American Opinion of German Unification, pp.
244-247.
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Gazley* asserts that Napoleon*s "character, his policies
as president, and the people who had elected him were all
held in contempt if not hatred by* the American people."
Still, thoughtful Americans could not ignore the fact
that Napoleon had been overwhelmingly elected by the
French people,

Because of this, Gazley concludes, until

the coup d'etat the general American attitude towards
Napoleon was ambivalent .^
According to Gazley, the American reaction to the
coup d'etat of December 2, 1851, was characterized by
bitter disappointment.

He writes:

It is true that many Americans were very much
disillusioned about the ability of the French
people to establish really republican institu
tions on the American model, but it is also true
that the violent overthrow of the Second
Republic, unpopular as it had become in the
United States, was received by most Americans
with an outburst of indignation.
To be sure, Gazley notes, a few Americans believed that the
French people had received a just reward.

Some also e x 

pressed a grudging admiration for Napoleon's boldness and
initiative.

Still, he writes, "the feeling in the United

States was none the less bitter against the author of the
coup d'et at."13

Not surprisingly, there was much opposition

against American recognition of the new government.

12 Ibid., pp. 243-244, 251-255.
•^ Ibid .t pp. 257-260.

The
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American minister at Paris, William Cabell Rives, reported
the coup to his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, adding
that the United States might express her dissatisfaction
by refusing recognition.

Gazley quotes Webster as reply

ing: " ’You sympathize, in this respect, with the great
body of your countrymen

, , .if the French people have

now, substantially, made another change, we have no choice
but to acknowledge that also,’" ^
But although Americans generally condemned Louis
Napoleon and his.coup d ’e t a t , Gazley believes that until
the Maximilian affair certain considerations mitigated
their animosity.

There was a growing admiration, he

claims, of Napoleon's great intellectual and administra
tive abilities.

"Perhaps it might be fair to say,” Gazley

writes, "that before 1862 most Americans hated and yet
respected Napoleon III,"

Furthermore, in spite of the

fact that the great majority of Americans judged the Second
Empire to be autocratic, Gazley adds that the regime "was
based on the vote of the French people, a vote so overwhelm
ing that it could not have been effected by any amount of
intimidation or bribery."

Consequently,

there existed a

considerable minority of intelligent Americans who believed
that the essence of Louis Napole on’s government was indeed
1^
democratic.

l4lbid., p. 262.
ISibid., pp.

271-278.
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It should be evident that any attempt to analyze
American public opinion with the hope of reaching some
generalizations is unavoidably plagued by the great
diversity of popular spokesmen.

Gazley manages to make

some generalizations regarding American attitudes toward
the Second Republic and Napoleon H I ,

but they are q u a l 

ified by the inclusion of opposing views.

Thus, we are

told that Americans both admired and condemned Napoleon III,
that various newspapers and individuals at once viewed the
Second Empire as autocratic and democratic.

This, of

course, reflects Gazley*s extensive researches.

But because

he strives to present the broad spectrum of American opinion
of France accurately, Gazley leaves us in some doubt regard
ing the impact of these attitudes upon Franco-American
relations.

Elizabeth Brett White makes a conscious effort

to avoid such ambiguity.

Using similar evidence, she

attempts to clarify the ultimate effect of American opinion
of both the revolution of 1830 and the reign of Louis
Napoleon upon United States relations with France.
White agrees with Curtis that the relations of the
United States with the new government of Louis Philippe
opened most auspiciously.

Americans, she states, saw much

to applaud in the Orleans monarchy.

In the first place,

it was headed by a man whose temperament and prior exper
ience- -Philippe, during an earlier visit to the United
States had expressed his admiration for the American system

1. 2 0 '*

of government--indicated a loyalty to democratic ideals.
Also, the new government had been sponsored by the
Marquis de Lafayette, whom Americans claimed as one of
their own national heroes.

Hence, White concludes,

"France

was deemed to have advanced materially toward the status
of a self-governing state,"

But in spite of this ideolog

ically inspired congeniality, relations between France and
the United States soon soured.

Like Curtis, White credits

French intransigence over the claims controversy as the
primary reason.

As the Paris government continued to

debate whether to honor the legitimate American claims
for indemnity,

it became evident, White asserts, "that the

Revolution of 1830, if it had brought into being a co n
stitutional state, had not created a harmonious one."^-^
White concludes that this early American prejudice against
the reign of Louis Philippe remained a problem in FrancoAmerican relations until the Revolution of 1848.-^
In W h i t e ’s view, the failure of the Second Republic
reaffirmed the popular view that the French were not suited
to democratic principles.

She agrees with Gazley that the

coup d ’etat of Louis Napoleon provoked condemnation from the
American press; but unlike Gazley, White avoids entanglement
in the confusing aspects of American opinion of Napoleon III.

-16Eiizab eth Brett White, American Opinion, of France
From Lafayette to Poincare (New York: Alfred A. Kno p f , T927),
pp. 93-94.
1 7 Ibid., p. 119.
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Instead, she emphasizes the impact of American disillusion
ment over the defeat of French republicanism upon FrancoAmerican relations.

She writes:

With such an impression of the French nature
prevalent, it was perhaps not to be expected
that the Americans should show any marked
friendliness toward their "ancient ally" in
political affairs.
Nor, on the other hand,
since the character and the government of the
French were obviously their own affair, was
there any cause for active antagonism, unless
in a specific instance the welfare of the United
States should be threatened.18
During the fifties, then, Americans resigned themselves to
the failure of French liberalism; not until Nap ole on’s
Mexican adventure did they openly condemn the emperor.
The works of Gazley and White, when used to supplement
Curtis's brief article, make for a coherent and welldocumented study of the American attitude toward the
traumas of French politics.

Their influence over subse

quent students has been potent,

Writing on James Buchanan’s

term as P o l k ’s Secretary of State, St. George Leakin Sioussat,
for example, is content merely to list a few of the more
obvious factors which stirred the enthusiasm with which
Americans greeted the February revolution.

Certainly the

comparative bloodlessness of the revolution contributed to
American sympathy for the French rebels.

Americans also

remembered the alliance with France during their own revolu
tion.

But of greater importance, Sioussat writes, was the

18Ibid., pp.

271-278.
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ministry of Louis Philippe, "and the substitution thereof
of a republic which,

it was hoped, would be like our own."

Sioussat further agrees with Gazley and White, as well as
Curtis, that this initial enthusiasm was soon dampened
by the appearance of socialistic experiment and the
abolition of slavery in the French colonies.^
In a lucid and provocative article, Merle Curti
suggests that much of the sympathy within America

for the

revolutions of 1848 arose from a national myopia--a proud
and artificial belief in the justice of the American
political system.

Troubled by the nagging social enigma

of institutionalized slavery, Americans misinterpreted
the revolutions of 1848 as a reaffirmation of their funda
mental political ideology.

Curti writes:

Pride in the apparent imitation of American repub
lican institutions further explained the enthus
iasm in every part of the land.
Republicanism
was commonly believed to be not only a necessary
ingredient of American civilization, but of civil
ization itself.
It was easy to overlook the rela
tion between prosperity and virgin resources and
to attribute the national success to political in 
stitutions alone,
With a marked self-consciousness
and faith in republican ideas, destined it was felt
to become universal, what was more natural than for
Americans to sympathize with peoples trying to break
the chains of despots and set up republics on the
American model?^9

19St. Ge orge Leakin Sioussat, "James Buchanan," in The
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by
Samuel F. Bemis, V o l . T (New York: Alfred A. Kno pf, 1928) ,
pp. 300-301.
29Merle Curti, "The Impact of the Revolutions of 1848
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A1though Curti*s article is well documented,

it would be

extremely difficult to substantiate the above.
idea is none the less valuable,

But his

for it explains why

Americans misunderstood the full meaning of the February
revolution.

Only a few intellectuals detected the economic

and social forces that would soon come to the fore.

Be

cause most Americans, as Curti writes, ’’looked on the
upheavals as moral struggles for abstract political rights"-the same political rights which had been secured in the
United States--disillusionment over the failure of the
Second Republic was widespread.

21

In effect, Curti's

thoughtful essay does much to reaffirm what Gazley and
White have written about the popular American belief that
Frenchmen were not capable of republican government.
Curtis and Gazley suggest that although Americans
became disillusioned with French liberalism after the June
Days and the election of Louis Napoleon, American opinion
of the new president was ambivalent.

One reason for this

may have been Napoleon's sudden decision to settle the
Poussin affair.

Writing on John Middleton Clayton's

career as Secretary of State, Mary W. Williams stresses
the significance of this relatively minor incident to the

on American Thought," Proceedings of the American Philoso
phical Soci ety , Vol. XCIll, Klo. 3 l J u n e , 1949) , p. 210.
21Ibid., pp.

210-211.
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relations of tire United States with the ministry of Louis
Nap ole on.
The affair began innocuously when Guillaume Tell
Poussin, the French minister to Washington in 1849, p r e 
sented a minor claim to Clayton on behalf of a French
national.

Poussin's belligerent language, however,

offended Clayton and President Taylor, and they retaliated
with the threat of registering an official protest against
the minister.

Poussin retreated, but not for long.

Again

over an insignificant issue, Poussin insulted the American
government.

Incensed, Taylor instructed Rush in Paris to

protest, hoping that Poussin would be recalled.

Tocqueville,

then the French Foreign Minister, replied that Clayton had
used undiplomatic language, and intimated that Poussin
would be retained.

Clayton, who had appointed Rives to

succeed Rush, again protested and announced that Poussin
would be dismissed.

Meanwhile, Tocqueville had named a

successor to Poussin, and was naturally offended when he
read Clayton's note.

He in turn demanded an explanation of

Washington's antagonism towards Poussin.

The comic opera

had come to the point that the administration regarded war
with France as not improbable.

But when Rives arrived in

Paris, Napoleon received him cordially, and tensions
finally relaxed.

According to Williams, Napoleon earnestly

desired to cultivate good relations with the United States.
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At the time, the new president was deeply involved in
European politics --he could not afford to allow the
Poussin affair to harm his relations with the United
States, already dulled by the failure of the February
revolution.

77

Two biographers of Taylor, Brainerd Dyer

and Holman Hamilton,

agree with Williams that Napoleon's

initiative in ending the Poussin affair mended what could
have been a serious breach in Franco-American relations.
After the reception given Rives, Americans could at least
view the Second Republic as compatible with the United
?3
Sta tes .
To this point, this writer has been concerned p r i 
marily with the historiography of American response to the
vicissitudes of French politics.

It has been clearly

shown that when the revolution of 1848 failed to emulate
the American example, the public reaction in the United
States was largely one of disillusionment, disappointment,
and finally, with Napoleon's takeover, resignation.

Only

White, however, attempts to assess the impact upon diplomatic
relations of this frustration of American hopes for French

22wary W. Williams, "John Middlbton Clay to n," in The
American Secretaries of State and Their Dip lomacy, ed. by
Samuel F. Bemis, V o l . T l (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1928) ,
pp. 187-190.
7^

^ See Brainerd Dyer, Z,acharv
Louisiana State University Press,
Hamilton, Zacharv Tav l or : Soldier
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,

Tavlor (Baton Rouge:
1946), p. 352; Holman
in the White H o u s e . Vol.
1951), pp. 187-190.

II

-26-

liberalism, and her conclusions are but speculation.

The

students of the Poussin affair have suggested that Louis
Napoleon made a concerted effort to improve his relations
with the United States, but they fail to determine for how
long this consideration guided the emperor's, diplomacy.
In a recent monograph, Henry Blumenthal attempts to rectify
this ambiguity by reviewing not only American opinion of
French politics, but official French opinion of the United
States as well,

It is with the latter that Blumenthal

makes a definite contribution to the historiography of
Franco-American relations.

His findings provide an essential

background to the study of the diplomatic relations between
Paris and Washington from 1828 to 1860.

Because for only

three of those thirty-two years was France governed by a
republic, Blumenthal centers upon the attitudes of the
governments of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III toward the
United States.
According to Blumenthal, the leaders of both the July
Monarchy and the Second Empire feared a resurgence of
republican spirit during their reigns.

Dedicated to

European monarchism, both governments felt uneasy over the
possibility that the French republican movement might be
so impressed by the success of the American republic that
the idea to establish such a system in France could gain
momentum.

Hence, Blumenthal adds, they regarded it "as a

■*27

^

serious challenge that the United States lent at least its
moral support to the republican movement in Europe, and
that some Americans actually aided and assisted it.”

In

meeting this supposed threat, the two governments became
even more entrenched in opposition to American expansion.
Blumenthal writes:
. . .the French monarchs did not only attempt to
control republican activities at home and to deny
the superiority of republican institutions, but
they also pursued policies designed to frustrate
the success of the American republic and to
arouse the suspicions of the Latin Americans
against the United States. ^
In Blumenthal*s view, then, the desire of the July Monarchy
to contain American continental expansion was ideologically
inspired.

Louis Philippe, and his chief minister, Guizot,

equated the national interest of France with the prevention
of the spread of republicanism.

Napoleon III, however,

initially desired to avoid difficulties with the sensitive
Americans.Nevertheless,

Blumenthal asserts that hope

for any real improvement in Franco-American relations during
the Second Empire was illusory.
Blumenthal maintains that Napoleon and his advisors
misunderstood the vigor of American culture.

Although the

imperial family refrained from expressing anti-republican
antipathies, Franco-American tensions were destined to

24Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American
Relations, 1830-1871 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1959) , p . 4.

-28

develop.

He writes:

Applying the standards of an ancient civiliza
tion to the young American nation, they completely
failed to understand the spirit that moved the
society of pioneers in the New World.
Napoleon
and Eugenie were accustomed to think in terms of
the glory of France, the desirability of a p o w e r 
ful state, special rights and privilege for a
top layer of society, and the vital importance of
the cultural and intellectual aspects of life.
American concepts and practices conflicted too
much with these ideas to be appreciated by the
French rulers and many citizens of France.2"
With the royal family harboring such prejudices,

it was

inevitable that they would eventually be manifested.
Blumenthal suggests that the "Young America" movement
provided the necessary catalyst,
"Young America" began its activities as a recognized
political group during the presidential campaign of 1852.
Led by such men as George N. Sanders of Kentucky and
Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, the "Young Americans"
actively supported the candidacy of the Democratic nominee,
Franklin K, Pierce.

During the campaign, the aims of this

ebullient movement became clear.

According to Blumenthal,

not only did their goals offend Napoleon III, but the
"Young Americans" also held a particularly bitter resent
ment against the new emperor.

26Ibid., pp.

24-25.

He writes:
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The supporter > of the "Young America" movement,
a group of militant democrats who advocated
active intervention in behalf of European liberals,
did not hide their contempt for the emperor.
A
prosperous French republic would have made an
ideal spearhead of republicanism in the midst
of monarchical Europe,
The rise of this new
"despot" frustrated the international aspirations
of "Young America," ever anxious to promote the
spread of constitutional liberties beyond the
s e a s .2 7
With Piercers election, it appeared to many Europeans that
the "Young America" spirit would settle in the White House.
An early student of the movement, Merle Curti, notes that
the reaction of the conservative French press to Pierce's
victory was nervous.28

Blumenthal agrees, concluding that

in conservative French circles--which, of course, included
the royal family--the United States earned a reputation "as
the enfant terrible, against which European society must
protect itself."

Secretary of State William L. Marcy's

denial of any intention on the part of the United States to
export American political doctrines did little to allay
these apprehensions.2^
Assuming that if the July Monarchy and the Second Empire

pp. 25-26,
See also Merle Curti, "Young
America," American Historical Review, XXXII (October, 1926),
pp. 35-45.
For D o ug la s’s relationship with "Young America,"
see George Fort Milton, The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A.
Douglas and the Needless "War (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
1935), pp. 67~80- 8 2 9 2 - 9 7 7 ”
2 7 i b i d . ,

28Curti, "Young Americaj" pp. 46-47.
^ B l u m e n t h a l , A Reappraisal, pp. 26-29.
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had been replaced by a republic, Franco-American relations
would have been less troubled, Blumenthal maintains that
Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon allowed their ideological
predilections to govern their relations with the United
States.

As a result, Americans viewed French desires to

limit the expansion of the United States as a threat to
7(]
the freedom and security of their republic.
In an exten
sive review of French opinion of the United States from
1315 to 1852, Rene Remond agrees with Blumenthal that both
Louis Philippe and Napoleon deeply distrusted the United
States.

He further suggests, however, that French suspicion

of the American republic went beyond the personal prejudices
of the King and the. Emperor,
According to Remond, the traditional friendship between
the peoples of France and the United States began to deter
iorate during the Jacksonian Era.

After the Revolution of

1830, Frenchmen, encouraged by the progress of popular
government in their country, undertook the task of redis
covering America.

Remond maintains that they were dis 

illusioned and confused by what they saw.

It became apparent

to them that the America of Jackson bore little resemblance
from afar to that of Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and
Washington.

Slavery had become a pervasive institution;

"Yankee” influence encompassed all walks of life; and

3^Ibid., p. 31
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Virginians were no longer the typical Americans.3-*-

The

continental expansion of the United States, Remond con
tinues, increased French criticism of the bumptious,
self-confident republic.

As a result, many of the motives

behind Napoleon*® adventure in Mexico were not peculiar
to that monarch, but had begun to appear throughout the
spectrum of French opinion by the early forties.

Distrust

of Anglo-Saxons, Latinism, affinity with the Spanish, the
idea of raising up a community of Latin and Catholic
civilization to oppose the menacing expansion of North
American power--all, Remond maintains, took their roots
from widespread French disillusionment over the fate of
the American ideal, and resentment with regard to the
•ZJ

impetuous expansionism of the forties.
True, Blumenthal and Remond are hardly impartial in
their interpretations,

Blumenthal seems unable to surmount

the American distaste for the instability of French politics
and monarchial governments, while Remond is in sympathy
with the contemporary French criticism of the faults of the
American system and appears to feel that the United States
was ungrateful towards a former ally.

And yet, Remond and

Blumenthal point out an essential ingredient in FrancoAmerican relations between the Revolution of 1830 and the

3lRene Remond , Les Etats-Unis Devant 1 *Opinion Francaise.
1815-1852. Vol. II (Paris: A. Colin, 1962), pp. 826-827.
3^Ibid., pp.

821-822.
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From their different perspectives, both suggest

that an ideological bond between French and American society
simply did not exist.

While Blumenthal emphasizes that

the primary cause of this gap was the distrust with which
Louis Philippe and Napoleon III regarded American repub
licanism, Remond points instead to the development of a
nativist America unfamiliar to the French and replete with
internal problems that did not exist during the early years
of the republic.

But what is important is not that they

differ in assessing a cause, but that they agree as to its
effect 6

Rhodes, Gazley, and White have shown that Americans

interpreted the revolutions of 1848 as attempts to emulate
the United States and its institutions.

This explains much

of the enthusiasm with which Americans reacted to the u p 
heavals of 1848, but, as Curtis has established from his
extensive research into French sources, the French Assembly
rejected the American example,

Curti asserts that Americans

in their expressions of sympathy for the French revolution
aries not only misunderstood the full meaning of the February
revolution, but that they also suffered from a national
myopia which deluded them into thinking that their political
institutions were requisite to the success of any nation.
So, in spite of the blossoming of international republican
spirit that occurred with the downfall of the July Monarchy,
relations between France and the United States were only

temporarily improved through ideological ties.

With the

June Days and the election of Napoleon to the presidency
of the Second Republic, Franco-American ideological unity
began to wither; three years later with the coup d ’etat
of December, 1851, it died.

The resulting chasm between

nYoung America” and Napoleon III was wide indeed.
Although most of the historiography reviewed to this
point is dominated by generalization and speculation-often of such a nature that it frustrates critical analysis
it is essential as a background for the subsequent chapters
Unless we understand the general trend of Franco-American
ideological relations, it will be difficult to follow the
historiography of the diplomatic relations between Paris
and Washington from 1828 to I860,

Obviously,

ideological

predilections influence the definition of national interest
It will be a fundamental purpose of the succeeding chapters
to determine what impact the ideologically inspired Amer 
ican distrust of the July Monarchy and the Second Empire
had on Franco-American relations.

CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH DEBT QUESTION AND JACKSONIAN DIPLOMACY

Prior to the declaration of war in 1812, American m e r 
chants had suffered heavy losses not only from the British
Orders in Council, but also from the French Berlin and
Milan Decrees,,

In 1814, the Treaty of Ghent brought an

end to hostilities, but the question of the commercial
depredations carried out by the French remained.

Hoping

to secure an indemnity for American claims against France,
President James Madison appointed Albert Gallatin to be
the American minister at Paris,

Gallatin and his successors

negotiated with the French government over the claims issue,
but to no avail.

Although the government of Charles X

never denied the justice of the American claims, it repeat
edly delayed discussions of a possible settlement.

In 1829,

the American claims remained unfulfilled.^
With the inauguration of Andrew Jackson, however, the
claims issue became a prime concern of the foreign relations
of the United States.

The new president mentioned the

problem in his first annual message,

and instructed William

ISee Richard A. McLemore, Franco-American R elations,
1816-1836 (University: Louisiana State University Press,
1941), pp. 1-42.
McLemore is the only author who has
reviewed these futile negotiations.

-
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Cabell Rives at Paris to renew negotiations.

But when

Rives met with Prince Auguste J.A.M. de Polignac, the
French Foreign Minister, he was told that France was
unwilling to recognize the American claims and was
reluctant to negotiate.

Jackson refused to allow the

French to continue to delay, and pressed for a settlement.
But Paris again avoided serious negotiations; not until
the Revolution of 1830 did a climate conducive to a settle
ment begin to form,2
Most Americans greeted the new government of Louis
Philippe enthusiastically, viewing the revolution as a
victory for popular government.

As a result of the improved

relations between France and the United States, a settlement
of the claims issue was reached on July 4, 1831, when the
July Monarchy agreed to pay an indemnity to satisfy the
American claimants.

But due to the reluctance of the

Chamber of Deputies to appropriate the necessary funds,
execution of the treaty was delayed.
demanded payment,

Although Jackson

the Chamber continued to postpone action.

Incensed, Jackson decided that diplomacy was futile, that
only a threat of reprisals would persuade France to meet
her obligations and begin payment.

On the eve of Jacks o n’s

annual message of 1834, Rives, the former minister to
France, visited the White House, hoping to obtain a copy

2Ibid,, pp. 58-70.
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of the forthcoming speech,

He found the general busily

engaged in rewriting his declaration,

" ’I know them

French,’" Jackson is reputed to have said, " ’they won't
pay unless they're made t o , " ’3
The next day Jackson brought the claims issue to a
head.

If the French continued to ignore their treaty

commitments, Jackson warned, the United States would
take "redress in our hand.’’^

Obviously, Jacks on ’s speech

is crucial to the historiography of the claims dispute.
In the preceeding chapter, it was noted that the animosity
caused by the claims controversy contributed to the deep
ening American disillusionment with the July Monarchy.
But, and this is a vital question, did Jackson's vigorous
pursuit of the much-delayed indemnity reflect a popular
demand for settlement, a determination of the American
people that they would no longer be trifled with, or did
it represent yet another example of the belligerency of
"Old Hickory?"

In short, it is important that historians

determine whether the deterioration of Franco-American
relations during the claims dispute was caused by public
opinion of France or by the attitude of one man toward
"them French."

3Quoted in White, American Opinion of France, pp. 95-96.
^The best review of J a ck s on ’s speech is found in
McLemore,' Franco-American Relations, pp. 130-133.

The furor that engulfed the relatively minor issue
of the French spoliation claims first attracted the
attention of Charles H, Peck,

In his 1899 study of the

Jacksonian Era, Peck tends to favor the Whig point of
view.

For that reason, he emphasizes the role of Jac k

son's personality in the claims crisis.

When Washington

learned that the French Chambers had refused to appropriate
the necessary funds to meet the requirements of the 1831
treaty, Peck writes, "Jackson was wroth."

In his annual

message of 1834, Peck continues, Jackson recommended
reprisals if at the next session of the Chambers no p r o 
vision was made for the payment of the debt,

"The

activities of the President," Peck writes, "created alarm
throughout the country, for France would undoubtedly view
it as virtually a recommendation of war,"^
According to Peck, Jackson's irrational fulmination
offended France and provoked a needless crisis in FrancoAmerican relations.

Fortunately, he adds, the refusal of

the Senate to approve an administration measure providing
appropriations for the fortification of coastal defenses,
tempered the militancy of Jackson's words in the eyes of
the French.

Ignoring the partisan nature of Jackson's

opposition in the Senate, Peck lauds the reasonableness of

^Charles H, Peck, The Jacksonian Epoch (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 189'9) , pp. 248-250 „

38Henry Clay, the Whig spokesman.

After the Senate rejected

the fortification bill* he writes,
The French Chambers passed a bill appropriating
the amount of the indemnity, but with the p r o 
viso that it would not be paid until their
government had received a satisfactory explana
tion of that part of the President’s message
which recommended reprisals--that is to say,
until he apologized for his belligerent affront
to the dignity of France,
To be sure. Peck does not absolve the French of all blame
for the crisis created by Jackson’s 1834 message.

"If

Jackson had been a little less vigorous," he writes,

"and

if the French government had been as regardful of its
obligation as of its settlement, there would have been no
rupture.

As it was the rupture was now complete."

Only

a fortuitous offer of mediation from a concerned government
in Great Britain, Peck concludes, allowed a settlement
to be reached,^
Significantly, P e c k ’s documentation gives us an insight
into his interpretation of the claims dispute.

Throughout

his study of the Jacksonian Era, Peck depends heavily upon
the Congressional Gl o b e .

Regarding the spoliation issue,

then, Peck bases his views on Jack so n’s annual message of
1834 and the subsequent Congressional debate.

Later authors

have supplemented this message and the related discussion

6 lbid., pp. 265-266.
According to Charles Webster, the
claims quarrel disturbed the British, for London feared that
France might find it necessary to defend its honor in the
face of J a c ks o n’s insulting language.
Charles Webster,
"British Mediation Between France and the United States in
1834-1836," English Historical Review, XLII (January, 1927),
pp. 60-62.
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in Congress with at least cursory examinations of newspaper
opinion and diplomatic correspondence.

Peck's failure to

use such material, coupled with his Whiggish sympathies,
leads him to conclude that during the claims dispute,
Jackson acted precipitously and without public backing.
For Peck, the spoliation crisis was animated by the
flamboyant, irresponsible politics of the Democratic
president.
Unlike Peck, John Spencer Bassett credits Jackson
with having much popular support for his initial attempts
to solve the claims issue.

In his view, the signing of

the 1831 treaty was an example "of Jackson's just but
vigorous methods of clearing our diplomacy of old issues."
Americans had long desired a settlement of the claims
question, and were therefore impressed by Jackson's success
in persuading the government of Louis Philippe to pay an
indemnity,

Bassett asserts, however, that the reluctance

of the French Chambers to appropriate the funds necessary
to fulfill the treaty obligation did not warrant Jackson's
decision to threaten reprisals.

For although the 1834

message "showed the people they faced a crisis and made
the world see that the supineness of American diplomacy
was past,” opinion, especially in the Senate, but through
out the nation as well, slowly sobered.

Nevertheless,

Jackson's refusal to apologize to France for his threat of

-40reprisals had broad support,

Bassett writes:

The message of 1834 was, in fact, needlessly
strong.
Members of the President's own party
urged him to be moderate in the next annual
message.
They had some effect, although they
did not seriously modify his private views.
If France were an honorable nation, he said
privately, she would pay the money and demand
an apology afterward, , , .But from Maine to
Florida came the voice, "No apology, no
explanation--my [Jackson's] heart cordially
responds to that voice,"7
Unfortunately, Bassett makes no attempt to document the
validity of Jackson's interpretation of public opinion.
He simply assumes that because of Jackson's popularity,
the American people supported his refusal to recant.
Bassett, like Peck, fails to provide adequate evidence
for his findings.
In her review of American opinion of France, Elizabeth
Brett White is the first to attempt to assess domestic
attitudes towards Jackson's conduct of the claims dispute.
Noting Jackson's strong personality and unmitigated partisan
ship, White stresses that after the 1834 speech, the claims
affair became an issue in the bitter party struggles of the
day.

"With the strong party feeling existing at the moment

in the United States," she writes, "it was inevitable that
the message should become the subject of party recrimina
tions,"

But although White admits that partisan sympathies

guided opinions of Jacks on ’s diplomacy, she suggests that

7John Spencer Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1916; first published in 1911),
pp. 96-101.
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Jackson had ventured beyond the sentiment of the country.
After reviewing the opinions of several Democratic and
Whig journals, as well as a few individuals of varied
standing, White concludes that Jackson's threat of
reprisals had very little support.

The majority of the

Democratic journals, as well as Democratic members of the
House and the Senate, viewed reprisals as unwarranted.
The American people believed that the claims of the United
States against France were just, but "Money, not the
honor of the country, appeared to be the point at issue."®
Although the Whigs roundly condemned J a ck so n ’s b el l i g 
erency, White notes that one notable Whig member of Congress,
John Quincy Adams, supported Jackson,

The ’’Old Man Eloquent"

did not deem war to be necessary, but he was certain that
reprisals should be made,

In reply to the opponents of the

fortification bill, Adams asserted that ” 'it was the duty
of the House to act upon this subject, and declare whether
they would comply with the proposal of the President or
that they would do something to sustain the rights, interests,
and honor of the n a t i o n , ” '
message, Adams concluded,

Whatever might be said of Jack so n’s

" ’he, for one, would say as once

was said of Lafayette, that whoever censured its impudence
Q
must yet admire its s p i ri t ,” ’
White adds, however, that

^White, American Opinion of France, pp. 96-101.
9 Ibid ., p. 104,
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Adams's opinions were unique.

«

And although the fortifica

tion bill passed the House, the Senate Whigs remained firm
and killed the measure by inaction.

Nevertheless, White

concludes that the partisan debate over the claims issue
"served to attract attention to France, and encourage
among both Democrats and Whigs a critical spirit in regard
to French affairs in g e n e r a l . " ^
While White rectifies the failure of both Peck and
Bassett to analyze American public opinion, her work does
not include diplomatic correspondence or the private
papers of officials in the Jackson administration.

Writing

on the careers of two of Jackson's Secretaries of State
during the thirties, Eugene I, McCormac demonstrates that
there was a good deal of sentiment within official circles
for punishing the recalcitrant French,

Louis McLane, who

held office from May, 1833, to June 1834, urged the
president to take strong measures against the French,
McCormac writes, for "the ministry possessed the power,
if it had the will, to pay the money without an appropria
tion by the Chambers."

Although McLane advocated the

application of bold initiatives to persuade the French to
pay the promised indemnity, McCormac adds that he did not
favor "an immediate declaration of war, but he advised

9 lbid., p. 1 0 4 .
10Ibid., p. 1 0 9 .

asking Congress for authority to make reprisals."11
Following the retirement of McLane, Jackson appointed
John Forsyth, an ardent supporter of the administration,
as Secretary of State.

According to McCormac, Forsyth

also had some influence on the writing of the annual
message of 1834.

Shortly after taking office, Forsyth

received a dispatch from Robert Livingston,

the American

minister at Paris, in which the representative asserted
that a settlement of the claims question was impossible
without some form of executive pressure.

McCormac notes

that Forsyth relayed Livingston's opinions to Jackson
with a favorable recommendation.

After the annual

message, Forsyth gained prominence as the chief defender
of Jackson's policy and, McCormac adds, was partially
responsible for the adamant refusal to grant the French
request for an apology.

Concluding, McCormac notes that

Forsyth advised acceptance of the British offer of media
tion only on the condition that the United States would
not be asked to retreat.12
Like Bassett, Marquis James views the claims contro
versy through the perspective of a biographer of Jackson,

11Eugene I. McCormac, "Louis McLane," in The American
Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel FY
Bernis, Vol. IV (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 285,
12McCormac, "John Forsyth," in ibid., pp.
315.
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But while Bassett maintains that Jackson's 1834 message
was '’needlessly strong,” James defends the president and
asserts that the crisis of 1834-1835 was caused solely
by the dilatory July Monarchy.

Reviewing the repeated

failure of American ministers to obtain justice on the
claims matter, James praises Jackson's firm approach which
resulted in the 1831 treaty.

But when the French Chambers

postponed payment, Jackson, "deeply mortified by their
betrayal,

realized that only the threat of reprisals

would stir the French into action."1^

The crisis deepened,

James continues, when France demanded an apology.
nately, he writes,

Fortu

"England stepped in to save the face of

Louis Philippe with an offer of mediation."

A settlement

was reached, James concludes, as "France immediately, and
Jackson after just enough hesitation to avoid a look of
precipitation, agreed to arbitrate."14
More a popularizer than a scholar, James ignores Ja c k 
son's domestic critics and assumes that the president
echoed the sentiments of the American people.

In a b i o 

graphy of Henry Clay, however, Glyndon G. Van Deusen
reaffirms White's assertion that Jackson's diplomacy stirred
a bitter partisan debate.

He views the Senate rejection

of the fortification bill as "Clay's one major victory

1 ^Marquis James, Andrew Jack s on : Portrait of a
President (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1937J-, pp. 3¥6-38 7.
14 Ibid,, p. 403.
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over Jackson.”

Admitting that Jackson's forceful diplomacy

may have enhanced respect for American rights, Van Deusen
asserts that the threat of reprisals weakened an excellent
moral issue, thereby presenting the Whigs with an oppor
tunity for political gain.

But the Whig opposition to

Jackson's annual message of 1834, in spite of political
enmity, "served as an emollient."

In Van Deusen's view,

the passage of the fortification bill would certainly have
insulted France.

"If one believes in sabre-rattling

diplomacy," he writes, "the Whigs should be condemned;
if not, they should be praised,"15
To this point, the historiography of the claims con
troversy has been fragmentary.

But although none of the

authors discussed devotes more than a few pages to the
subject, most have taken a similar attitude towards the
claims dispute.

Although Peck's biased view led him to

isolate Jackson's personality as the decisive factor in
the process which caused the claims question to become a
critical issue in Franco-American relations, Bassett, White
and Van Deusen all agree that Jackson's threat of reprisals
t

was unwarranted.

White and Van Deusen point to the partisan

debate that resulted from Jackson's vigorous assertion of
American rights, and conclude that Whig opposition m i t i 
gated the presi de nt ’s belligerency.

McCormac, on the

i^Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clav (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1937), pp.. 289-294.

,
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basis of research, into the diplomatic correspondence,
asserts that Jackson was not alone in believing that
strong measures were needed to convince France to pay
the indemnity, but this does not suffice to establish
that the p resident’s actions reflected public opinion.
Ignoring White, James maintains that Jack s on ’s leader
ship was sound, and that the French were entirely to
blame.

J a m e s ’s sympathy for Jackson is obvious, and

his work does not weaken the more prevalent view phat
Jackson himself created much of the animosity surrounding
the dispute.

In a 1941 monograph devoted to the history

of the claims question from 1816 to 1836, Robert A.
McLemore expands and reaffirms this interpretation of
the impact of Jack so n ’s diplomacy.
Reviewing the progress of the claims question from
1816 to 1829, McLemore concludes that a considerable
"national sentiment” for settlement had begun to develop
during the administration of John Quincy Adams.

As early

as 1826, he writes, ’’there was developing among the public
a demand that more drastic measures be taken to secure an
adjustment of the claims,”

To corroborate this, McLemore

refers to two articles--one a report in the National
Intelligencer of a public meeting held in January of 1826
concerning the need for a settlement of the spoliation
claims, the other an editorial in the North American Review
suggesting that "energetic steps” were required to solve
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the issue.

That these two articles demonstrated a public

demand for indemnity from France is at best speculation,
and they are used by McLemore only to provide a b a c k 
ground to the claims crisis of the eighteen-thirties.1^
Tracing the negotiations leading to the signing of
a treaty in 1831, McLemore adds much to the historiography
of the claims question.

Through the use of both American

and French diplomatic correspondence, he reviews the
intricate negotiations, emphasizing the importance of the
Revolution of 1830.

Before the July Monarchy, McLemore

maintains, relations between the United States and France
were often plagued by partisan newspaper editorials.
Because of this occasional animosity, Rives made only
slow progress with the Bourbon regime.

With the downfall

of Charles X, however, Americans believed that the disputed
claims would finally be solved and justice achieved.17
McLemore writes:

nThe news of the revolution was welcomed

in the United States with much joy--the press seemed to
feel unanimously that now, with the Bourbons out of the
way, the negotiations could be completed with little
problem.1' McLemore hastens to add, however, that the
issue of indemnity was still far from solution and could
have posed a serious threat to the renewed Franco-American
amity.

He refers to a dispatch sent by Rives to Secretary

^ M c L e m o r e , Franco-American Relations, pp. 33-39.
17jbid., pp. 52-63.
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of State Martin Van Buren in which the minister -warned that
although the new French leaders sympathized with the A m e r 
ican claims, the question of finance would be difficult.
And in spite of the signing of the treaty in 18 31, Rives
expressed regret that the French government did not believe
the claims issue to be serious,

1 ft

R i v e s ’s trepidations were soon realized.

The French

Chambers refused to grant the necessary appropriations
and the July Monarchy procrastinated.

Furious with the

delay, Jackson believed that the French government was
unwilling to fulfill its obligation,

”No one was more

severe in the denunciation of the French than Jackson
himself,” McLemore writes, ”he pronounced the course of
the King of France

’Jesuitical

, , ,toward u s . ’" ^

In his estimation of the role of J a c ks on ’s personality
in the crisis of 1834*1835, McLemore agrees with White,
Van Deusen, and Bassett that the threat of reprisals was
unnecessary.

But McLemore also asserts that Jackson’s

1834 speech aroused a spirit of ’’national aggressiveness”
that had been absent since the War of 1812,

The nation

had expected Jackson, McLemore maintains, to deal with the
claims issue in a firm but friendly tone, with possibly
some recommendation for commercial restrictions if France

18lbid,, pp,

70-73,

19Ibid,, p, 125,
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still refused to comply with the treaty,

But when Jackson

adopted a ’’strongly nationalistic tone,” McLemore writes,
and suggested the taking of ’’redress in our hand,"
he aroused a n a t i o n w i d e interest in the matter
which brought on the one hand bitter reproaches
upon the administration for its hazardous
experiment, and on the other vehement defenses
of such a program.
A matter which had been
largely local in interest was transformed into
one of "national honor,’’ threatening to involve
the two nations in w a r , 20
To this point, only James has suggested that Jackson's
speech transformed the spoliation controversy into a
question of "national honor,"

It is therefore requisite

to examine McLemore's foundation for making such a claim.
As evidence that after Jackson’s 1834 message the
claims dispute was animated by an aroused '’national honor,"
McLemore refers primarily to the Washington Globe and the
National Intelligencer, as well as to a few private
observers.

Without detailing the relationship of the Globe

and its editor Francis B, Blair to the administration,
McLemore quotes that organ as assaulting the more reserved
Intelligencer for suggesting that the 1831 treaty failed
because of Jacks on ’s militant diplomacy.

It is certainly

true that, as McLemore writes, "the press did not permit
the public to forget the action that had been taken or
the prospects fox the f u t u r e N e v e r t h e l e s s ,

20lbid., p, 132.
21Ibido, pp. 133-136.

this alone
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is insufficient to prove that Jackson*s management of the
claims affair revived an aggressive "national sentiment
In fact, McLemore admits that to use newspaper opinion as
evidence of a national feeling on the claims dispute is
misleading, for "the press of the United States divided
in its views on the question according to whether it was
Jackson or anti-Jackson,"

22

Given the polarization of

the country in the thirties as the second two-party
system was developing,

it is not surprising that the

message of 1834 stimulated acrimonious debate in the press
as Whigs and Democrats vied for popular support.
In an attempt to bolster his claim that the spoliation
dispute engendered a new belligerency within the United
States, McLemore presents the views of three prominent
citizens,

"That the relations of the two countries were

strained almost to the breaking point may be inferred*"
McLemore writes,

from the following American leaders:

James A, Harris [Assistant Secretary of State
and intimate friend of Adams] wrote Jackson,
"under a strong conviction that eventually
there will be war," offering his service in any
capacity,
Adams wrote in his Memoirs that "if
the two countries be saved from war, it seems
as if it could only be a special interposition
of Providence," Judge Joseph Story found "the
state of public affairs . , .anything but
satisfactory," with the President "exceedingly
warm for war with France." Story felt that the
only hope lay in t h e resistance of the s e n a t e . 23

22i b i d ., p. 121.
25Ibid,, p. 15 7.
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When McLemore states that the above opinions, in addition
to the newspaper debate, are evidence of "strained rela
tions" between France and the United States, he is
undoubtedly correct.

But it is doubtful that "strained

relations" demonstrated that the American people was in
arms demanding payment of the indemnity,
Like Bassett, McLemore asserts that J a c k s o n ’s refusal
to apologize to the French for his belligerent remarks in
his 1834 message had broad support.

Even in the Senate,

where the fortification bill went down in defeat, there
was a reluctance to accept responsibility for the failure.
McLemore writes:
The fact that sentiment of the nation was becom
ing more solidified in support of the president
may be inferred from the care the senate took
to throw from its shoulders, as far as possible,
the responsibility for the defeat of the fort
ification bill.
McLemore adds that the Intelligencer,

seldom an adminis

tration advocate, warned that the defeat of the fortifica
tion bill did not mean that the nation was going to accept
passively the nonexecution of the 1831

t r e a t y .

^4

Although McLemore goes to great pains to establish
that Jack s on ’s militant diplomacy was not without support,
he concludes that the most important factor in the claims
controversy was "Old Hickory,"

Z^Ibid., pp.

158-160.

He writes.
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Probably the most interesting revelation is
the predominant influence of the President’s
personality upon the conduct of foreign rela
tions.
The difficulty of a democratic legisla
tive body in divesting itself of partisan
politics in dealing Kith international questions
is also apparent.
The intensification of
bitterness over a comparatively unimportant
issue as a result of constant stimulation of
differences might have brought the two nations
into conflict.
The slowness of communications,
which gave public opinion an opportunity to
forget the differences, the influence of a group
of conservative advisers, and the existence of
other international issues of more consequence
combined to act as successful preservers of
the p e a c e , 2 5
Nowhere in the above quotation is there any reference to a
new spirit of ’’national aggressiveness.”

In essence, then,

in spite of some dramatization, McLemore reaffirms the
findings of Peck, Bassett, White, and Van Deusen.

M c Le mo re 1s

claim that the spoliation crisis stirred up a national
sentiment antagonistic toward France and favorable to war
appears to be an overstatement,
Since the appearance of McLemore*s study, historians
have interpreted the claims controversy as a typical example
of J a c k so n’s presidential leadership and have emphasized
the partisan reactions to his 1834 speech.

In his biography

of Adams, Samuel F, Bemis notes the contrast between the
presidency of the experienced diplomat from,Massachusetts
and that of the venerable general from Tennessee.

25ibid., p. 211,

Adams
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was unwilling to resort to forcible measures to persuade
the French to negotiate.

Because of general public

apathy, Bemis writes, Adams "had not wished to risk a
rupture with a friendly nation over what seemed to so
many people such a small matter, of private concern
rather than paramount public interest,"

Jackson, however,

"had the ability to arouse the p e o p l e ’s patriotism and
put them solidly behind him and the nation,"2^
Reviewing the aftermath of the 1834 message, Bemis
maintains that Jackson indeed had broad popular support.
Although he relies on McLemore for background, Bemis uses
extensive manuscript material to support this view.

Noting

the Whig opposition to the fortification bill, he concludes
that "public reaction to the debate in the House of Repre
sentatives made it clear that the people were behind the
President,"

Jackson's ultimate victory in the claims

controversy "made the Whig Senate look sick,"27

And yet,

Bemis never claims that Jackson's management of the affair
aroused a new spirit of national militancy.
In a study of the Jacksonian Era, Van Deusen admits
that there was a good deal of excitement created by Jack
s o n ’s diplomacy, but he again places the entire public

2^Samuel F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union
(New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1 9 5 6 ) , p p . 306-307.
27Ibid., pp,

320-322.
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sentiment toward the issue within the spectrum of American
partisan politics.

"The merits of the French debt c o n 

troversy can be endlessly debated, and to little effect."
Van Deusen w r i t e s i
Jackson had used threatening language in an
effort to obtain satisfaction of a just claim.
This was "big-stick" diplomacy.
The Whigs
paraded themselves in all the panoplies of
moderation,
Both sides angled for political
advantage, and each sought, with some reason,
to blame the other for the loss of the fort
ification bill,28
The impact of Jackson's 1834 message upon American
opinion of France, then, remains unclear.

McLemore

suggests that the militant speech stirred a "national
sentiment of aggressiveness" absent since the War of
1812, but he fails to provide evidence to support this
claim.

As a result, the emphasis given especially by

Van Deusen and White to the partisan reaction toward the
message is more convincing.

Still, it cannot be doubted

that the claims issue contributed to a growing estrange
ment between Paris and Washington,

And although Peck's

prejudice against Jackson led him to emphasize his role
in the claims dispute, it is also clear that much of
the impetus behind the controversy originated with
"Old Hickory,"

The difficulty of explaining the effect

of the spoliation issue on American opinion of France

1848

28Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 1828(Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 102-103.
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is perhaps why Henry Blumenthal, in his survey of FrancoAmerican relations, avoids entangling himself within
the domestic politics of the thirties,

Blumenthal merely

concludes that the claims controversy is only one e x 
ample among many showing that relations between France
and the United States during the thirties were not as
amicable as has usually been assumed.29
Despite the ambiguity of much of the historiography
of the claims dispute, the authors under discussion
provide support for Albert Weinberg's interpretation
that the thirties were a time of internal building before
the expansionism of the “Roaring 'forties,”

“The speeches

of Jackson as president»“ Weinberg writes, “exude the
complacency and sense of self-sufficiency of this decade.
Especially noteworthy is his confident observation c o n 
cerning an issue always highly determinative of the
attitude toward expansion;

'You have no longer any cause

to fear danger from abroad,*” 30

Perhaps this is what

McLemore intended when he referred to a renewed "national
sentiment of aggressiveness.”

Be that as it may, the

claims dispute, in spite of Jackson's belligerency, was
settled in 1836, thereby removing the one most outstand
ing issue in Franco-American relations.

^ B l u m e n t h a l , A Reappraisal, p. 45.
xn

Weinberg, Manifest Dest i ny , p. 108.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN CONTINENTAL EXPANSION AND FRANCE

On the surface, the much'■delayed settlement of the
claims dispute in 1836 removed one obstacle to better
relations between France and the United States.

During

the next few years, the two countries pursued their own
goals without interference or objectiono

Striking

examples of this apparent easing in Franco-American
relations are to be seen in the lack of reactions to
the French military interventions in Mexico in 1838 and
in the La Plata region of South American in 1839.
Both the ’’Pastry Wa r ” and the La Plata venture were clear
violations of the Monroe Doctrine, but the United States
voiced no protests.

Explanations of this unusual A m e r 

ican indifference towards European interference in the
Western Hemisphere are vague, but there is little doubt
that American claims against Mexico, popular sympathy
for the Texan revolution, and the general timidity of
the Van Buren administration were important factors,^

iFor a review of the "Pastry War,” see Hubert Howe
Bancroft, History of M e x i c o . Vol. V (San Francisco: The
History Co., 1887), p p , 186-205; William Spence Robertson,
"French Intervention in Mexico in 1838," Hispanic American
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But rather than providing time for reconciliation,
the years after the settlement of the claims dispute
were characterized more by the development of anxiety
and suspicion.

The United States, ending a period of

consolidation, was approaching an era of new growth.
To the West lay the undeveloped but tantalizing Pacific
coast and the sparsely settled Mexican province of
California.

To the Southwest, American immigrants

had already freed their adopted Texas from Mexican rule
and established the Lone Star Republic.

Towards all of

this, the French government of Louis Philippe reacted
nervously.

Once underway, would there be any limit to

American expansion?

Paris was the first major power

to recognize Texan independence; after 1840, Louis
Philippe’s new Foreign Minister, Francois Guizot, began
to look for other means to protect French interests in
the New World from the anticipated expansion of the
American republic,
French apprehensions materialized quickly.

Seeking

Historical R e v i e w . XXIV (1944), pp. 222-252.
Regarding
the La Plata episode see John F. Cady, Foreign Interven
tion in the Rio de La P l a t a . 1838-1850 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929), pp. 24-25,
182-188,
For explanations of American policy, or the
lack of policy, toward these intrusions, see White,
American Opinion of France, pp. Ill, 114-115; Dexter
Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine. 1826-186 7 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 42-45, 63; and Cady,
Intervention in the La P l at a. p. 268,
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to redeem his discredited administration with a spectacular
success, President John Tyler endorsed the annexation of
Texas in his annual message to Congress on December 3,
1844.

During the presidential campaign of 1844 the

Texas issue had gained momentum, and in February of the
new year a joint resolution offering annexation passed
Congress.

Prompted by his Secretary of State, John C.

Calhoun, Tyler decided to initiate the proceedings for
annexation.

On the eve of the inauguration of the Dem o

crat James K» Polk, he dispatched Andrew J, DoneIson to
Texas to offer annexation,^"

It soon became apparent that

Polk would accept T y l e r ’s plan, and on July 4, 1845, the
Texas Congress voted overwhelmingly to enter the Union,
During the previous two years, Guizot had cooperated with
Great Britain in various efforts to insure Texas indepen
dence.

Now, with annexation certain, and with American

troops on the contested border of the Rio Grande, war
between Mexico and the United States seemed imminent.

The

results of such a war foreboded ill not only for Mexico,
but for France and Great Britain as well--California would
certainly be at stake,

^Senate Ex. Doc, (449), 28th Cong,, 2nd Sess., No, 1,
pp. 1-18.
See also Charles Sellers, James K, P o l k : Continent a l is t. 1843-1846 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966), pp. 50-60,
^Congressional Gl o b e , Vol. XIV, 28th Cong,, 2nd Sess,, pp. 322-363,
^Sellers,

P o l k , pp.

215-216.
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Guizot's involvement in Texas had aroused accusations
of French intrigue from the ardent American expansionists.
Apprehensive lest France find herself at odds with the
United States, Guizot's domestic opposition questioned
the wisdom of his policy.

In reply, the French minister

addressed the Chamber of Deputies in June, defending his
attempts to prevent the annexation of Texas and defining
France's broad interest in the New World in the face of
growing American dominance,

France, Guizot declared,

had a lasting interest in the maintenance of
independent states in America, and in the balance
of forces which exists in that part of the
world,
There are in American three powers,
The United States, England, and the states of
Spanish origin. . , .What is the interest of
France?
It is that the independent states
remain independent, that the balance of forces
between the great masses which divide America
continue, that no one of them become exclusively
preponderant, , , .France. . .ought to protect
by the authority of its name the independence
of states and the maintenance of the balance
of the great political forces in America.^
Guizot's declaration created much excitement in the United
States and became a factor in the framing of Polk's annual
message to Congress in December of

1845

.^

In a private conversation with George Bancroft at about
the time of his inauguration, Polk had divulged his commit
ment to '"the acquisition of California and a larger district

^Quoted in Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp.
& I bi d. , pp.

73-74.

71-72.

on the coast,”

According to Polkas most recent biographer,

"only later would it become clear that he had resolved from
the first to unroll the nation's territory far up and down
the Western shore of North America."^

Between his inaugura

tion and the writing of the annual message, Polk had been
warned of possible French and British designs on California,
This, coupled with Guizot's June speech, may have influenced
the President to dedicate much of his December message to
the danger of European involvement in the New World, and
especially in North America.

Alluding to Guizot's speech,

Polk warned that the extension of American settlements to
previously unoccupied territories, "the expansion of
free principles, and our rising greatness as a nation, are
attracting the attention of the powers of Europe, and lately
the doctrine has been broached in some of them of a 'balance
of power' on this continent to check our advancement."

Al

though desirous of preserving good relations with all
nations, Polk continued, the United States "can not in
silence permit any European interference on the North
American continent, and should any such interference be
attempted will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards,"
Since "the American system of government is entirely dif
ferent from that of Europe," the Old World principle of a

^Sellers, Po l k , p. 213.
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’’balance of power can not be permitted to have any applica
tion on the North American continent, and especially to
the United States.”

Concluding, Polk lauded Monroe's 1823

definition of the principle of two spheres, and added that
"the reassertion of this principle, especially in reference
to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a
policy which no European power should cherish the disposition
O
to resist.”
The Guizot-Polk exchange is a central point in the
historiography of Franco'•American diplomatic relations.
Occurring during the most critical year of American con
tinental expansion, the two speeches have been interpreted
by one group of historians as representing an irrepressible
dichotomy between the Old and New Worlds.

Hence, when

Guizot declared that it was in the interest of France to
preserve ’’the balance of forces” that existed in the
Western Hemisphere, historians of this inclination have
generally asserted that the security and natural rights of
the United States were directly threatened.

They view P o l k ’s

annual message, then, as essentially defensive in nature:
if the United States had not acted to prevent European
intervention in North America', Texas, California, and Oregon
could have fallen under the sway of the absolutist,

8James D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the
Presidents (Washington, 1890). Vol. IV, pp. 398-399.
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reactionary governments of France and England.

In his land

mark study of the Monroe Doctrine, Dexter Perkins expands
this interpretation by suggesting that a "clash of systems,"
implicit in Monroe's 1823 declaration, existed beneath the
surface of the relations of the United States with Europe,
and the turmoil of American expansion only brought it to
the fore.

Perkins isolates the Guizot and Polk statements

of 1845 as the best examples of this ideologically inspired
split.®

Significantly, both Perkins and this first group

of historians depend heavily upon the accusations of A m e r 
ican expansionists,

including Polk, for evidence that

France did indeed present a threat to the security of
American democratic principles,

And yet, Perkins helped

to revise this viewpoint by noting the partisan background
of Polk's speech.

Since he wrote, historians have generally

challenged his dependence upon the rhetoric of American
expansionism.

The frantic alarm over European "machinations"--

be they French or British--has been placed within the context
of partisan politics and sectionalism.

As a result,

recent

historians have tended to conclude that any fear of overt
French intervention in the New World was chimerical,

and

that published forebodings were largely propaganda intended
for domestic consumption.

®Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp.

70-96.

The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to review
the historiography of Franco^American relations with
respect to American continental expansion, examining in
detail the above trends.

Gn the basis of this review,

an attempt will be made in the conclusion to answer the
following questions:

(I) Can it be said that French i n 

volvement in the affairs of North America

presented a

challenge to the United States and as a result provided
much of the impetus behind American continental expansion?
(2) What significance did the Guizot-Polk exchange have
within the context of Franco-American relations?

(3) What

impact did the realization of Polk's continental vision
have upon Franco-American relations?

Because of the c o m 

plexity of the topic, this writer will examine first the
role of Texas in Franco-American relations, culminating
with Guizot's speech, and second, the California issue,
leading to Polk's message.

Finally, this writer will

review the historiography of Franco-American relations
during the year 1846, concentrating on the issues of Oregon,
the Mexican War, and European intervention in the La Plata
region of South America,
The impact of the Texas issue upon Franco-American
relations was first noted by three early twentieth-century
historians, whose works are still used today.

In 1907,

Jesse S. Reeves published an analysis of the diplomacy
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practiced by Tyler and Polk; three years later, Ephraim D.
Adams brought forth his influential work on Great Britain's
interests and efforts in the Lone Star Republic; and finally,
Justin H. Smith's history of the annexation of Texas
appeared in 1911.

Taken together, the three almost

concurrent works form a nearly complete review of FrancoAmerican relations regarding the Texas question.10
Dealing with American policy towards Texas, Reeves
isolates the role of Calhoun as Secretary of State during
the last year of Tyler's presidency.

While in the State

Department, Calhoun often voiced a fear that Texas, in
pursuing a policy of independence, would fall under the
sway of a country hostile to the interests of the United
States.

Reeves asserts that the South Carolinian's appre

hensions were not unwarranted,

Because the Van Buren

administration refused to accept the Texas offer of
annexation in 1837, the leaders of the infant republic turned
elsewhere for security against a still belligerent Mexico,

11

Upon the election of Mirabeau Bonaparte Lamar to the pres i
dency of Texas in 1838, the United States was duly warned,

lOSee James S, Reeves, American Diplomacy Under Tyler
and Polk (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1907);
Ephraim Douglass Adams, British Interests and Activities in
T e x a s . 1838-1846 (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1910);
Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York: Barnes
and Noble Reprint, 1941; first published in 1911),
llReeves, Diplomacy Under Tyler and P o l k , p. 84.
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Reeves writes, that if Texas were denied American p r ot ec 
tion, "she would turn for aid to the powers of Europe,
notably to France and England, who.

. .would be glad to

avail themselves of the great advantage which a generous
commercial treaty would give,

them,"12

According to

Reeves, this consideration later spurred Calhoun to assail
the "designs" of France and Britain in Texas.

Although

the Secretary was confident that the people of Texas still
desired annexation, he "feared that there might be a r e 
vulsion of feeling.
treaty,

, .on account of the rejection of the

and that this might be played upon by those who

were unfriendly to the United S t a t e s , I t

is clear,

then, that Calhoun believed Texas annexation to be necessary
to the security of the United States.

He viewed Mexico's

policy of stalling annexation by a threat of war as an
attempt '"to drive Texas into political connections with
some other power less congenial to her feelings and favor
able to her independence, and more threatening to her and
our permanent welfare and safet y, *"1^
But Calhoun believed that Great Britain and not France
posed the greatest threat to American security in T e x a s „

•^ Ibido t p, 87,
iS lbid., p. 166.
14 lbid., pp, 169-170,
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In his explanation of the different policies pursued by
Calhoun toward the two European powers most concerned
with Texas, Reeves makes his most important contribution
to the historiography of Franco-American relations.

In

1843, the French Chambers had voted to refrain from
participating with Great Britain in outlawing slavery.

In

spite of Guizot's amiable feeling toward Lord Aberdeen,
the British Foreign Secretary, the rejection of the p r o 
posed treaty by the Chambers signified a lingering French
animosity towards Great Britain,15

When in 1844 the rumor

reached Calhoun that France was considering joint action
with London to prevent the annexation of Texas by the
United States, the Secretary's response was dictated by
his adamant views on slavery.

Consequently, Reeves writes,

Calhoun "dwelt upon the dissimilarity of interest between
France and Great Britain,

The latter had political, the

former merely commercial motives in treating for Texas
independence."

Unfortunately, Reeves neglects to explain

why the contemplated Anglo-French joint intervention in
Texas never materialized.

Instead of pursuing his analysis

of Calhoun's policy towards France and attempting to
interpret its relation to traditional Franco-American
friendship, the author is content to deride his deceitful
diplomacy.

He writes;

l^Ibid .t pp. 34-36,

It is hard to comprehend that such a position
was ever assumed by any American Secretary of
State,
Had Calhoun stated, , .that Great Britain
and France must keep hands off Texas, he would
have remained on safe ground.
He could not,
however, say this as long as the United States
had determined not to permit Texas to remain
independent.
To draw France away from England
upon the Texas question was obviously n e c e s s a r y .
In part, R e e ve s’s reluctance to examine French policy
towards joint intervention with England in Texas can be
explained by a lack of documentary evidence.

In 1910,

three years after Reeves published, the archives of the
British Foreign Office and the Admirality were opened.
E.D. Adams demonstrates that these are indeed vital to an
understanding of French attitudes towards the Texas question<,
Adams makes two basic points regarding the policies of
London and Paris in Texas,

In the first place, he denies

that slavery played any role in the British involvement in
Texas.

And in the second place, he asserts that the British

were responsible for the failure of joint Anglo-French
intervention.

Because Calhoun so feared British aims in

Texas, these viewpoints are of special note to FrancoAmerican relations.

Adams intimates that since Britain was

unwilling to resort to forcible intervention in Texas, any
apprehensions of a similar French threat were illusory.
To dispel the notion that a conspiracy to abolish slavery
was behind the British efforts in Texas, Adams examines closely

1 6 I b i d , , pp.

173-174,
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its principal source.

Duff Green, an unofficial American

representative in Europe dedicated to the annexation of
Texas, first warned of the ulterior motives of Britain
in Texas,

In contrast to G re e n ’s forebodings, Adams

reviews the dispatches of Edward Everett, the American
Minister to the Court of St, James.

Writing to Secretary

of State Abel P. Upshur in November of 1843, Everett
asserted that "'the subject of domestic slavery was never
so much as mentioned or alluded to by the British minister
to the government of Texas except to disclaim in most
emphatic terms any intention on the part of England to
interfere with it there.'"

Although Britain might be forced

to appease her own abolitionists, Everett concluded, she
" ’had no idea of going on a crusade with them to abolish
slavery in Texas or anywhere else."

Regrettably, U p s h u r ’s

successor, Calhoun, chose to ignore Everett's dispatch and
to accept Green's warning as valid.17
Because London's interest in Texas was basically
commercial, not political, Aberdeen never seriously con 
sidered resorting to force to impede the annexation of
Texas.

According to Adams, Aberdeen "probably never dreamed

that the United States would venture to annex Texas in the
face of vigorous objections from England and France."1 ^

17Adams, British Interests and Activities in Tex as , p, 144,
18 Ibid., p. 159.
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Confident that the Americans would be intimidated by a
united Anglo-French diplomatic front guaranteeing the
independence of Texas, Aberdeen proceeded to enlist the
French behind his "Diplomatic Act."

The British minister

at Paris reported that ” ’M, Guizot was of opinion that it
was of importance that the designs of the Government of
the United States with regard to Texas, should be p r e 
vented.
Britain’s withdrawal from the plan, Adams states,
frustrated Guizot’s desire to forestall American expansion
to the Rio Grande.

The turning point came in the summer

of 1844, when the British ambassador at Washington,

Sir

Richard Pakenham, warned Aberdeen of the danger to European
intervention in Texas,

Pakenh a m’s "portrayal of the

strength and depth of American feeling," Adams writes,
was a revelation to Aberdeen, and was extremely
disconcerting.
In his plan for a joint action
with France, he had made but meager allowance
for United States opposition, and he had b e 
lieved that if accepted by Mexico and Texas it
would effectively and peacefully prevent
American annexation,20
Aberdeen had been assured of "French compliance and cordiality
when joint action was first proposed,

[and] he had no reason

to think that France would not act heartily with England."
But even French cooperation, Adams notes, "would not insure

19Quoted in i b i d , , p.
2 0 i b i d . , p.

180.

160.
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a successful termination of the negotiation under such
circumstances as Pakenham states."

Thus, Aberdeen realized

his plan was destined to fail, and he gracefully allowed
France to withdraw from the "Diplomatic Act,"2!
So far, it has been shown that much of Calhoun's fear
of Anglo-French intervention in Texas was unwarranted.
Although Reeves notes that Calhoun's commitment to slavery
as an institution led the Secretary to discriminate between
the British and French involvements in Texas, he fails to
determine what interest the French government had in that
youthful republic.

Adams intimates that France might have

intervened in Texas if Aberdeen had not retreated upon
receipt of Pakenham's dispatch; but his work also contains
no outline of French policy towards Texas.

Through exten

sive research into French source material--both private
and governmental--Justin Smith was able to construct a
summary of French Texan diplomacy.
In Smith's view, a prime motive behind French efforts
in Texas was the limitation of the expansion of the United
States.

Because of his devotion to monarchy, Smith writes,

Louis Philippe "could not look with favor upon the develop
ment of a powerful republic,"

Furthermore, the July M o n 

archy was sympathetic towards London, for the British had
been the first to recognize the government of Louis Philippe,

21I b i d . , pp.

180-181.
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and since the two countries had similar interests in Texas,
they "would naturally be drawn together by joint action
regarding i t . " ^
French policy in Texas, Smith tells us, was further
prompted by a keen desire to forestall American dominance
in Latin America.

Louis Philippe regarded France as the

guardian of Spanish America, and especially Mexico.
this reason,

For

Smith writes, the French monarch "was alive

to the danger that our neighbor on the South [Mexico] might
suffer from American encroachments."

Also, it was to Paris

"a point of pride to save a power which his majesty had
acknowledged as independent from being swallowed up by
annexation.
Unlike Adams, Smith claims that it was France which
first indicated a reluctance to intervene in Texas.
According to Smith, the diplomacy of the Guizot ministry
so irritated the French public that the minister was forced
to abandon the "Diplomatic Act,"
detente with Aberdeen,

In spite of Guizo t’s

Anglo-French relations were still

plagued by such questions as the future of Algeria and
Morocco, and the memory of recent troubles in Egypt.

As

a result, most Frenchmen harbored an unmitigated resentment
of the British.

Furthermore, because London’s deeper

involvement in Texas, as well as her superior power in the

22smith, Annexation of T e x a s , p. 385.

2^Ibid.t p . 286.
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New World, required France to submit to the British lead
in any joint effort, Guizot's government was accused of
’'truckling" to the English,

Hence, when Guizot's adherence

to the "Diplomatic Act" came into the public view, Smith
writes, "the outcry against it was furious."

In the Chamber

of Deputies Duizot's diplomacy was denounced as "undignified
intrigue," and Guizot was accused of betraying the United
States.

"It was entirely wrong, said many, to turn against

an ancient and valuable customer without the strongest of
,.24
reasons."
In his assessment of the failure of joint intervention,
Smith credits French public opinion with forcing Guizot to
reconsider.

Never would the French people be willing to

risk war with the Americans, Smith reasons.

But as evidence

of an American determination to resort to war to defeat any
European attempt to guarantee Texas independence, Smith
notes only the vehement outcries of Calhoun, Green, and
other advocates of annexation.

His assumption that Calhoun

and Green echoed the sentiments of the American people
permits Smith to conclude the following:

24

I b i d , , pp.

397-398.
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In short then, it appears that_Great Britain was
so anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas
that she stood ready, if supported by France,
to coerce Mexico and fight the United States;
that the French government were at first no less
willing than England to agree upon decisive
measures; that the determination of the American
people to resent vigorously such dictation--a
course sure to arouse the many Frenchmen who
were against the British, against the King, and
against Guizot*.caused that power to fall back;
that in consequence England wavered and then
withdrew; and that all this grand effort at
international concert resulted only in a sort
of conspiracy to divert the people of Texas
from the destiny actually preferred by the
m a j o r i t y ,25
More so than Reeves, who seems to avoid the matter,

Smith

sees a crisis in Franco-American relations with regard to
Texas--a crisis precipitated by the unpopular diplomacy of
the Paris government.

It was only when the prospect became

clear that France, in union, with England, risked war with
the United States that Guizot retreated.

Smith notes that

a "decisive element in the affair was the readiness of a
large number of Americans to plunge into a war for which
the nation was wholly unprepared."

He does not mention,

however, that this willingness for war was most prevalent
among dedicated American expansionists.

He does not give

consideration to the possibility that the American outcry
against the "Diplomatic Act" was more partisan politics
than responsible leadership, except to note that "after

2 5 I b i d , , p.

413.
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these diplomatic events had been taking place for months,
it was loudly asserted by opponents of T y l e r ’s administra
tion, not only that England had no schemes afoot with re f 
erence to Texas, but that every idea of a European concert
against annexation was transparent m oonshine."2^
this is a vital exception.

True,

But it simply is insufficient

to counter what has gone before.
A third interpretation of the failure of the AngloFrench effort at joint mediation appeared in 1913.

Writing

on Mexican diplomacy on the eve of war with the United
States, George L. Rives suggests that Britain doubted the
willingness of France to act forcibly against its former
ally.

Although he agrees with Smith that American expan

sion affronted Paris, Rives points out that even the French
ministry distrusted the British and was hesitant to offend
the United States.
Rives writes,

Because Guizot was a Protestant bourgeois,

"he profoundly distrusted the people, and he

never comprehended the strength or sincerity of their demands.
He practiced, therefore, with the cordial consent of the
King, a policy of timid conservatism, of which continued
peace and material prosperity were to be the fruits."27
With such an attitude, Rives concludes, although Guizot did
what was possible to strengthen ties with London, "there was

26Ibid., p. 413.
2 7Qeorge L. Rives, "Mexican Diplomacy on Eve of War
with United States," American Historical Revi ew , XVIII
(January, 1913), pp. 267-277.
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a point beyond which the French government would not have
to go in support of Great Britain,"

?8

In spite of their many dissimilarities, Reeves, Adams,
Smith, and Rives agree on one point--namely, that by the
summer of 1844 the "Diplomatic Act" had been severely
weakened and could present little real threat to the United
States.

Both London and Paris had reason to avoid confront

ing the United States over Texas,

Smith provides an

obvious explanation for Gu iz o t ’s refusal to intervene
actively in Texas--the French populace was squarely opposed
to any gesture offensive to the United States--but he still
sanctions the alarm sounded by many Americans over the rumor
of Anglo-French intervention in Texas.

Reeves, Adams, and

Rives also fail to examine the motives behind the vehement
American denunciation of European involvement in Texas.
More recent historians of the Lone Star Republic, as well
as students of American continental expansion, have asserted
that not only was any fear of European intervention in Texas
artificially stimulated by a shrewd Texas diplomacy, but
also that the rhetoric surrounding the annexation of Texas
was highly partisan and designed for domestic consumption.
In 1904, and with access only to printed sources,
George P. Garrison noted the Texas reaction to the refusal

2 8 i b i d . , p.

285„
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of the United States to accept its offer of annexation.
"If the mother"Country of Texas would not cultivate
sufficiently cordial relations with her runaway children,"
Garrison writes, the young republic would be forced to
appeal to France and England.

The Texas ambassador to the

United States warned Secretary of State John Forsyth that
"delay might be fatal to annexation, for Texas was estab
lishing relations with foreign powers that might develop
insurmountable obstacles" to that project.

Unfortunately,

Garrison concludes, the Van Buren administration at first
postponed, then dropped a n n e x a t i o n , ^
To be sure, Van BurenJs rejection of the Texas invita
tion was predicated upon an accurate judgment of domestic
politics; but the delay of annexation only made Texas
leaders more determined to insure i n d e p e n d e n c e . ^
eighteen-forties, Texas diplomacy had succeeded.

By the
Sam

Houston and Anson Jones provided the impetus behind the
effort to protect Texas through the recognition and mediation
of France and England,

That they had good reason to turn

to Europe is clear; that both realized the impact their

^ G e o r g e p. Garrison, "The First Stage of the Movement
for the Annexation of Texas," American Historical R e v i e w , X
(October, 1904), pp. 78-89.
"^See ib i d . . pp. 80-81; also Ethel Zivley Rather, "The
Recognition of the Republic of Texas by the United States,"
The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Associaton. VIII
(April, 1910), pp. 155-256.
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diplomacy would have on tke American government is also
clear.

According to Thomas M, Marshall, Houston realized

that the Tyler administration would be sensitive to rumors
that Texas had close ties with Europe.

Hence, when Texas

dependence upon Europe was "made known to Tyler, as Houston
probably intended," Tyler became even more adamant in his
•Z1
devotion to annexation.
St. George Leakin Sioussat also suggests that the
Tyler administration capitalized upon rumors of French and
British involvement in Texas to further annexation.

Writing

on Calhoun's tenure as Secretary of State, Sioussat notes
that the American minister at Paris, William Rufus King, had
informed the Secretary that France had no intention of
forcibly intervening in Texas.

In reply to allegations that

France was siding with England in opposition to annexation,
King further reported to Calhoun that "'Mr, Guizot at once
reassured me that no such step

. . .had been taken:

that on

this subject France had acted for herself and in connection
with no other power,*"

But, according to Sioussat, Calhoun

was better informed than his representative in France and
could not be mollified.

Although he approved of King's

distinction between the interests of France and those of
England in Texas, Calhoun set out to defeat the intrigues

^ T h o m a s Maitland Marshall, "Diplomatic Relations of
Texas and the United States, 1839-1843," ibid., XV (April,
1912), p. 290.
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of. Paris- and London through annexation,
Sioussat’s research into the King-Calhoun correspon
dence broke new ground, but in justifying Calhoun’s denial
of the mi n i s t e r ’s reassurances, he demonstrates his accep
tance of the polemics of annexation.

In contrast to

Sioussat, Mary Katherine Chase views the American accusation
of French and British ’’machinations” in Texas as unfounded.
According to Chase, European interest in Texas was
innocuous and based solely upon the professed desire of the
Texans for independence.

Perhaps a little sentimental

towards the Lone Star Republic, Chase maintains that Te x a s ,
deeply wounded by the refusal of the United States to accept
its proposal of annexation, was rescued by her friends in
Europe.

Chase scorns what she calls the "pretendues

’menees europeens’ au Texas,”

so vehemently denounced in

the United States, and is one of the first to recognize
the partisanship of these accusations, , She writes:
.
,^1’interet que certain des gouvernements
europeens commencaient a prendre au sort du
Texas, ou ils^envoyerent des agents pour les
representer reguliejement, ne tarderent pas
a faire croire aux Etats-Unis mille bruits sur
les intentions de ces gouvernements amis et de
fair coire, a la facile jalousie du peuple
^
Americain, q u ’il existait des intrigues europeens,
et surtout britanniques, au Texas.
Ces sentiments

32St. George Leak,in Sioussat, ’’John Caldwell Calhoun,"
in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy,
edo by Samuel F, Bemis, Vol. V (New York: Alfred A, Knopf,
1928), pp. 169-170.
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de defiance et de soupcon furent habilement exploites
par les orateurs politiques--pour des raisons
souvent personnelles, IIs acquirent enfin une
telle importance que, si l'on devait lire l'histoire
des relations entre 1 'Europe et Texas dans les
pamphlets et les journaux de l ’epoque on n'y
trouverait gu'un tissu de mensonges et de rancunes
politiques.33
Lest the United States take offense, Chase notes, Britain
and France were at first circumspect and required that Texas
prove itself a viable nation,
Chase stresses two points which were instrumental in
revising the historiography of France-American relations
with respect to Texas.

In the first place, she asserts

that neither France nor England intended to offend the
United States in their dealings with Texas,

They simply

believed that Texas desired independence and should be
allowed to determine its own destiny.

In the second place,

she concludes that warnings of European intrigues in Texas

33Mary Katherine Chase, Negociations de la Republiaue
du Texas en E ur o n e . 1837-1845 (Paris: Libraire Ancienne
Honore Champion, 1932}, pp. 110-112,
I have translated
Chase as follows:
, . ,the interest certain European governments began
to take in the fate of Texas, where they sent agents
to regularly represent them, was not long in causing
widespread speculation in the United States as to
the intentions of these friendly governments, and in
leading to the belief of the easily jealous American
people, that European intrigues, especially British,
existed in Texas,
These feelings of mistrust and
suspicion were skillfully exploited by political orators--often for personal reasons.
They acquired such
an importance that finally, if one must read the h i s 
tory of the relations between Europe and Texas from
the pamphlets and newspapers of the period, one will
find only a pack of lies and political spite.

were expansionist propaganda,

Unfortunately, Chase provides

sufficient evidence to support only her first assertion.

If

expanding upon Sioussat*s findings, she had shown that Cal 
houn, Tyler, and the other advocates of annexation had
information revealing the basically honorable intentions of
France and Britain and neglected or rejected it, then her
second point would have been strengthened.

It is simply

not justified to claim that partisan politics and expan
sionist emotion created an artificial crisis in FrancoAmerican relations without extensive documentation.
In his thoughtful study of "Manifest Destiny," Albert K
Weinberg supports the view that the proponents of the
annexation of Texas raised the spectre of European intrigue
to further their cause.

In the eyes of the dedicated

American expansionists, Weinberg asserts, European involve
ment in Texas, as elsewhere in North America, "appeared"
to threaten the United States.

He writes:

British and French attempts to establish sovereignty
or political influence in adjacent countries
appeared to threaten not merely economic and
strategic interests but also the security of
democracy.
The expansionism of the *forties
arose as a defensive effort to forestall the
encroachment of Europe in North America. . . .
As one can see in the most numerous utterances,
the conception of an "extension of the area of
freedom" became general as an ideal of p r e 
venting absolutistic Europe from lessening
the area open to American democracy.34

34Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, p. 109,
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In a 1941 article, R»A, McLemore offers further proof
that France and England only "appeared" to endanger A m e r 
ican interests in Texas,

Drawing heavily from the archives

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, as well as
from Smith, Adams, and Chase, M cL em or e’s brief article is
a synopsis of French policy in Texas.

He asserts that

France gave little reason for the United States to resent
her involvement in Texas.

"In the end," he writes, French

"policy weakened the British program of opposition and
thus made the final consumation of annexation less di f 
ficult."

Throughout the entire affair, from 1837 to 1845,

"the French leaders were careful not to take any action
that would alienate the friendship of the United States.
The desire to avoid offending the United States, McLemore
claims, was coupled with the hope of the Guizot ministry
that Texas independence would be preserved.
Smith when he writes that "Guizot found.

McLemore echoes

, .there were

certain political and commercial considerations which
would not permit France to view such a move with indifference."
Included in these considerations were

•^Richard A. McLemore, "The Influence of French
Diplomatic Policy on the Annexation of Texas," Southwestern
Historical Quarterly, XLIII (January, 1940), p. 347.

the possible consequences to Mexico, the Spanish
race and the Catholic religion in America.
The
annexation of Texas, Guizot declared, would lead
directly to the conquest of Mexico,
This would
place the United States in such a position of
predominance that it would cause alarm in Europe.
The commercial considerations of most impor
tance. . .were first the hope that Texas would
offer a profitable market. . .and second the
expectation that French shipping would find the
direct trade with Texas profitable.
Guizot also
expressed the belief that French prestige would
suffer by annexation since France had been the
first European state to recognize the independence
of T e x a s .
The French attitude towards Texas, then, was ambivalent.
Consequently, France could present no real threat to
American interests in Texas, and suspicions to that
effect were unwarranted,
McLemore*s article is a watershed in the historiography
of the role of Texas in Franco-American relations.

During

the past thirty years, historians have increasingly stressed
both the influence of Texas diplomacy upon American attitudes
toward the French presence in Texas and the enervating
ambivalence of French policy and sentiments towards A m e r 
ican expansion.
In 1941, Joseph William Schmitz published the first
detailed examination of the various aspects of Texan
diplomacy.

Paraphrasing Memucan Hunt, the Texas minister

to the United States during most of the Van Buren adminis
tration, Schmitz analyzes the unfavorable situation in

36lbid., p . 342.
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Washington concerning annexation:
. . .he [Hunt] wrote that most of the important
political men including Van Buren were eager for
annexation; for the past twelve years had it not
been the settled and uniform policy of the United
States to acquire Texas?
Yet they would not act
hampered as they were "by their party trammels
on the one hand, and their treaty obligations
with Mexico on the other, by the furious opposition
of all the free states, by the fear of incurring
the charge of false dealings and injustice, and
of involving this country in a war . "37
It was with Hunt's views in mind, Schmitz asserts,

that

Texans fashioned their diplomacy to provide insurance in
the event that annexation continued unfulfilled.
annexation was not regarded as a cure-all,

But

for the Texan

government feared that war with Mexico would result.

In

essence, then, Schmitz interprets Texas diplomacy as twosided:

on the one hand, the leadership sought to satisfy

the popular desire for annexation; and on the other,

it

hoped to provide an opportunity for European mediation to
settle the dispute with M e x i c o . ^
In a 1948 biography of Anson Jones, A Texas diplomat
and politician whose career spanned the entire life of the
Lone Star Republic, Herbert Gambrell makes the more positive
claim that the Texan leadership hoped to stimulate American

•^Joseph William Schmitz, Texan Statecraft, 1836184 5 (San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1941), p . 58\
3 8 I b i d ., pp.

176,
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alarm over European intrigues so that the United States
would offer annexation.

After the failure of the first

attempt to bring Texas into the Union, Jones knew, Gambrell writes, "that annexation would be impossible unless
American sentiment c h a n g e d , H o u s t o n

appointed Jones

Secretary of State in 1842, whereupon the effort to change
the American attitude intensified.

Intending to stir

Washington into action, Jones instructed his representa
tive there to intimate "that Texas was seeking connections
with Europe."4®

Calhoun and Tyler responded quickly, but

the debate on annexation was renewed in 1844, and Jones
saw the need for further "hints" of Anglo-French designs
in Texas.

Gambrell writes;

"What the United States

needed, Dr, Jones thought, was

'another scare.

two doses of English calomel and French quinine.

One or
. .and

the case will be pretty well out of danger.'"4 ^
Stanley Siegel capped the historiography of the shrewd
Texan diplomacy in 1956,

Siegel's study is primarily a

political history of Texas, going beyond Gambrell to include
such figures as Lamar, Austin, and Houston.

Nevertheless,

^ H e r b e r t Gambrell, Anson J o n e s ; The Last President of
Texas (Garden City; Doubleday and Co., 1948), p. 156,
40Ibid,, p. 276.
4^-Ibid. , p. 327.

Author's italics.
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Siegel does reaffirm what Gambrell has written about the
goals of Texan diplomacy,

"The Executive’s entire policy

in the annexation proceedings," Siegel claims, "was based
on the idea of prompting the United States to accept
annexation by making the most of English friendship."42'
But not only was English involvement to be emphasized,
for due to the Anglo-French "Diplomatic Act" a British
threat to the United States meant a French threat as well.
Paris had recognized Texas in 1839, and in the forties
the Texan government hoped that this would "show the United
States the Republic’s importance as an independent power."4 ^
Schmitz, Gambrell, and Siegel, then, clearly establish
that the leadership of Texas employed American suspicion
of Europe to further annexation.
With few exceptions, recent historians have reaffirmed
M cL em or e’s view that French policy in Texas did not endanger
American interests,44

Mc L e m o r e ’s influence is pervasive in

^ S t a n l e y Siegel, 4 Political History of the Texas
Repu bl ic . 1836-1845 (Austin; University of Texas Press,
1956), p. 228.
45 Ibid., p. 119,
notable exceptions are Donald C . McKay, The
United States and France (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1951); and Ray Allen Billington, The Far Western
Frontier. 1830-1.860 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956),
McKay is confused regarding French policy in Texas (see
p. 88), and Billington reverts to the older view that
France did indeed present a challenge to American interests
in Texas (see p. 137).
4 4 T wo
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Henry Blumenthal*s important monograph.

Summarizing French

policy in Texas, Blumenthal writes:
As long as France could not acquire Texas d i 
rectly. , .it favored the independence of the
Lone Star Republic.
This policy was designed
to block the dynamic southwestern advance of
the American people as well as to keep the door
open for the dynastic interests of the House of
Bourbon.
For in Gu i z o t ’s judgment, Europe had
the duty to stem the flow of Protestantism and
republicanism on the American continent.
When
in the fall of 1839 France recognized Texas in
exchange for a favorable trade treaty, it
became the first European power to take this
step.
From that moment on it had an additional
reason to object to the annexation of this
independent state by the United States.45
But France merely "wished to convey the impression of a
united diplomatic front in order to make military inter
vention unnecessary," Blumenthal hastens to add.

He also

quotes, as does McLemore, G u i z ot ’s declaration that " ’I
am not prepared to say that its [Texas] junction with the
American states is of sufficient importance to us to
justify us in having recourse to arms in order to prevent

One point, however, remains in doubt.

Because McLemore

does not mention the failure of A be rd ee n’s scheme for joint
action in Texas, it can only be assumed from his article
that Paris feared that intervention in Texas would offend
the United States.

Blumenthal is content to list the

45Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 36-37.
46Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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differing opinions of Smith, Adams, and Rives on the matter,
concluding that "historians are generally agreed that the
question was one of joint intervention or n o n e . " ^
Frederick Merk has shed some light on this confused sub
ject, and he suggests that due to memories of British
arrogance and predominance, the entente cordiale was at
best feeble.

Merk also reviews the Calhoun-King corres

pondence, as well as Calhoun's subsequent efforts to
discriminate between Paris and London, and in his c o n 
clusion asserts that this only further alienated the
British from the French.

Thus, Merk seems to accept

the validity of both the Adams and Rives interpretations.
Clearly,

the American annexation of Texas ran counter

to Guizot's sympathies, and his resulting frustration
was exhibited in his June speech,

Hindered not only by

domestic politics, but also by the weakness of France in
the New World, Guizot was unable to preserve Texan inde
pendence,

His speech reflects both the inability of France

to influence events in the New World, and the ideological
inclinations of the July Monarchy.

It is surprising that

only two authors have dealt extensively with the Guizot
declaration;

it is significant that they differ as to its

mean in g.

4 7 ibid., p. 38.
^ F r e d e r i c k Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American E x 
pansionism. 1843-1849 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966),
pp. 40-43.

•»

88

»

According to Dexter Perkins, Guizot's speech was
self-defeating and only further separated the United
States from France.

After quoting Guizot's remarks,

he writes:
It is true that nothing in the sentences
just quoted implied a policy of armed inter
vention in the New World; it is true, indeed,
that the French minister expressly disclaimed
the use of force; but the theory which he
propounded in this defense of his policy was
a theory which could not fail to be entirely
uncongenial to the public opinion of the
United States.
For behind the Monroe Doctrine,
from the very first, had lain an antagonism to
those shifting arrangements of interest on
which the balance of power was based; and
however innocent might be the methods employed
for the moment to promote the idea of an
American equilibrium, the idea itself was
naturally repugnant to the people of the
rising republic of North America,
In an era
of self-confident nationalism, it was
naturally a little galling to be regarded,
not as the dominant nation of the New World,
but as only one element in an American balance
of power.
Perkins goes on to review the American reaction exemplified
by the Washington Union and the Democratic R e v i e w .

While

admitting that both were administration organs, he con 
cludes that their vehement criticism of Guizot probably
influenced P o l k . ^
Stressing the unsavory connotation of the balance of
power doctrine, Perkins accepts completely the interpreta
tion of the Union and the Democratic Review that Guizot

^^Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp.

72-74.

was advocating an "American balance of power."

Frederick

Merk has taken Perkins to task on this account, criticizing
his dependence upon partisan polemics.

It was only in

American expansionist journals, Merk insists, that Guizot
was presented as advocating that the Old World principle
of a power balance should be applied to the New.

Merk

reviews the assessments of the speech in the correspondence
of the American minister at Paris, William Rives, in the
French press, both conservative and opposition,
London T i m e s , and in American Whig p a p e r s .

in the

None found

Guizot advocating an "American balance of power."50

While

Perkins emphasizes the upsurge of "Manifest Destiny" feel
ing after the Guizot speech, Merk claims that "this reverses
the actual order of events, which was that Manifest Destiny
advocates were using a phrase attributed to Guizot for their
own purposes."51
To demonstrate further that it is fallacious to inter
pret Guizot as pressing for an "American balance of power,"
Merk reviews the speech itself.

He concludes that Guizot

chose his phrases with care:
They included "equilibre des forces" between the great
masses which divide America, so that no one of them
become exclusively predominant; "equilibre des divers
E t a ts "; and "equilibre des grandes forces politique
en Amerique." "Equilibre" was a general term meaning
balance, a condition, natural and even beneficial.
It
was the opposite in political affairs of domination by
a single power over a continent or a world.

50Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and Expansionism, pp.
51Ibid., pp. 60-61.

52-53.
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Furthermore, Merk notes, ’'balance of power" in French is
equilibre europeens; nowhere did Guizot use equilibre
✓ . *52
amencain . ^
While only two authors have examined the Guizot
speech, several deal with P o l k ’s annual message.

But

because during the intervening months American expansion
had turned toward the Pacific,
declaration have varied.

interpretations of Polk's

A few historians see Polk's

revival of Monroe's principles as caused by new threats,
both French and British, on the West Coast.

Perkins is

the only one of this group to discuss Gu iz o t ’s policy
announcement and to assert that Polk was replying to the
insidious doctrine of an "American balance of power."
Nevertheless, his work is similar to that of the others
included in this grouping--all of whom are influenced
by expansionist propaganda,
nature.

in spite of its partisan

A second viewpoint, most clearly illustrated by

Reeves, is that Polk was plotting to acquire California,
and consequently reiterated the Monroe Doctrine to gain
popular support,

More recently, historians have clarified

the relationship of California to the "Polk Doctrine,"
and have emphasized the political background of his Decem
ber message.

^2Ibid., pp. 49-51.
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In his innovative study of American diplomacy during
the administration of Tyler and Polk, Reeves is unmoved by
the claim, so prevalent among the advocates of expansion,
that Polk's message was a warranted response to a very
real danger.

Instead, Reeves asserts that Polk "coveted

California from his entrance into office.

. .with Polk

belongs the glory, if glory it be, of the Mexican War
C *Z

and of the conquest of California."

According to

Reeves, Polk's instructions to John Slidell, the newly
appointed representative to Mexico, are proof of his
dishonorable diplomacy.

These directives dwelt first on

the rumored designs of France and Britain upon Mexican
territory, and Reeves writes, they "are the key-note to
Polk's aggressive policy of expansion,"**4

Turning to the

December message, Reeves makes no mention of Guizot, or
of an "American balance of power."

He views the speech

as primarily directed to Oregon and the dispute With
Britain.

Nonetheless, he suggests that in order to gain

additional popular backing, Polk "*re-affirmed'

the Monroe

Doctrine, with an eye as much to California and the fine
bay of San Francisco, as to Oregon,"****

^Reeves,

Diplomacy Under Tyler and P o l k , p. 189.

54Ibid., p. 275.
55Ibid., p. 258.
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Although Polk had received reports from the American
consul in California, Thomas 0. Larkin, "that Great Britain
and France had evident designs upon the province,” Reeves
doubts the validity of these warnings.

Rather, he con

tinues, they were only a pretense to bolster Polk's determ
ination to acquire California regardless of the means.
This caustic treatment of P o l k ’s California policy is
countered by Eugene I. McCormac in his 1922 biography of
the ninth president.

McCormac asserts that California was

not a sine qua non to Polk's diplomacy;

if it had not been

for the efforts of Britain and France to usurp Mexican
sovereignty in California,

then the United States would

not have been driven to acquire it.

To be sure, McCormac

adds, Polk was not immune to the lure of the West Coast.
But "rumors o f British and French designs on California
induced Polk to take early steps to prevent their success."
Thus, McCormac writes, Polk "told Congress that certain
European nations,

in order to check the territorial expan

sion of the United States, were attempting to extend to
America the ’balance-of-power’ doctrine which had been long
maintained in Europe."

56Ibid», pp.

57

As a biographer, McCormac tends

278-281,

'Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. P o l k : A Political
Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 192 2) ,
pp. 391, 692-693.

to sympathize with his subject.

po

Unfortunately, he makes

no further reference to Franco"American relations.
J. Fred Rippy also asserts that P o l k ’s speech was a
justified reaction to European lust for California.

To

Rippy, the threat of European interference in California
signified more than just the possible transfer to terri
tory.

Because Europe was monarchial and conservative,

the acquisition of California by the United States was
unmistakably necessary.

To support this claim, Rippy

refers indirectly to the ’’undemocratic principles”
articulated by Guizot,

59

Perkins expands upon R i p p y ’s interpretation and
emphasizes its importance to an understanding of FrancoAmerican relations.

From our review of the interpretation

given by Perkins to the Guizot speech, what that author
has to say about P o l k ’s message should come as no surprise.
According to Perkins, Guiz o t’s principles,

if left u n 

challenged, threatened the security of the United States.
He writes:

5®0f the decision to send General Zachary Taylor
across the Nueces River, McCormac writes:
” It was
certainly the duty of the President to defend Texas.”
Ibid., pp, 38~381,
Fred Rippy,
The United States and Mexico
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp. 29.
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The Guizot doctrine of the balance of power in
the New World, (if it be not unfair to call by
the name of Guizot a doctrine not uncommonly
held by many others), was a doctrine dangerous
to the peace of the American continents.
It
ought to have been challenged, and so far as
the United States was concerned, repudiated,
Because the December speech came in the midst of the
Oregon dispute, P o l k ’s bold reply to Guizot would seem
to have been risky, if not foolhardy *

A crisis with France

might have led to an Anglo-French accord directed against
the United States,

’’But in answer to this,” Perkins h a s 

tens to add, ”it can be pointed out that the risks of any
very serious breach with France were decidedly not great."
Because there "existed in France a very friendly feeling
o . .for the United States,

, , ,the American government

would have had to go much further than to dispute what
was after all a theoretical principle, however dangerous,
before a genuine tension in Franco-American relations
would r e s u l t , " ^
By detailing the Paris reaction to the Polk message,
Perkins establishes that the American president was in
deed replying to the French minister0
Guizot again spoke in the Chambers,

On January 12, 1846,

Perkins writes:

60perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 96-98.

. . ,[Guizot] amplified and expanded his views
o f American policy* and his doctrine of the
balance of power, and directly challenged the
P r e s i d e n t s doctrine.
The two great races of
the Hew World, the Spanish and the English, he
declared, must not be permitted one to absorb
the other, and in particular, the southern
Catholic race must not be devoured by the
Anglo-American.
The doctrine of the balance
of power, he went on, in language which sounds
a little grotesque to the generation which
remembers the balance of power of 1914, had
been the source of the development, the
prosperity, the moral and social greatness of
Europe, and would be equally salutary in the
New World. . . .with regard to the United
States the French prime minister made his
viewpoint clear.
The relations of the United
States with France* he declared, were entirely
friendly; France, far from looking with regret
upon the rising greatness of the new republic
of the West, applauded it.
With this outline of French

concern for events

in theNew

World, Perkins notes, Guizot went on to declare that he
could not accept the idea that Europe should be barred
from exercising any political action in
Significantly, Perkins

the New W o r l d . ^

denies that Polk's

speech was

an accurate appraisal of European aims in the New World.
Of the problems that had stimulated the speech, Perkins
writes, "it is worth noting that one, Texas, had been
settled; that another, California, existed only in the
President's imagination;.

. .and that the third, Oregon,

was finally composed without reference to what Polk had
to say."

Furthermore, Perkins notes, the support accorded

6 1 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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the speech was largely partisan.^2

And yet, in spite of

the fact that much of what gave Polk cause for concern was
illusory, and in spite of its obvious partisan background,
P o l k ’s address, Perkins claims, punctuated the conflicting
interests of Washington and Paris in the New World.

When

Guizot replied to Polk in January of 1846, the dichotomy
between French and American goals was clearly defined.
Perkins writes:

"It was Guizot,

. .who, first of all

European statesmen, denounced the pretension of the United
States to the hegemony of the New World in a public
a ddress.
Historians writing after Perkins have reinforced his
assertion that the problem of European intervention in
California was imaginary.

Furthermore, where Perkins speaks

but briefly about the political aspects of P o l k ’s speech,
subsequent historians have stressed the acrimonious
partisanship of the forties, in which the December speech
played a significant role,

Frederick Merk, as seen above,

goes so far as to challenge Perkins's assumption that Polk
was correct when he interpreted Guizot as advocating an
"American balance of power,”

Nevertheless, Perkins's

interpretation that the Guizot-Polk exchange symbolized
an ideologically inspired breach in Franco-American relations

62ibid,, p. 120.
6 3 lbid., p. 117.
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remains intact,

Historians have generally accepted his

view that, regardless of P o l k fs immediate motives,

the

December speech was representative of the conflict between
the New and Old Worlds.
Prior to Perkins, a few authors had dealt with
European aims in California.

E.D. Adams, for example,

discounted the British involvement in that Mexican province
as being greatly exaggerated.

Aside from being indifferent

to colonial expansion, the Peel government had close ties
with Mexico and was basically ignorant of California,

For

these reasons, Adams writes, the British attitude toward the
province was one of "consistent passivity„"64

George Rives

does not view the British as being so indifferent to Calif
ornia, but he notes that any designs of London were still
born because of the French policy of keeping "in accord
with the United States,**6'’

Likewise, St. George Leakin

Sioussat believes that the lack o f French support frustrated
any potential British effort in California,66

Thus, even

before Perkins wrote, there was a belief that a European
threat in California was minimal.

64A d a m s , British Interests and Activities in T e x a s ,
p. 264.
65

Rives, "Mexican Diplomacy on Eve of War with the
United States," pp. 286-298,
66St. George Leakin Sioussat, "James Buchanan," in
The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed.
by Samuel F. Bemis, Vol. V (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1928), p. 271.
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It was not until 1945, however, that the European
involvement in California began to come into clearer light.
Relying on extensive research into the records of French
activities in California, Abraham P. Nasatir supplies by
far the best review of French policy in the province.

In

his view, the French interest in the West Coast of North
America was exemplified by the expedition of Eugene Duflot
de Mofras in 1841-1842.

”There can be little doubt,” he

writes, ”that France, in sending Mofras as an agent to
collect information about the Pacific region entertained
hopes similar to those of England and the United States-that California might fall into her possession,”^'7

But

France was forced to be discreet, awaiting a favorable
opportunity.

By 1844, Nasatir asserts, Paris realized

that the United States and Great Britain were the two
powers most likely to secure California.

And since France

had other interests in the Pacific--interests most e n 
dangered by an expansion of British power--she preferred
California,

if it could not belong to France, to fall to

the United S t a t e s . ^
Drawing from American and European manuscript material
as well as from Nasatir, Norman A, Graebner provides a
superior account of the international rivalry for California

67Abraham P. Nasatir, French Activities in California
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), p. 15.
6 8 Ibid., p. 8.
69 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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and its relations to the Guizot-Polk exchange,
discredits French aspirations in California:

He, too,

"French

hopes in California faded first, if they existed beyond
the minds of a few enthusiasts,

France possessed no special

claims to the region, nor did her power and interests in
the Pacific equal those of Great Britain and the United
States."

Graebner agrees with Nasatir that Paris feared

a British victory in the contest for California,

70

He is

also in accord with earlier historians, especially Adams,
for he doubts that either France or Britain would have
acted with conviction in California.

He writes:

British and French diplomacy, which became so
grand in its pretensions and so disillusioning
in its eventual failure, ended finally as little
more than a tribute of commercially minded powers
to the grandeur of California and the growing
importance of the Pacific Ocean, . , .neither
government ever revealed any true imperialism
toward the Mexican province. . . .Frenchmen who
knew California coveted it to the end, but they
never inaugurated any policy. , .that might have
acquired it.^l
Graebner makes his most important contribution to the
historiography of Franco-American relations when he connects
the French frustration in failing to influence events in
California, as well as Texas, to Guizot's June speech.
1845, both France and Britain, he writes,

"had turned

rman A. Graebner. Emnire on the Pacific: A Stu d
in American Continental Expansion (New York: The Ronald
Press, 1955), pp. 74-75.

71Ibid., p. 81.
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jaundiced eyes toward the United States,

for American

expansionism threatened to encompass the bay [of San
Francisco! and destroy the balance of Pacific commerce."7^
In a 1953 article, Graebner refers to a dispatch sent by
Alphonse Pageot, the French ambassador at Washington,

to

Guizot, in which the representative ’’thought it time to
protest against American arrogance which threatened the
'balance of forces in this hemisphere.’

He believed that

the American spirit of usurpation could ’endanger the
peace of the w o r l d , ’ if not restrained in time by serious
warning,”

Upon receipt of Pageot's anxious observations,

Graebner continues, Guizot declared in front of the
Chambers:

" ’It behooves France to preserve the balance

of power in the Western Hemisphere,
In their assessments of the intent of Guizot's p r o 
nouncement, Perkins and Graebner differ,

Perkins, as we

have seen, views the American criticism of Guizot's speech
as not unjustified,7^

Graebner, however, believes the

reaction of the American expansionist press to be mistaken.
Even if it be only through diplomacy, Graebner writes,

72Ibid., p. 66,
73Graebner, "American Interest in California, 1845,"
Pacific Historical Revi ew , XXII (February, 1953), p. 19.
74perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 72.
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these expansionists, [Graebner here refers in
part to the same editors quoted by Perkins]
ironically, never understood that the European
inclination to interfere in American affairs
resulted largely from a fear of this n a t i o n ’s
apparent continental ambitions.
The mushroom
growth of American acquisitiveness toward
California in 1845 was actually more alarming
to European observers than the annexation of
Texas.
But these natural British and French
reactions toward American expansionism merely
aggravated the American desire to annex Cal i 
fornia.
European intervention seemed to
threaten the moral growth of the nation and
endanger the entire concept of the Monroe
Doctrine.
Where Perkins sees a threat inherent in Guizot's doctrine
of American equilibrium, Graebner sees an understandable
concern.

But both authors agree that the American response

to this concern, whatever its intent, signified an ideo
logical division between the Old and New Worlds.
Subsequent to Graebner*s work, Frederick Merk makes
the only significant contribution to the historiography
of the Guizot-Polk exchange.

We have already seen that

Merk criticizes the one-sidedness of Perki ns ’’s' evidence-.
Like Graebner, Merk emphasizes the partisan background of
the "Polk Doctrine."
the subject.

Merk, however, is more explicit on

Indeed, he views the Polk message as a

virtual campaign document, and in doing so he is reminiscent
of Reeves.

Of the motives of Polk in reasserting Monroe's

principles, Merk writes:

^Graebner,

Empire on the Pacific, p. 88.
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When Polk began preparation of bis message to
Congress in' the autumn of 1845, he was unques
tionably aware of all this newspaper discussion
of the "balance-of-power" idea.
The Washington
Union, his daily fare, was filled with the
subject. . . .Newspaper propaganda is not
normally lifted into state papers, and yet how
could a President who had employed it to such
advantage in his election and had seen it so
usefully employed afterwards fail to use it?
The magic phrase "balance-of-power" occurred
thrice in brief space in the message, as if
to make sure that it be remembered.
It was,
indeed, remembered.
Thereafter, it was used
by Democrats incessantly to suggest that
European monarchs were intent on keeping the
American world divided,76
Merk further resembles Reeves when he assesses the role
played by California in stimulating Polk to expand the
principle of the two spheres to exclude even diplomatic
intervention.

In order to secure California, as well as

to solve the Oregon dispute and the Mexican boundary
question, Merk writes, "what could be more useful than to
remind Americans of meddling and 'balance-of-power’
tactics employed by European monarchs in the recent past
as a protection against their use in the future?"77
As further evidence that Polk misinterpreted Guizot
in crediting him as advocating an "American balance of
power," Merk examines the debate between Guizot and Thiers
during January of 1846,

Perkins uses this debate as final

proof of Guizot's devotion to a principle inimical to
American interests.

But, according to Merk, Thiers never

76Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and Expansionism, p. 60.
77Ib i d .t p. 64.
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accused Guizot of supporting an "equiTibre americalne";
furthermore, Guizot translated P o l k ’s phrase "balance of
power" as " ’ce_ q u ’on appelle en Europe la balance des
s
78
pouvolrs entre les E t a t s .’"
picayunish,

True, this may seem

But Merk has at least demonstrated that

what Polk meant when he referred derisively to the phrase
"balance of power" was something entirely different from
what Guizot intended.
The significance of Merk's interpretation of Guizot's
speech is illustrated by two historians who published before
Merk and who revert to the Perkins viewpoint.

In a summary

of French policy towards the United States, Henry Blumenthal
writes that Paris sought to "check" American expansion,
using as evidence G u i z o t ’s speech.

79

Along the same lines

Glyndon G. Van Deusen claims that Polk was troubled not only
by the Oregon dispute and the vulnerability of California,
but also by "the declaration by French Premier Francois
Guizot that it was in the interest of France to preserve
QQ
the existing balance of power in the New World."0
Both
authors view Guiz ot ’s speech as proof that France hoped to
hinder the growth of the United States.

That the Guizot

ministry was upset by American expansionism is obvious,

78Ibid., pp. 88-91.
^ B l u m e n t h a l , A Reappraisal, p. 36.
8°Van Deusen, The Jacksonian E r a , pp. 217-218.
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but to claim, using Guiz ot ’s June declaration as a sole
support, that France sought to prevent the acquisition
of territory by the United States is misleading^
It has been suggested that Merk and Reeves are
similar in that both authors interpret P o l k ’s December
message as a campaign document.

Polk's most recent b i o 

grapher, Charles Sellers, reaffirms this viewpoint,
challenging the idea that Guiz ot ’s speech and the European
involvement in California directly prompted Polk to revive
the Monroe Doctrine,

Sellers claims that Polk, upon his

inauguration, already possessed a ’’continental vision"
that included California.

The conversation with Bancroft

has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, and in refer
ence to P o l k ’s dedication to the acquisition of California,
Sellers asserts that the annual message was a fundamental
step in the process that fused the traditional agrarian
expansionism of the United States with the new force of
commercial expansionism.

According to Sellers, Polk was

"superbly fitted" to direct the drive to the Pacific.

He

writes:
. . .[Polk] had the political genius to sense the
latent strength of the continentalist impulse and
the political audacity and skill to chart the
series of declarations and actions by which he
committed the country to an continentalist course,
and in response to which the continentalist impulse
became manifest and overwhelming.81

SlSellers, P o l k , pp.

213-214.
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Tlie significance of the annual message, then, cannot be
ignoredo

Polk practiced the Jacksonian theory of

presidential leadership, Sellers writes,

"more systemat

ically than any other nineteenth-century p re si d en t,"
Fundamental to this theory was the principle of pres i
dential initiative in the legislative process, the primary
instrument of which was the annual message.

Sellers

writes:
Thus a President who was attuned to the public
mood--as John Quincy Adams had not been in a
notable earlier effort at presidential initia
tive --could make the annual message a powerful
instrument for crystallizing national opinion
behind his measures and bringing it to bear on
a distracted or even hostile Congress,
Although Polk made no direct references to California in
his speech, Sellers concludes that "the thought of
California was interwoven with every word of his arresting
warning that

’any European interference on the North

American Continent’ would be resisted by the United States
'at any and all h a z ar d s, ’"

Sellers adds that Polk received
o

2

overwhelming bipartisan support for his message.
For the most part, historians have consistently moved
away from the idea that European interests in the New World
threatened the American democracy and as such warranted
the acquisition of Texas and California,

Adams, Smith,

and Rives, in spite of their faults, have established that

82lbid,, pp„ 324-326,
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the ’'Diplomatic Act," so suspect in the eyes of Americans,
was stillborn,

The historians of the Texas republic have

further demonstrated that the Texan leadership of Houston
and Jones played upon American suspicions of Europe to
advance the cause of annexation.

Furthermore, beginning

with Reeves and Adams, and including Nasatir and Graebner,
it has been shown that fear of European intrigue in
California was chimerical.

It is clear, then, that

neither France nor Britain seriously planned to thwart
the continental expansion of the United States,

To be

sure, both London and Paris hoped to preserve Texan inde
pendence.
California.

The two also had some interest in the fate of
Still, nowhere did France or Britain present

a challenge to American interests.

For this reason,

recent historians have differed with Perkins’s interpreta
tion that Guizot's June speech endangered American interests
in the New World and therefore warranted P o l k ’s strident
revival of M o n r o e ’s principles,

Perkins himself noted the

partisan background of P o l k ’s annual message,

Graebner,

Merk, and Sellers have emphasized this point even more.
the process, Reeves’s early denunciation of Polk's plot
to acquire California has come into new focus.

Sellers

has also placed the December message within the context
of Polk's contribution to the development of presidential
leadership.

Nevertheless, Perkins has not been totally

In

-

repudiated.
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In his belief that the Guizot-Polk exchange

signified an ideologically inspired dichotomy between
the interests of France and the United States in the New
World, Perkins has been upheld.

Although P o l k ’s motives

have been clarified, although Guizot’s speech has been
re-defined,

it cannot be denied that the bumptious e x 

pansion of American republicanism conflicted with the
predilections of the government of Louis Philippe.

But

because the expansion of the United States did not threaten
the security of France, but only offended the sensibilities
of the July Monarchy, G u i z ot ’s desire to limit the American
advance was not matched by a determination to implement it.
French policy towards the Oregon question and the
outbreak of war between Mexico and the United States, as
well as the American response to renewed Anglo-French
military intervention in the La Plata region of South
America, offer an insight into the quality of FrancoAmerican relations in the aftermath of the Guizot-Polk
exchange.

During 1846, all three of these issues reached

a crucial point.

But Paris remained neutral towards the

Oregon dispute and the Mexican War, and Washington in
effect ignored events in the La Plata area.
French abstention from involvement in the Oregon
question first attracted the attention of George Vern Blue.
Relying upon dispatches between the French minister in
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Washington, Pageot, and Guizot, Blue demonstrates that
although both were offended by American belligerency,
Guizot was adamant that France must not intervene.

In

reply to Pageot*s suggestion that France should offer
arbitration, Blue quotes Guizot as writing the following:
On a special question of Oregon we warmly
desire that a pacific solution take place;
for it would be doubly regrettable if the
peace of the world were threatened by such
a matter, and we are in any case firmly
decided to keep the most complete neutrality
as long as it will be possible for us to do
s o .83

Blue concludes that the French were uninterested in the
Oregon issue, for no French policies were immediately at
stake.

Agreeing with Blue, two more recent authors have

also asserted that the French policy of neutrality co n
tributed to the peaceful solution of this dispute.
John S, Galbraith maintains that a contributing factor
in Lond on ’s Oregon policy was its concern for relations
with France.

British statesmen, Galbraith writes,

"could

not ignore the possibilities of conflict with European
states,

in particular with France, as a concomitant to war

with the United States,"
weak, Galbraith continues,

The entente with France was so
that "hatred of Britain, evident

in the speeches of French politicians and in the tone of
the French press, might force the government of Louis

83George Vera Blue, "France and the Oregon Question,"
Oregon Historical Quarterly, XXXIII (1933), pp. 149-150.
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Philippe into war and that war fever in Prance would mount
if Britain were to be drawn into conflict with the United
States „”8^
Galbraith’s assertions are based upon thorough research
into British records, and his article is revealing of
Anglo-French relations.

Over the objections of his foreign

minister, Aberdeen, Sir Robert Peel remained distrustful
of France,

The possibility that war with the United States

would involve war with France did not cause Peel to retreat
before the American bluster, Galbraith notes,

’’Such co n

siderations, however, compelled him to seek peaceful
agreement with the United States if it could be attained
without the sacrifice of prestige,”^
Henry Blumenthal ventures beyond Galbraith to assert
that ’’Brit a in ’s suspicion of France,

, .was the decisive

factor in its final disposition of the Oregon question,”
But Blumenthal also considers the impact of the Oregon
dispute upon Franco-American relations.

In his view, the

French attitude toward Oregon was similar to that taken
toward Texas and California,

Guizot interpreted the

slogan ”5 4 ’40° or fight” as another example of American
acquisitiveness.

But, Blumenthal notes, the French minister

was trammeled by domestic opinions.

Thus, ’’unable to act

84john S. Galbraith, "France as a Factor in the Oregon
Negotiations,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly. XLIV (April,
1953), pp. 69-70,
85Ibid.,'p.

72.
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with determination and forcefulness, he announced that
France would be neutral in case of an Anglo-American war,"
Blumenthal adds, however, that "This premature neutrality
declaration had serious consequences."

Not only did

Guizot demonstrate to both Britain and the United States
that France could not be counted on, but he also further
alienated the United States from France.

It is Blumenthal's

opinion that upon the sudden termination of the Oregon
dispute, "the Pacific triumph of P o l k ’s administration did
OA

not help endear ’n e ut r al ’ France to the United States."
Blumenthal’s support for this assertion is weak, but until
further research is done on the matter, his work remains
the only general review of the impact of the Oregon q u e s 
tion upon Franco-American relations.
Unlike Oregon, French interest in Mexico was strong.
Historians are agreed, however, that France did nothing to
offend the United States during the Mexican War.

Elizabeth

Brett White points out that although Paris bolstered its
squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, little concern was shown
in the United States,

It was only in cooperation with England

that France would undertake any important operations.^
Throughout the war, France remained devoted to her position

OA

Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 42-43,
^ W h i t e , American Opinion of France, pp. 113-114.
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o£ neutrality.

According to Sioussat, this had a favor

able effect upon American opinion,

The significant fact

of the Mexican War, he writes, ’’was the abstention of
the British and French Governments from any attempts at
intervention or interference,”^
After the settlement of the Oregon issue, Blumenthal
asserts, any chance for a united Anglo-French intervention
in the Mexican War was negated.

Still, he adds, the

French government begrudgingly declared its neutrality.
”Even after his

’defeat*

in Texas,” Blumenthal writes,

Guizot ’’continued to make some half-hearted efforts to
organize a great European coalition to block the United
States from overrunning Mexico,”

Despite reassuring

pledges to the American minister early in 1846, Blumenthal
notes, Louis Phil ip pe ’s ’’government was really still
undecided in June of 1846 as to its policy in the Mexican
War.”

The cumulative effects of the Oregon decision and

the impressive early successes of the American army, however, prompted France to proclaim its neutrality.

89

In contrast to Blumenthal, Frederick Merk emphasizes
that French neutrality in the Mexican War was due to public
enmity towards the British.

Although French public

opinion of the Mexican War was sharply divided, Merk

88sioussat, "Buchanan," p. 282,
®9Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, pp. 43-44.
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writes, opposition journals made it clear "that if a
choice must be made between hegemony by the United States
and hegemony by the British, they preferred the former„
They exhibited, in general, antipathy for their British
partner in the entente cordiale,"

qq

In addition to French

domestic opinion, Merk notes, joint Anglo-French inter
vention in the Mexican War was also hindered by British
suspicion concerning French dynastic relations with Sp a i n ,91That the "Polk Doctrine" was proclaimed to further
American continental expansion rather than intended as a
principle to guide American diplomacy is illustrated by
the American attitude regarding renewed intervention in
the La Plata region.

In the heady aftermath of Polk's

speech, Senator William Allen, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, introduced a resolution which was
directed against the resumption of European intervention
in the La Plata,

Lewis Cass, a Democratic colleague of

Allen, claimed that the resolution merited support because
of its condemnation of Guizot's balance of power prin ci 
ples.^

While Polk for the most part had omitted South

America in his declaration, the Allen resolution purported

90Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and Expansionism, p. 167.
9^ Ibld, , pp. 178-181,
92Ibid,, pp. 98-99.

to extend his doctrine to all of the New World,

Significantly,

historians have used the defeat of A l l e n ’s proposal to cast
light upon Franco“American relations regarding the La Plata
affair.
In her review of the debate over the Allen resolution,
White stresses its significance to Franco"American relations.
Although opposed to the resolution, Calhoun ’’strongly o b 
jected to the

’improper interference’ of the European powers

in American affairs.

, . .But he did not think it possible

that the United States could take under her guardianship
the whole family of American states.”

The Allen resolution

was defeated, but White adds that Calhoun’s indignation at
the overt intervention was typical of American opinion.
In the end, she concludes,

French efforts in the La Plata
Q *7

only further prejudiced Americans against France.
The official attitude of the United States towards the
La Plata incursion was first outlined by Sioussat.

"In

contrast with its vigorous opposition to British or European
expansion or interference in Texas, in Oregon, in California,"
he writes,

"Po lk ’s administration did not see fit to attempt

to prevent European intervention in the affairs of these
South American nations.’’®^

Subsequent historians have agreed

^ W h i t e * American Opinion of France, pp. 116-118.
^Sioussat,

’’Buchanan," pp. 314-315.
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with Sioussat that Polkas use of Monroe's principles was
directed towards securing American in North America and
was not intended to challenge French or British efforts
elsewhere.
Nevertheless, John F. Cady asserts that the La Plata
affair had some impact upon Polk as he prepared his Decem
ber message.

But Polk's diplomacy was shrewd, Cady adds,

for when he asserted that all American states had a right,
because of their sovereignty and independence, to be free
from foreign interference, he was merely showing a token
interest in the affairs of South America.

By the feeble

warning "that the people of the United States could not be
indifferent to,

. .violations of the sovereign rights of

these states," Cady writes,

"Polk thus avoided committing

his government to any policy."

Furthermore, Cady notes,

Polk instructed his envoy to Argentina that although
"existing circumstances" prevented American involvement
in behalf of the beseiged Argentinian nation, the "moral
influence" of the United States would be used.

Polk

assumed this noncommittal attitude, Cady claims, in spite
of the unanimous condemnation by the American press of the
operation of French and British forces in the La Plata,
and in the face of accusations of foreign "m ac hinations."^

®^Cady,

Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, pp. 182-185.
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Perkins also believes that Polk's mention of the right
of American nations to be free from foreign interventions
was a response to affairs in the La Plata region.

Q6

But

while Cady is critical of Polk's polite deference to South
America--he goes so far as to accuse Polk of conniving to
secure the unopposed expansion of the United States -Perkins merely writes that "the Polk administration.

. .

remained for the most part extraordinarily indifferent to
what was going on in La Plata."97
A summary view of W a shington’s policy regarding the
resumption of hostilities in La Plata is found in Harold
Peterson's recent work,

Like White, Peterson outlines

the considerable clamor in the United States for inter
vention,
war.

But, he writes,

"In his eagerness to avoid

.over Oregon and to forestall Anglo-French opposition

to his dreams of expansion in the southwest, Polk had no
intention of forcing a showdown over the faraway La
Plata.

. , .The Polk administration was facing west, not

south.
It is clear, then, that the July Monarchy made a

^ P e r k i n s , Monroe Doctrine, p. 84.
97Ibid., p. 133,
^ H a r o l d F, Peterson, Argentina and the United States.
1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York Press,
1964), pp. 137-138.
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conscious effort to avoid any involvement prejudicial to
American interests in the Oregon question and the Mexican
War.

It is also clear that the Polk administration,

in

spite of popular criticisms, allowed France and Britain
to continue their efforts in the La Plata without inter
ference.

Still, Guizot was uneasy over the prospect of

further American expansion.

But Texas, and to some extent

California, were the central issues in Franco-American
relations during the mid-forties.

The French government

had failed to preserve Texas independence,

in part due to

Mexican ineptitude--there was little reason, then, for
Paris to assist the Mexicans in regaining Texas in the
face of American military might.

Furthermore, whatever

designs the July Monarchy had on California had long been
given up, and Oregon had never been a matter of concern
for France.

By the middle of 1846, Paris had resigned

itself to continental expansion of the United States,
and Washington, anxious to consolidate that expansion,
sought to avoid further difficulties with Europe, even at
the expense of South American republics.

CHAPTER V

FRANCO-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN HAWAII AND THE FAR EAST

Three short years after the controversial annexation
of Texas, the United States had acquired the vast South
west, upper California, and Oregon.

The westward impulse,

however, did not stop at the ocean's edge.

The expansion

of the United States to the west coast of North America
stimulated American interest in the central and east
Pacific, marking the beginning of a new era in the
struggle for the control of the fabled Far Eastern
trade.'*'

Speaking before Congress in 1847, President

James K. Polk defined the real significance of the
acquisition of California by the United States.

The

bay of San Francisco and the other harbors along the
coast of California, Polk predicted,

"would in a short

period become the marts of an extensive and profitable
commerce with China and other countries in the Far East."

■^See Robert G. Cleland, "Asiatic Trade and American
Occupation of the Pacific Coast," Annual Report of the
American Historical Associa t io n, Vol. I (Washington, 1916),
pT 289.
^"Annual Message," Congressional Gl o b e , December 7,
1847, 30th Cong., 1st Sess„, Part I, p. 6.
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But American eyes turned first to the Hawaiian archipelago-the hub of Pacific commerce and a temptation to the world's
two other great maritime powers, France and Great Britain,
American policy towards Hawaii was first defined in
1842,

For several years prior to that date, Hawaii had

been the scene of numerous interventions,
assorted coercive acts.

intrigues, and

French, British, and American

warships had frequently anchored in Honolulu's serene
harbor.

By 1842, the native Hawaiian government, fearful

lest the islands should fall to one of the competing
Pacific powers, determined that the time had come to
insure its sovereignty.

King Kamehameha III dispatched

envoys to Washington, London, and Paris to secure recogni
tion of Hawaiian independence.

In response, President

John Tyler, acting upon the advice of his Secretary of
State, Daniel Webster, declared that the United States
would respect Hawaiian sovereignty.

Tyler reassured the

Hawaiian diplomats that although the United States possessed
the largest share of the kingdom's trade, it sought
no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over
the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its
independent existence. . . .Its forebearance in this
respect, under the circumstances of the very large
intercourse of their citizens with the islands,
would justify the Government, should events he r e 
after arise, to require it, in making a decided

remonstrance against the adoption of an
opposite policy by any other p o w e r .3
Twelve years later, however, an American representative
signed a treaty with the native Hawaiian government
providing for the annexation of the islands by the
United States„
The first, and largest, part of this chapter will
be devoted to determining how historians have treated
the apparent shift in American policy within the larger
framework of Franco-American relations.

To be precise:

did French involvement in Hawaii have any impact upon
American policy-makers in 1842 and in 1854?

The second

part of this chapter will be a brief review of the h i s 
toriography of Franco-American relations with respect to
China.

By way of introduction, a summary of French and

American interests and activities in Hawaii might be
helpful before embarking on a study of the historiography.
But rather than repeat a list of events, this writer will
review the works of two early twentieth-century historians,
emphasizing the more significant points.
In a 1901 examination of American involvement in the
Pacific, James Morton Callahan touches upon many points

^Foreign Relations of the United Sta t es . 1894,
Appendix, II (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1901), pp. 39-41.
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vital to Franco-American relations regarding Hawaii,

He

recognizes that by the eighteen-thirties Protestant A m e r 
ican missionaries of staunch New England stock had come
to exert a potent influence upon the native Hawaiian
government.

Also, Callahan acknowledges that the French

interest in the islands was founded upon an equally
staunch Jesuit mission.

Hence, when French Captain C.P.T.

Laplace coerced Kamehameha III into an unfavorable treaty
in 1838, he sought to protect both the Catholic mission
and the interests of the government of Louis Philippe.

4

Laplace’s intervention was but one of a series by both
France and Great Britain, which, Callahan asserts, caused
Kamehameha to strive for the recognition of Hawaiian
independence.

The American response to the Hawaiian plea,

Callahan tells us, was honorable.

For despite the reports

of progress in the islands and the increase of American
involvement there, the United States sought no exclusive
control or advantage.

Even after learning of Kamehameha's

voluntary cession of sovereignty to the British Admiral
Lord Paulet in 1843, Callahan continues, Washington resorted

^Two later studies of American and French missionaries
in Hawaii are Bradford Smith, Yankees in Paradise: The New
England Impact on Hawaii (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co.,
1956), and Aarne A. Koskinen, Missionary Influence as a
Political Factor in the Pacific Islands (Helsinki, 1953) .
Unfortunately, neither author sheds much light upon the
role played by Hawaiian missionaries in Franco-American
relations.
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only to diplomatic retort.

The United States, he notes,

informed Britain and France of its hope that neither
would violate Hawaiian sovereignty.

According to Callahan,

the American attitude helped persuade London and Paris to
recognize Hawaiian independence by a joint declaration.^
Although Tyler subsequently refused to participate
in the Anglo-French declaration guaranteeing Hawaiian
independence, the Hawaiian government interpreted his
1842 statement, coupled with later assurances by Secretaries
Abel P. Upshur and John C. Calhoun, as constituting recog
nition of the island kingdom.

Thus assured, Hawaii hoped

to enjoy normal relations with the competing Pacific
powers.

But further trouble soon arose.

In 1849, French

forces, upon the instigation of Consul Patrice Dillon,
occupied Honolulu.

Callahan neglects to assess the purpose

of the intervention, but he does describe the American
reaction.
According to Callahan, the administration of Zachary
Taylor was apprehensive of French intentions in the Pacific.
Tahiti had recently succumbed to an aggressive French effort,
and Washington feared a similar occurrence in Hawaii.

5James Morton Callahan, American Relations in the
Pacific and the Far E a s t , 1784-1900. Johns Hopkins Univer
sity Studies in History and Political Science, Vol. XIX
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901), pp. 115-117.
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Secretary of State John Clayton, Callahan writes,

informed

William R. Rives at Paris "that, although the Hawaiian
islands were not coveted by the United States, their
relations were such that the United States could never
with indifference allow them to pass under the dominion
or exclusive control of any other power."

France disavowed

Dillon's actions and the crisis subsided.

But in 1851,

convinced that France was again considering the conquest
of the islands, the Hawaiian government proposed annexa
tion to the United States.

Nevertheless, the Fillmore

administration, Callahan claims, remained faithful to
established Hawaiian policy and rejected the annexation
offer.

Secretary of State Webster did protest to France,

however, and Paris, somewhat surprised by the American
reaction, denied any intention of violating Hawaiian
sovereignty.^
Hawaii became the cause for further discord between
Paris and Washington upon the inauguration of President
Franklin K. Pierce, a devotee of "Manifest Destiny."
Secretary of State William L. Marcy,

reflecting the tenor

of Pierce's policy, instructed the American ambassador at
Paris that it was inevitable that the Hawaiian archipelago
would come under the control of the United States.

6 Ibid„, pp. 119-120.
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contrast to his earlier view that American respect for
Hawaiian independence was established policy, Callahan
justifies Marcy's intimation that he anticipated annexation.
"While the United States had long expressed her policy of
maintaining the independence of the Hawaiian islands,"
he writes, "she had never entered into any international
agreement which would prevent her from negotiating a treaty
of annexation with the Hawaiian government."

In spite of

vigorous French and British protests, Callahan asserts,
negotiations for annexation continued and it was only the
death of Kamehameha III late in 1854 that postponed Hawaiian
entrance into the Union.7
Like Callahan, John W. Foster defends the American
involvement in Hawaii,

But while the United States pursued

an honorable policy in Hawaii, Foster claims, the efforts
of Britain and France to obtain an equal footing constituted
aggression.

His interpretation of events in Hawaii is

based, at least in part, upon a devout belief in the
righteous and beneficent efforts of the American mi ssion
aries.8

According to Foster, the American presence in

Hawaii, founded upon the humanitarian missionary endeavors
and supplemented by a long history of trade relations, was

7Ibid., pp. 121-123.
8John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin C o ., 1903), pp. 106-109.
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predominant.

In spite of Tyler's affirmation of that

belief and his announcement that the United States would
not allow any other nation to control the islands, Foster
continues,

it "did not deter other powers from repeated

efforts to secure their possession.

Their commanding

situation in the Pacific was a constant temptation to the
greed of colonizing powers."9
Reviewing the intervention of Captain Laplace in 1838,
Foster exceeds Callahan in the vigor of his criticism.
Assuming that Laplace acted with explicit orders from Paris,
he writes:
British]

"The third demonstration [the first two were

of a foreign power against the sovereignty of

Hawaii was on the part of France in 1839."

To be sure,

Foster adds, the Hawaiian king and his missionary advisors
may have erred by expelling the Jesuit fathers, but this
did not justify the Laplace intervention.
After clearly identifying France as the aggressor in
Hawaii, Foster then contrasts French policy with that of
the United States.

Like Callahan, he credits Tyler with

frustrating French, as well as British, designs on Hawaii.

11

Foster further claims that the Whig administration of Taylor

9 Ibid., p. 111.
■*•0Ibid. , pp. 119-121.
Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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and Fillmore reaffirmed T y l e r ’s stand, for they too defeated
French dreams of an Hawaiian empire.

During the Dillon

affair, for example, the American government informed Paris
that it would not allow France to occupy Hawaii.

Relations

between Paris and Washington underwent further strain when
France sent Louis Perrin to Honolulu in 1850.

According to

Foster, Perrin had been instructed to renew pressures upon
the Hawaiian government for concessions to France.

This

led Hawaii to turn to the United States for protection,
suggesting the possibility of annexation.

As a result,

Foster concludes, the efforts of Perrin constituted the
final attempt at aggression by a foreign power against the
island kingdom.12
Callahan and Foster make one basic error that is crucial
to the historiography of Franco-Americans regarding Hawaii.
In their researches, they totally ignore French primary
materials.

They assume--neglecting even the revolutions

of 1848 and the coup d ’etat of Louis Napoleon--that throughout
the period between 1838 and 1851, the French government sought
to acquire Hawaii.

Consequently, both authors see France and

the United States in clear opposition over Hawaii;

the former

dedicated to preserving Hawaiian independence, the latter
seeking to supplement its empire.

But what of the American

attempt at annexation during the Pierce administration?

12Ibid., pp. 130-131.
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Surely it would seem that Tyler's policy of respect for
Hawaiian independence had been ignored?

Foster fails to

mention it, and Callahan claims that it was justified
because of the threat of French aggression.
The various essays contained in The American Secre
taries of State and Their Diplomacy cast little new light
on Hawaii's role in Franco-American relations.

Writing

about Webster's first term, C.A. Duniway claims that the
Hawaiian request for recognition of its independence p r o 
vided but another occasion for Washington to assert its
traditional principle of non-intervention.
however,

He notes,

that "there was reason to fear at the time that

European rivalries might lead to occupation and coloniza
tion which would be prejudicial to American commercial
interests."

Because the United States had more interest

in the fate of the islands and their government than any
other nation, Duniway maintains, American policy became
two-fold.

The sovereignty of the island kingdom must be

respected, and their acquisition by any other power would
be inimical to the interests of the American p e o p l e , ^
In his sketch on Calhoun, St. George Leakin Sioussat
has supplied some details on the circumstances surrounding

l^ciyde Augustus Duniway, "Daniel Webster," in The
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplo m ac y, ed. by
Samuel F. Bemis, Vol. V (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928),
p . 56.
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recognition.

When it learned that the

Hawaiian government

had ceded its sovereignty to Paulet, the State Department
remained silent, Sioussat explains,

for discussions in

progress in London soon made it evident that Great Britain
would disavow his actions.

But the Paulet matter also

involved France, and during the subsequent negotiations
between London and Paris, speculation arose regarding the
American policy toward Hawaii.

"In reply to an inquiry

concerning the designs of the United States in the Sand
wich Islands," Sioussat adds in a footnote, "our minister
gave the assurance that our purposes in the Pacific were
purely c o m m e r c i a l . " ^

Sioussat does not specify if this

disclaimer constituted an American commitment to Hawaiian
independence.
In her essay on Clayton, Mary W. Williams affirms that
the French intrusion into Hawaii in 1849 alarmed the United
States.

But unlike Callahan and Foster, Williams views the

American response to the Dillon affair within the broader
context of Franco-American relations.

So it was, she

suggests, that Clayton "warned the Dominican Republic that
a French protectorate over it would not be

'pleasing' to

the United States, and notified the French Government--when
it was trying to coerce Hawaii over the question of
extra-territoriality--that the United States would not

■^Sioussat,

"Calhoun," in ibid., pp. 223, 375.
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with indifference permit the islands to pass under the
dominion of another nation."

Although Paris recalled

Dillon, Williams notes that Washington took advantage
of the affair to strengthen its ties with Ha wa i i .15
Concerning the American protest against renewed
tension between Hawaii and France during the Perrin
mission, Duniway,

in an essay on Webster's second term,

moderates the findings of Callahan and Foster.

Webster

did instruct his minister at Paris to insist that France
refrain from making unjust demands upon the Hawaiian
government.

Furthermore, Duniway continues, Webster

directed his commissioner in the islands "not to interfere
by force in the Franco-Hawaiian controversy--but he need
not explain this to the French,"

Still,

the Fillmore

administration did not interpret events in Hawaii as
signifying a breach in relations with France,

Duniway

emphasizes that the United States later authorized its
representatives in Hawaii to cooperate fully with the
French and British to bring about stability in the islands. ^
Unlike Callahan and Foster, Henry Barrett Learned
recognizes the expansionist tenor of the Pierce administra
tion.

Pierce hoped to acquire both Cuba and Hawaii.

^Williams,

For

"Clayton," in ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 14-15.

■^Duniway, "Daniel Webster," in Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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that reason, Learned states, his Secretary of State, Marcy,
i7

contemplated the annexation of Hawaii.

Unfortunately,

Learned sees no contrast between the Hawaiian policies of
Tyler and Pierce.

He also neglects to explain why

annexation failed.
None of the authors of these essays rectifies the
failure of Callahan and Foster to use French primary
material.

George Vern Blue demonstrates the importance of

such sources to the historiography of Franco-American
relations regarding Hawaii.

Drawing from the archives of

the Ministry of the Marine and the Quai d'Orsay, as well
as from private correspondence, Blue establishes that
French representatives in Hawaii often exceeded the letter
of their instructions.

At best, the government of Louis

Philippe was apathetic towards the idea of establishing a
colony in Hawaii founded upon the Catholic mission.

In

spite of the concessions made by the Hawaiian government
to Laplace,
to diminish.

the French presence in the islands continued
Captain Mallett attempted to revive it in

1842, but like Laplace he had no official support and his
endeavor failed.

This abortive effort was, according to

l^Henry Barrett Learned*
in ibid., pp. 147, 290-291.

"William Learned Marcy,"

18George Vern Blue, "The Project of a French Settle
ment in the Hawaiian Islands, 1824-1842," American Historical
R e vie w, II (1932), pp. 85-87.
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Blue, "the final chapter to the story of the only French
project that might have been the nucleus for a colonial
establishment in the kingdom of the Kamehamehas."
Although French agents desired to regenerate enthusiasm
for the idea after 1842, Blue finds no evidence of any
official instructions to that effect. ^

Blue does not

deny, however, that the efforts of individual Frenchmen
often raised speculation as to the

aims of the French

government.
Referring to Blue, as well as to his own extensive
researches in British documents, Richard W. Van Alstyne
argues that Great Britain was the only true guardian of
Hawaiian independence.

During the forties, and especially

in the early fifties, he writes, "France, or at least the
French representatives in Honolulu, hoped to bring the
islands under her veiled control, and the United States
aspired to annex them o u t r i g h t . A c c o r d i n g

to Van Alstyne,

the American rejoinder to France in 18 50, credited by some
historians with causing France to retreat, was accompanied
by a more persuasive protest from London.
France, he writes,

Britain reminded

"that its policy was only calculated to

destroy French influence in the islands and throw them into

•^ Ibid. , pp. 89-96.
^ R i c h a r d W. Van Alstyne, "Great Britain, the United
States, and Hawaiian Independence," Pacific Historical
Review, IV (1935), p. 15.
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arms of the United States."

Paris apologized to London

for the activities of its representatives, and suggested
that a detente be reached in the form of a tripartite
agreement with London and Washington over Cuba.

To this,

Van Alstyne claims, President Fillmore was sympathetic,
further suggesting that the agreement be extended to
Hawaii.

But it all came to naught, for Fillmore met defeat

in his bid for renomination.
Not surprisingly, Van Alstyne is critical of the policy
of the Pierce administration toward Hawaii.

After 1843,

he writes, "by tacit consent Hawaii was treated as a
neutralized territory.

. .and though Polk gave a nationalist

twist to the American policy in his famous message of Decem
ber 2, 1845, he did not essentially alter i t , " ^

So when

negotiations for annexation began in 1854, both France and
Britain rightfully and vigorously protested.

Although the

eventual treaty contained provisions objectionable to the
United States, Van Alstyne asserts that the Anglo-French
protest did contribute to the failure of annexation.

In

response to this unified opposition against annexation, he
writes,

"Marcy could do nothing but complain helplessly of

the British and French penchant for interfering with the

^ Ibid. , pp. 18-20.
^ Ibid. , p. 16.
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expansionist plans of the United States."23
Van Alstyne*s assertion that Anglo-French opposition
to annexation had an impact upon the American government
is supported by an earlier article.

Concerned with Russo-

American relations on the eve of the Crimean War, Frank A.
Golder refers to a speech given by Lord Clarendon before
Parliament.

Clarendon's remarks, he writes, were "inter

preted to mean that in the future England and France
would take a more active part in American affairs than
heretofore."24

According to both Van Alstyne and Golder,

Callahan’s view that annexation failed because of the
death of Kamehameha cannot be accepted without reference
to the impact on the United States of Anglo-French opposition.
To this point, the historiography of Franco-American
relations with respect to Hawaii has been piecemeal.

Missing

are both a general history of the Hawaiian kingdom and a
detailed study of foreign involvement in the mid- Pac ific.
And although Blue, Van Alstyne, and Golder correct the earlier
neglect of European sources,

their works are but articles

and as such suffer from a need to generalize.

Neither Van

Alstyne nor Golder, for example, attempt to explain how
Anglo-French opposition could have dulled the energies of

23Ibid., p. 22.
24Frank A. Golder, "Russian-American' Relations During
the Crimean War," American Historical Re vi e w . XXI (April, 1926),
pp. 463-464.
Clarendon spoke in January, 1854, as the agita
tion for annexation was at a fever pitch.
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"Young America" and forestalled annexation.

Consequently,

Ralph S. Kuykendall's history of Hawaii to 1854 is indeed
important.

In fact, Kuykendall's research is so complete

that this chapter pivots around his work.
To begin, Kuykendall, although more explicit, reaffirms
what Blue has written concerning the initial French involve
ment in H a w a i i . ^

But while Blue dismisses the Laplace v e n 

ture as unauthorized, Kuykendall asserts that the intervention
had a long-term importance.

He notes that Laplace pressed

several demands upon the Hawaiian government which embittered
Franco-American relations for many years.

Not only did

Laplace demand tolerance for the Catholic missionaries, but
he further demanded a twenty thousand dollar guarantee that
Kamehameha would honor this pledge.

Reluctantly, Kamehameha

also consented to lessen the duty on French spirits* and to
allow certain extra-territorial rights for Frenchmen.

These

last two articles, Kuykendall points out, offended the king
for they infringed on his sovereign p o w e r . W h e n

the

Hawaiian commissioners came to Paris in 1842 seeking recog
nition of the independence of their island kingdom,
agreed to grant the request.

Guizot

But he insisted, Kuykendall

25Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom. 1778-1854;
Foundation and Transformation (Honolulu: The University of
Hawaii Press, 1938), pp. 138-141.
26Ibid., pp. 165-166.
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continues, that the disagreeable Laplace treaty remain in
effect.

Guizot's stubbornness disappointed the envoys,

and continued resentment of the Laplace treaty eventually
led to the crises of

1 8 4 9 -1 8 5 1

.27

Kuykendall disagrees with the claim made by the earlier
historians, excluding Van Alstyne, that Tyler's 1842 declara
tion persuaded France and Britain to respect Hawaiian
independence.

Before the American pronouncement, he notes,

Aberdeen had determined to recognize the sovereignty of
the Hawaiian government and to refrain from seeking an
exclusive position for Britain in Hawaii.

This decision,

Kuykendall adds, was a direct response to the Laplace
visit „^
The early historians also assume that when Tyler and
Webster formulated their Hawaiian policy, they were p r o 
tecting an extensive and obvious American involvement in
the islands.

Kuykendall demonstrates, however, that the

Tyler administration was at first indifferent to Hawaiian
affairs, and that it required a calculated disclosure by
the Hawaiian envoy to prod Webster into action.

Referring

to the notes taken by William Richards, one of the Hawaiian
commissioners, Kuykendall writes:

27Ibid., pp.

201-202.
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Aside from the indication they give of W e b s t e r ’s
initial lack of interest in Hawaii, the most
significant thing in them is the revelation of
Richards' purpose to place the islands under the
protection of Great Britain in case he found it
impossible to obtain recognition of their
independence, and the evident effect of the
revelation upon the American o f f i c i a l s . 2 9
But when stimulated into action, the Tyler administration
saw not only a British menace in the mid-Pacific, but
possibly a French threat as well.

Kuykendall quotes a

dispatch which H.S. Fox, the British minister at Wash in g
ton, sent to London, analyzing T y l e r ’s speech.

It is the

opinion of the American government, Fox wrote, "'that those
islands ought not to be allowed to fall under the dominion
of any Foreign Power.

It is probable that this declaratory

movement has been prompted by the colonization of New
Zealand by Great Britain, and by the reported recent occupa
tion of the Marquesas, and other islands in the Pacific, by
a Naval Force from Fran ce .’"30
When news of Paulet's seizure of Hawaii reached Europe
and North America,

London quickly disavowed his actions.

But the British government,

suspicious Of French intentions

in the Pacific and doubtful of the American attitude,
hesitated to order Paulet's departure.

"In view of the

recent activity of the French in the Pacific and of the

^ Ibid. , p. 194,
30Ibid., p. 196.
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special interest which the Americans had in the Hawaiian
islands," Kuykendall writes, "the British government felt
it necessary, before restoring those islands, to guard
against the possibility of their falling, at some later
time, into the possession of either France or the United
StatesAberdeen

hoped to use the Paulet episode to

persuade France and the United States to agree to a tripartite
recognition of the Hawaiian kingdom.
to join with Aberdeen,

Guizot, after consenting

inquired into the American feeling

regarding Aberdeen's proposal.

Two secretaries of state,

Kuykendall notes, signified their approval of the spirit of
the plan.

Upshur "showed himself disposed to accede to the

proposition," and when France learned that the United States
would not comply, Calhoun affirmed that the American acts
constituted "'a full recognition on the part of the United
States, of the independence of the Hawaiian government.1"
With an eye to the troubles between France and Hawaii during
the Taylor and Fillmore administrations,

Kuykendall adds

that it was unfortunate that the United States did not go
the full route.32
It is Van Alstyne's premise that Great Britain sought
to protect Hawaii from French imperialism.
repeats this idea.

Kuykendall

In his view, the efforts of French

Sllbid., p. 200.
32Ibid., pp. 2 02-204.
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consuls and naval officers between 1849 and 1851 to increase
French influence in the islands, coupled with American w e s t 
ward expansion, relegated the independence of Hawaii once
again to a state of uncertainty*

The exuberant expansionism

of the United States, first demonstrated by the acquisition
of California and Oregon, and culminating with the "Manifest
Destiny" agitation of the Pierce administration,

led many

Americans to desire Hawaii for the United States.
American interest in Hawaii, Kuykendall continues, was
further stimulated by troubles between French representa
tives in Honolulu and the native government.

He writes:

"A factor of far-reaching importance was the aggressive
policy of France as exemplified in the proceedings of
French consular and naval officers in Hawaii.

French

pressure was a reagent, which, applied time after time,
precipitated crisis after c r i s i s . " ^
The American reaction to the 1849 seizure of govern
ment buildings in Honolulu by Admiral de Tromelin, Kuykendall
explains, was twofold.
Williams,

First, and here Kuykendall recalls

ties with Hawaii were strengthened by an equitable

commercial treaty.

When news reached Secretary Clayton

"of the outrage committed at Honolulu by the French Admiral

53Ibid., p. 383.
54lbid., p, 388.
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de Tromelin, at the instigation of Consul Dillon," Kuykendall
writes, "this made the American government even more willing
to take a friendly and protective attitude towards Hawaii.
Second, Clayton instructed William C. Rives at Paris to
persuade France to yield.
with some regret,

But as in 1843, Kuykendall notes

"the United States government, while

determined to. uphold the independence of Hawaii, was not
prepared to enter into any treaty arrangement with France
and Great Britain respecting the island

k i n g d o m .

"36

Upon

the receipt of American as well as British remonstrances,
the French Foreign Minister rebuked Dillon.

Finally, an

accord was reached between French officials in Hawaii
and the native government, but Kuykendall emphasizes that
it only temporarily stilled the rumors of French aggres
sion. 37
In a fashion similar to that used by Sam Houston and
Anson Jones in Texas, Gerrit P. Judd dramatized the remote
possibility of French hostilities against the Hawaiian ki ng 
dom.

After meeting Perrin, Judd, a New England missionary

prominent in the Hawaiian government, came to fear that
France might resort to force to compel Hawaii to yield to
her demands.

Thus aroused, Kuykendall continues, Judd

wrote to Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary,

55Ibid,, p. 379.
56Ibid. , p.

378.

•^Ibid. , pp. 391, 403.

-139-

and to Clayton, urging that Great Britain and the United
States protest to France and that British and American
warships be sent to Honolulu to protect the island kin g
dom^®

Webster had succeeded Clayton, and the new secre

tary voiced his concern to France.

He instructed Rives to

make such representations "'to the minister of foreign
affairs of France as will induce that Government to desist
from measures incompatible with the sovereignty and indep
endence of the Hawaiian islands, and to make amends for
the acts which the French agents have already committed
there in contravention of the law of nations and of the
treaty between the Hawaiian Government and France.'"
In reply, Kuykendall writes, France "protested her entire
innocence of any sinister designs on Hawaii.

. .all that

France wanted was equality of treatment with other nations,"
The Paris government further asserted that "the dignity of
France had been wounded by the uncourteous manner in which
the United States had intervened in the affair.
But in spite of these protestations and reassurances
of good intentions, French efforts in Hawaii had a profound
impact upon American opinion.

Because "the proceedings of

the French officers Dillon and De Tromelin were not disavowed

58Ibid,, pp. 398-399.
59Ibid., p. 407.
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by the French government and the assurances given by that
government to the United States and Great Britain were not
made public at that time,” Kuykendall writes,

"exaggerated

reports and unfounded rumors ran about freely and created
a widespread impression that France had some ulterior design
upon the Hawaiian islands and only awaited a convenient
opportunity to put it into execution,"4®

As a result, any

initiative that France may have possessed in Hawaiian
affairs soon passed to the United States.

With the upsurge

of expanionist spirit embodied in the Pierce administration,
many Americans pressed for the annexation of Hawaii.

In

quiring into Washington's attitude toward this popular
sentiment, the French and British ministers were reassured
by Secretary Marcy that the United States had the same goals
in Hawaii as their own governments.

But, Kuykendall

emphasizes, Marcy added that there were "causes which might
render the continuance of that independence impracticable,
as a consequence of which the government might fall into
other hands."

If it should come to this, Marcy continued,

the American Congress and people would welcome them.
Kuykendall suggests that Marcy was waiting for an invitation
from Kamehameha before he promoted annexation.41

40lbid., pp. 407-408,
41Ibid., pp. 418-419.
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When Hawaii,

in response to new rumors of French

ambitions, voluntarily placed herself under the auspices
of the United States in 1853, the move for annexation
began in earnest.

Although fear of French aggression soon

subsided in Hawaii, Kuykendall points out that reports
continued to circulate in the United States that such a
danger still e x i s t e d . D a v i d

L. Gregg, the newly appointed

commissioner in Honolulu, began negotiations with the native
government, ignoring the disappearance of the alleged
French threat.

In response, the French and British consuls

forewarned Kamehameha of the unhappy consequences of
American rule.

When it became clear to the London and

Paris governments that Gregg had been instructed to
negotiate for annexation,

they protested vigorously.

Fundamental to their objections, Kuykendall states, was
the not unmerited premise that three secretaries of state-Calhoun, Upshur, and Webster--had pledged the United States
to respect Hawiian i n d e p e n d e n c e .

After the eventual w i t h 

drawal of the treaty, Kuykendall notes, "several senators
attributed the failure of the annexation project to the
interference of Great Britain and France and spoke bitterly
of the hostility of those governments to the foreign policies

42lbid., p. 412.
45Ibid., pp. 423-425.
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o£ the United States.”

Clayton, now a senator, took issue

with their complaints.

Clayton argued, Kuykendall continues,

that the United States had been morally bound since 1843 to
respect the independence of Hawaii.44
In Kuykendall's opinion, then, annexation would never
have succeeded, for the United States was committed to
Hawaiian independence.
objected to annexation.
abandonment

Hence, France and Britain justifiably
Kuykendall does not credit the

of annexation solely to British and French

protests, however.

As Van Alstyne points out, the treaty

itself contained provisions objectionable to the United
States; Kuykendall also sees some merit in Callahan's
emphasis upon the impact of the death of Kamehameha III „4 ^
But Van Alstyne further asserts that Anglo-French protests
had their effect, and Kuykendall agrees.
Published in the same year as Kuykendall's study,
Clifford Gessler's paean to the beauty of Hawaii stands
in contrast to the former's erudition.

Gessler mentions

the French effort in the islands, but is content to report
the reactions of native Hawaiian and American missionaries.
In his view, the American acquisition of Hawaii was

44 Ibid., p. 427.
45 lbid., pp. 426-427.
For a lucid account of the co n
trast between Kamehameha III and his successor, Kamehameha IV,
see Osborne E. Hooley, "Hawaiian Negotiation for Reciprocity,
1885-1857,” Pacific Historical Review, VII (1938), pp. 128146.
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inevitable; hence, opposition by France and Great Britain
was futile.

No power, Gessler writes,

"can withstand the

slow, quiet force of economic penetration.

Industry had

grown up, demanding markets; the American influence that
had begun with the missionaries of 1820 became more and
more important as it developed vested interest in the
land and its products."46

Gessler is mentioned only b e 

cause he assumes that Hawaii was well within the American
sphere; why this is important this writer will discuss
later.
The influence of Kuykendall is clearly shown in the
works of three later historians.

That three students of

international affairs in the mid-Pacific published their
findings within seven years after Kuykendall gives credit
to his effort.

In 1941, Jean Ingram Brookes published a

monograph on the international competition for islands in
the Pacifid;

in 1942, Harold Whitman Bradley's review of the

American role in Hawaiian history prior to 1843 appeared,
followed a year later by his article summarizing the rela
tion of the island kingdom to American expansion; and in
1945, Sylvester K„ Stevens presented a monograph dealing
with the history of Hawaiian-American relations from 1842
to 1898.

46Clifford Gessler, H a wa ii . Isles of Enchantment
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938), pp. 81-82.
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Two aspects of Brookes’s study are of particular sign
ificance to the historiography of Franco-American relations
regarding Hawaii.

First, she clarifies the affinity of the

government of Louis Philippe for the Catholic missionaries
in the Pacific.

And second, although she reiterates

Kuykendall’s interpretation of the impact of French efforts
in Hawaii upon the United States, Brookes reaches a different
conclusion regarding the failure of annexation.
It was during the eighteen-thirties, Brookes claims,
that France became attentive to affairs in the Pacific.
But Louis Philippe’s government hesitated;

the Pacific did

not have the appeal in France that it had in Britain and
the United States.

Few agencies were available which France

could use to develop a presence in that distant region.47
Thus, Brookes states, the government of Louis Philippe,

in

spite of its bourgeois Protestantism, reached a sort of
quid pro quo with the crusading Catholic missionaries.

The

efficacy of this entente between the secular and the clerical,
was, according to Brookes, "demonstrated most spectacularly
at this time at Hawaii and Tahiti, where the French mission
aries had to cope with native governments more developed
than the average, and with strong bodies of Protestant
teachers, both American and British."48

47Jean Ingram Brookes, International Rivalry in the
Pacific Islands. 1800-1875 (Berkeley: University of California
Pr e s s , 1941), p . 69.
Ibid., p.

79.
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Because Laplace found It necessary to resort to force
in order to underwrite the mission in Hawaii, however,
France realized her impotency in the Pacific.

In order to

compete effectively with the Americans and the British,
Brookes writes, "French entrepreneurs would need not only
naval protection, but the intelligent and open backing of
their government, a first step in which would be the co m
missioning of consuls among the i s l a n d s . B u t

when

consuls Dillon and Perrin exhibited a determination to
increase the French presence in Hawaii during the years
1849-1851, the Paris government could do little to assist
them.**^

Domestic turmoil prevented France from actively

supporting her representatives abroad.

Unfortunately,

Brookes neglects to mention this.
Reviewing the Dillon affair, Brookes adds some detail
to Kuykendall's work.

It is her view that the traditional

Franco-American amity,

invigorated by the 1848 revolution,

mitigated Washington's response to Dillon's belligerency.
To be sure, Clayton became alarmed and instructed his
minister at Paris to protest.

Still, Brookes continues,

Rives found it necessary to assume a mild attitude, for
"he sensed 'an undue anxiety' on the part of the British

49lbid., p. 89.
50Ibid., pp. 191-193.
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ambassador ’to put us forward in an insidious and delicate
office that might compromise our friendly relations with
France,' when after all it was Great Britain which had a
declaration with France in 1843."51
But when in 1851 consul Perrin revived the demands on
Kamehameha, Franco-American relations suffered.

Again,

Brookes does not depart from Kuykendall's findings.

In

fact, throughout her study, Brookes uses basically the
same sources as Kuykendall.
writes,

Webster instructed Rives, she

"to inform the government that the enforcement of

such demands would be equivalent to the subjugation of the
islands by France, and that such a step would disturb
seriously the friendly relations then existing between the
United States and France."

Brookes also repeats Kuykendall's

appraisal of the French reply to these protests.^2
Lest one thinks Brookes overly dependent upon Kuykendall,
this writer will review what the former has to say about the
movement for annexation during the Pierce administration.
Before Marcy instructed his minister at Paris "to ascertain
if possible what course France would eventually take if the
United States were to add the Islands to her territories by
means which were fair and peaceable," he was aware, Brookes

5lIbid., pp. 191-192.
52Ibid., pp. 193-196.
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states, that France would appose annexation.

The French

envoy at Washington, the author continues, had tried to
give Marcy the impression that a transfer of Hawaiian
sovereignty would be forcibly resisted.

Brookes concludes,

then, that Marcy knew that this project would arouse the
disapproval of the other maritime powers.

Still, he

doubted that either France or Britain would resort to
force to prevent a n n e x a t i o n . ^
It follows from the above that Brookes discredits
the impact of Anglo-French protests against annexation.
Instead, she suggests that by the fifties American influence
in the islands had begun to decline.

Consequently, the

Hawaiian government from the beginning was ambivalent
toward annexation,

and eventually came to reconsider.

Brookes does not credit the failure of annexation merely
to this trend, however, and she is quick to add that it
did not contribute to a rise in French prestige in the
islands.^4
It is clear that both Kuykendall and Brookes see France
as the major protagonist in Hawaiian affairs during the
late forties and early fifties.

But neither author claims

that the French government was devoted to a policy of

•^Ibjd. , p. 212.
54Ibid., pp.

217-218.
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empire-building in the Pacific prior to the recognition
of Hawaiian independence.

In fact, although both review

the entente between the government of Louis Philippe and
the Catholic missionaries, they appear uncertain as to
the overall purpose of French policy in the Pacific before
1843.

The work of Harold Whitman Bradley ends this amb ig 

uity.
According to Bradley, France under Louis Philippe
was clearly committed to a program of expansion in the
Pacific.

He writes:

The first fruits of this policy were the seizure
of the Marquesas Islands and the establishment
of a protectorate over Tahiti, the latter at
the risk of a breach of relations with Great
Britain.
How much more France coveted in the
Pacific was uncertain.
The energy of the
French navy in that ocean and the willingness
of the French government to identify the cause
of Catholic missions with its own interests
furnished ample reason for fear, shared by many
American and English residents of the Hawaiian
Islands, that French aggression would not be
confined to the region south of the equator.5'5
Certainly,

the Laplace visit did little to allay these

apprehensions.

Indeed, Bradley asserts, the coercion

imposed by Laplace spurred the American missionaries at
Honolulu to send a memorial to Congress urging that the
United States shield them from similar action in the
future.

To this appeal, the Van Buren administration was

55Harold Whitman Bradley, The American Frontier in
H a w a i i : The Pioneers. 1789-1843 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1942), pp. 395-396.
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mute.

And although Tyler and Webster also hesitated,

Bradley adds that the New Englander could not afford to
ignore the American Missionary Board.

He promsied to

make at least a nominal protest to France.

So it seems

that even before the recognition of Hawaii in 1842, the
American government was aware of French imperialism in the
Pacific.

Yet, We b s t e r ’s was but a token response to the

plea of the missionaries, and Bradley concludes that Wash^
ington remained largely indifferent to affairs in H a w a i i . ^
When in 1842, the Hawaiian government determined to
obtain international recognition of its sovereignty, the
Tyler administration decided to acknowledge the extent of
the American involvement in Hawaii.

Although Bradley agrees

with Kuykendall that Webster was prompted by warnings of a
possible British protectorate over the islands, he intimates
that the missionary appeal of seventeen months earlier might
have been a factor in the decision to formulate a Hawaiian
policy.

"It is interesting, although perhaps futile,"

Bradley writes,

"to speculate as to whether the action of

Tyler and Webster in December of 1842 was in any way
influenced by a memory of Bingham’s [like Dr. Judd, a New
England missionary high in the circles of the Hawaiian
government]

recital of the aggression of Laplace or his

56lbid., pp.

315-316.
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emphasis upon the 'great importance of the entire indepen
dency of the Sandwich Islands' to the commercial interests
of the United States.
If the repercussions of the Laplace affair did influence
Webster and Tyler when they determined upon a policy for
Hawaii, then, Bradley reasons, it would have been for the
most part due to the Frenchman's reluctance to follow
official policy.

For although the Ministry of Marine favored

the expansion of French influence in the mid-Pacific, he
explains, there was nothing in Laplace's instructions which
could have provided the basis for the occupation of Hawaii.
According to Bradley, Laplace occupied Hawaii on his own
initiative primarily because he refused to accede to an
American dominance in the Pacific.

It was this personal

conviction that led Laplace in 1842 to urge his superiors
in Paris to "protect" the Hawaiian government and to advise
the Governor of California "to seek the protection which
C O

France could give but which it could not offer unsolicited."
This is convincing proof of Laplace's independence;

for, as

we have seen in the preceeding chapter, the French government
entertained little real hope of acquiring California and
even preferred it to fall, if fall it must, to the United
States rather than Great Britain.

5?Ibid., p. 316.
•^Ibid. , pp,

317-318.
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Regarding the immediate situation which prompted the
Hawaiian government to strive for recognition in 1842,
Bradley is more explicit than either Kuykendall or Brookes„
With the Laplace experience all too fresh in their memory,
the native government and its missionary advisors,

Bradley

suggests, were further aroused by news of French aggression
elsewhere in the Pacific.

He writes:

The occupation of the Marquesas Islands by France,
in July of 1842, was an event which could be
regarded only with alarm by friends of the
Hawaiian government, for it was tangible evidence
that France had colonial ambitions in the Pacific
and an unpleasant reminder that relations between
France and the Hawaiian government were less than
cord ia l.59
In the fall of 1842, Kamehameha commissioned his envoys to
treat for recognition.

The arrival of the French Captain

Mallett in late 1842, Bradley continues, made an interna
tional guarantee of Hawaiian independence even more urgent.
Many Hawaiians, as well as British and American residents,
believed that had the situation been more propitious,
Mallett would have seized the islands.

Only because the

king had already sent his representatives to Europe and the
United States, Bradley adds, was Mallett dissuaded from
adding Hawaii to the list of French possessions in the
Pacific.6°

59ibid., p. 418,
^ I b i d . , p. 420.
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Like Kuykendall and Brookes, Bradley views Pa ul e t 's
acquisition of the islands as an indication of British
suspicion of France.

Bradley notes that before the

Hawaiian government consented to transfer the islands to
Paulet, it contemplated the feasibility of a joint FrancoAmerican protectorate.

That ubiquitous Hawaiian of

American origin, Dr. Judd, rejected this, for he feared
the American government would refuse to join, thereby
allowing France to dominate Hawaiian

affairs,

61

So the

islands were surrendered to the British admiral and,
Bradley adds, an appeal sent to President Tyler urging
him to persuade Great Britain to disavow Paulet's ac ti on s, 62
Although the British disclaimed any intention of
accepting Paulet's coup de m a i n , they delayed ordering his
withdrawal.

Kuykendall and Brookes credit this hesitation

to Aberdeen's determination to commit Guizot to recognition
of Hawaiian independence.

Bradley agrees, but adds that

Kamehameha*s envoys and Edward Everett, the American minister
at London, supported British diplomacy.
France,
kingdom.

They feared that

if given an opportunity, would seize the island
Thus, Bradley continues,

they believed that the

continuation of the British occupation pending the recognition

6 1 lbid., p. 431.
6 2 Ibid., p. 435.
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of Hawaiian independence by France would be in the interest
of the i s l a n d s B u t

Everett's belief in Britain's altruistic

dedication to Hawaiian independence was not reflected in
Washington.
In Bradley's opinion, Tyler refrained from joining
Great Britain and France in a tripartite guarantee of
Hawaiian independence because he viewed the relation of
the United States to Hawaii to be vitally different from
that of the other powers.

Kuykendall and Brookes credit

American abstinence from the accord to a tradition of
avoiding treaty commitments to Old World powers.

But

Bradley sees more to Tyler's decision than merely diplomatic
tradition.

It must be remembered that Tyler distrusted

European involvement in the New World; thus, it was only
natural that he should be wary of French or British interest
in any region where the American presence was predominant.
According to Bradley, Tyler's declaration that the commercial
value of Hawaii and its geographical tie to the United States
would cause the American government to view with dissatisfac
tion a threat to Hawaiian sovereignty by another power,
signified more than merely recognition of the independence
of the island kingdom.

In effect, he continues,

it meant

that the Monroe Doctrine had been extended to the m i d - P a c i f i c .^4

63ibld., p. 462.
64Ibid., pp. 444-445.
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Fundamental to the Monroe Doctrine is the presumption that
not only is the United States predominant in the Western
Hemisphere, but also it is the sole guardian of all free
nations in that portion of the world.

It is Bradley's

view that because Tyler defined Hawaii as within the sphere
of American influence, he could not consent to a joint
guarantee of the island kingdom.
Jean Paul Faivre reaffirms much of Bradley's findings.
But while Bradley stresses the impact of Tyler's extension
of the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii upon the Anglo-French
decision to recognize Hawaiian sovereignty, Faivre emphasizes
instead the European rivalry in the Pacific.

According to

Faivre, Guizot and Aberdeen viewed possible hostilities
between their nations as too high a price to pay for the
acquisition of further territory in the Pacific; the two
thus consented to a mutual recognition of Hawaiian indepen
dence.

Concurrently with this decision, Faivre continues,

Tyler and Webster expanded the Monroe Doctrine to include
Hawa i i4

He writes:
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A

\

En 1842, la France parait a la veille d'une
puissante pousse d'expansion dans le Pacifique. . .
Aux Hawaii, le Commandant Mallett, expede des
Marquesas avec l'Embuscade par Du Petit-Thouars,
rapelie durement Kamehameha III. . ,au respect
des traites: on redoute la aussi une annexion
francaise.
Mais 1'affaire Pritchard a Tahiti,
la tentative du C.V. Lord Paulet pour placer
Hawaii sous le protectorate anglais. . .
provoquent le recul simultane de l'Angleterre
et de la^France.
Guizot et Aberdeen jugent
que les iles du Pacifique ne meritent pas de
susciter une conflict internation. . . .Les
deux puissances reconnaissent 1 1independence
d'Hawaii cependant que le president Tyler et
son secretaire d'Etat Daniel Webster elargissent
sur ce point le doctrine de Monroe.65
On the whole, Faivre's work is disappointing.

Not only is

he overly dependent upon Bradley, and also Kuykendall, but
his research is inferior to that of his predecessors.
Kuykendall, Brookes, and Bradley all employ French archival
material to a greater degree than does Faivre.
is important,

Still, Faivre

for he does support Bradley's interpretation

of Tyler's declaration.

65jean Paul Faivre, L'Expansion Francaise dans le
Pacifique de 1800 a 1842 (Paris: Nouvelle Editions Francaise,
1953), pp. 459-497.
I have translated Faivre as follows:
In 1842, France appeared on the verge of a powerful
expansionist drive in the Pacific.
In Hawaii,
Commandant Mallett, dispatched from the Marquesas
by Du Petit-Thouars, forcibly reminded Kamehameha
III. . .in regard to the treaties:
French annexa
tion was also feared.
But the Pritchard affair
in Tahiti, the attempt of C.V. Lord Paulet to
place Hawaii under an English protectorate. . .
provoked the simultaneous retreat of England and
France.
Guizot and Aberdeen decided that islands
in the Pacific did not merit the instigation of
an international conflict. . . .The two powers
recognized the independence of Hawaii; meanwhile,
President Tyler and Daniel Webster, his Secretary
of State, extended the Monroe Doctrine to that region.
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But Bradley and Faivre are not alone in their interpre
tations of Tyler's Hawaiian policy.

Sylvester K. Stevens

also believes that in 1842 Hawaii came under the auspices
of the United States through the Monroe Doct ri ne .

Stevens

maintains that Tyler saw the need to do more than merely
announce his policy.

He writes:

"The transmission to

diplomatic representatives in France and Great Britain of
the views of the administration emphasized the international
significance of T y l e r ’s statement and recorded it as an
American doctrine."66

With his policy so proclaimed,

Stevens adds, Tyler could never condone the Paulet affair.
Echoing Bradley, Stevens explains the motive behind the
American protest against the temporary cession of Hawaii:
"Actually the United States had more to fear from the
French, and might well have welcomed the Paulet seizure.

. . ,

The American response to the news of the Paulet cession c o m 
bined a bitter condemnation of British imperialism with a
shrewd calculation of the importance of Hawaii to the United
States."

f\ 7

The real significance of the protest against

Paulet's occupation of Hawaii, Stevens asserts,

is that it

indicated that Tyler's proclamation was more than a mere
statement of policy.

"Fundamental principles of Tyler's

66sylvester k . Stevens, American Expansionism in
H a wa i i . 1842-1898 (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Co.
of Pennsylvania, 1945), p. 4.
^ I b i d . , p. 16.

doctrine had been affirmed,” he writes.

It was further

"supplemented by the bilateral declaration of France and
Great Britain binding the two chief possible opponents to
a mutual check on each other,
After 1842, Stevens sees the United States as the
prime benefactor of Hawaiian independence.

He points out,

for example, that Kamehameha had been forced to sign objec
tionable treaties with Great Britain and France,

And a l 

though Ten Van Eyck, the American minister to Hawaii in
the late forties, also demanded too much from the native
government, Stevens notes that he was rebuked by Secretary
Buchanan.

69

Similarly, he credits the American protest

against the Dillon affair with persuading France to withdraw-no mention is made of any British influence.

The Taylor

administration informed the Hawaiian government that it would
not only mediate, but make clear its disapproval.

Stevens

contends that unless the United States demonstrated its
ability to protect Hawaii,

the Dillon incident could have

meant the permanent loss of the islands.

70

When difficulties again befell Franco-Hawaiian relations
in 1851, Stevens maintains that the Whig Fillmore administra
tion, which was ideologically opposed to annexation in the

68 Ibid.t p. 20.
^ Ibid. , pp. 21-22.
^9 Ibid,, p. 50.
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first place, reaffirmed Tyler's policy.

He views Fillmore's

rejection of annexation, as well as the failure of the
attempt to link Hawaii with Cuba in a tripartite guarantee,
as fortuitous.

He writes:

The Fillmore policy succeeded in forestalling
annexation and upheld the principles of the
Tyler doctrine with success, if with little
vigor.
The failure of the proposal for a
triple protectorate was fortunate indeed from
the standpoint of its effect upon future
American relations with the islands. . . ,
the forebearance of Washington in not pressing
the opportunity for a foothold offered by the
cession proposal combined to give a powerful
urge toward better relations with the United
States.71
Significantly,

Stevens insists that President Pierce,

though devoted to fulfilling the destiny of the United States,
also upheld Tyler's Hawaiian doctrine.

According to Stevens,

Marcy's instructions to David Gregg, the new commissioner to
Hawaii, "indicate again how fundamental were the principles
established for Hawaii a decade earlier by Tyler."

He notes

that "the necessity for certain territorial acquisitions as
a protection for the expanding interests of the nation became
a cardinal point in the foreign policy of Pierce."

But, he

adds, "Hawaii stood in the same relationship to the United
States as Cuba and the Antilles, which the United States
would be 'pleased'

71lbid., pp.

to see

56-57.

7^Ibid., p. 60.

'independent of European p o w e r s . '"72
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Unlike Kuykendall and Brookes, Stevens asserts that
much of the impetus behind the move towards annexation
came not from the "Manifest Destiny" spirit, but rather
from Anglo-French opposition to the possible outcome of
the increased expansionist fervor.

In his anxiety to

forward the union of Hawaii with the United States, Gregg,
Stevens notes, was confronted by "the undisguised opposi
tion of the English and especially the French consul, to
American control."

When Marcy was informed to this,

Stevens continues, he called G r e gg ’s attention to "one of
the most significant angles of the Hawaiian problem--the
growing entente of France and Great Britain in opposition
to further American territorial expansion."

Because the

Monroe Doctrine included Hawaii, a combined Anglo-French
resistance to annexation violated the principle of an
American sphere of influence.

Stevens writes:

This rise of the ambitious Louis Napoleon in
France, and the union of that power with Great
Britain in the diplomacy of the Near East against
Russia, paved the way for a closer Anglo-French
cooperation in proposals for the throttling of
American ambitions.
There were objections
equally to American attempts to control either
Cuba or Hawaii.
Marcy had placed them upon
equal footing from the standpoint of the national
interest of the United States. *
By viewing Hawaii as within the realm of the Monroe Doctrine,
Stevens can have no sympathy for the attempts of France and

^•^Ibid. , pp. 64-66.
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Britain to protect their inferior stake in the islands.
In his assessment of the failure of annexation,
again departs from Kuykendall.

Stevens

The latter, drawing from

Van Alstyne and Golder, as well as from his own researches,
concludes that the Anglo-French protest had an effect upon
Washington.

Stevens, on the o t h e r ‘hand, maintains that

annexation failed because of complications in Hawaii, and
not because of external opposition.

Stevens1s argument is

strengthened by his consideration, then rejection, of
evidence to the contrary.

He points out that Buchanan, then

minister at London, distrusted Louis Napoleon.

"'As a despot,

he regards the existence and the rapid growth of the Republic
of the United States as a standing censure upon his usurpa
tion and tyranny,'" Stevens quotes Buchanan as writing.
"'He is bold, wary and unscrupulous,'" Buchanan went on,
"'knowing that our naval force is comparatively insignifi
cant.

. .it would be altogether in consistency with his

character to attempt to humble us by one of those bold
strokes in which he so much delights, and to declare that
we shall not have the Sandwich Islands.'"

Buchanan con 

cluded, Stevens writes, that "while Cuba might be worth the
risk of war, the Islands were certainly not so important as
to justify the chance."74

74Ibid., p. 69.

Stevens concludes, however, that
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Buchanan's trepidations and the formal Anglo-French protest
had little impact upon Washington:
The question arises as to the effect known AngloFrench opposition and the advice of Buchanan may
have had.
It is questionable whether it entered
into the problem at the time.
The treaty was so
undesirable as to preclude its consideration,
even had no other factors been involved.
Marcy
was definite in his opinion that the demand for
immediate statehood would not have been accept
able.
Vigorous protest from England against
annexation may have had some influence, but was
not fundamental J 5
Perhaps it is an overstatement to claim that Kuykendall
and Stevens differ.

Both authors credit domestic problems

in Hawaii, as well as a disagreeable treaty, as contributing
to the failure of annexation.

Still, Kuykendall believes

that Anglo-French opposition to annexation was justified.
Stevens disagrees, concluding only that "the time was not
ripe for the annexation of Hawaii."7^

Because he maintains

that Tyler's doctrine in effect extended the Monroe Doctrine
to Hawaii, Stevens cannot accept the view that European
protests against annexation were justified.
This perhaps is why Henry Blumenthal reverts to the
Kuykendall viewpoint.

Reviewing T y l e r ’s Hawaiian policy,

Blumenthal never mentions the American predominance in the
islands.

The Tyler administration, he writes,

"disclaimed

any desire to seek exclusive control over Hawaii."

75rbid., p. 75.
76Ibid.

To
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avoid an international conflict, he adds, "Daniel Webster
suggested that the commercial advantages the islands offered
be made available to all powers."77

Likewise, Blumenthal

makes no mention of a reaffirmation of a "Tyler Doctrine"
in response to the Dillon affair.

He suggests that the

United States hoped to avoid difficulties with Republican
France.

Washington "did little more, therefore, than speak

up in favor of Hawaiian independence."

In so doing, he

adds, "the United States was wise--why should it complicate
relations with Paris when Great Britain could be counted
on to stop France in Hawaii?"

Obviously, Blumenthal

rejects the view that the island kingdom was under the
protection of the Monroe Doctrine.

Regarding the reaction

of the Fillmore administration to renewed Franco-Hawaiian
troubles and the offer of annexation,

Blumenthal again omits

any reference to a "Tyler Doctrine," and repeats what
Kuykendall has written about the French reply to Webster’s
remonstrances --i .e ., that American protests against French
diplomacy insulted Paris, for it had no
acquiring Hawaiian territory.

intention of

78

°

With greater confidence than Kuykendall, Blumenthal
maintains that the Anglo-French protest against annexation
was both effective and warranted.

Not only does he emphasize

^ B l u m e n t h a l , A Reappraisal, p. 61.
78Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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Buchanan's warning that Louis Napoleon might decide to resist
annexation, but he also reports that Eugene de Sartiges, the
French Foreign Minister, endeavored to convince Marcy that
such a transfer would be resisted by France and Britain,
This was no idle threat, Blumenthal adds, for "in the fall
of 1854,

. „combined Anglo-French forces moved into Hawaiian

waters to protest against the impending annexation,"

Of

the decision to drop annexation, Blumenthal writes:
The consideration which led to the decision
against annexation at that time was the A m e r 
ican government's realization that it could
not defend the islands against a strong naval
assault.
Fearing that over expansion might
weaken, if not humiliate, the United States,
the Pierce administration respected, as in the
case of Cuba, the realities of power politics.'9
Unfortunately, Blumenthal presents inadequate evidence to
support this claim.

He, as well as Van Alstyne and Golder,

fail to demonstrate that France and Great Britain, occupied
with the Crimean War, were able to resist annexation forcibly,
or to establish that the Pierce administration heeded their
p rotests.
Along these lines, it should be noted that three recent
authors have avoided committing themselves to a specific
explanation for the failure of annexation.

In a revised

edition of his biography of Pierce, Roy Franklin Nichols

79lbid,, pp. 63-64,.
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does suggest that foreign opposition to annexation did not
go unnoticed.

Nevertheless, he credits the failure of

the project more to the death of Kamehameha than to anything
else.^

Marcy's biographer,

Ivor D. Spencer, emphasizes

that the annexation proposal itself was not sincere, and
was only a stopgap measure to frustrate the rumored French
aggression.

He further asserts that March did not allow

the official protests of Clarendon and the advice of
Sartiges to deter him from pursuing an honorable Hawaiian
policy,Merze

Tate offers yet a third, an even more

general, explanation for the failure of annexation.

She

agrees with Brookes that American prestige declined during
the fifties, due primarily to the irresponsible behavior
of American residents in Hawaii and the rumors of filibuster
ing expeditions from California.

These antics, she writes,

"provided a basis for British and French contentions that
Americans were hostile to the Hawaiian race,"

Tate also

points to the death of Kamehameha III as a factor in
Hawaii's decision to move from annexation to r e c i p r o c i t y . ^

80Roy Franklin Nichols, Franklin Pier ce : Young Hickory
of the Granite Hills (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1958), pp, 376, 396-397.
81Ivor D. Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils: A Life
of William L. Marcv (Providence: Brown University Press,
1959), pp. 396-397.
^ M e r z e Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom:
A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956),
pp. 18-19; Tate, Reciprocity or Annexation (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 30.
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In summation, historians of Hawaii's role in FrancoAmerican relations have clearly demonstrated that although
French agents and consuls in the islands were indeed trouble
some, neither Louis Philippe nor Louis Napoleon aspired to
extend their Pacific realm to include the kingdom of the
Kamehamehas.

Since Foster and Callahan wrote, their assump

tion that Paris sanctioned such efforts as the Laplace and
Tromelin interventions has been successfully challenged,,
Beginning with Blue, and including especially Kuykendall,
Bradley, and Brookes, historians have searched French
archives for evidence of any official desire to acquire a
foothold in Hawaii, but none has been found.

Although

Bradley establishes that the July Monarchy pursued certain
imperialistic ambitions in the Pacific, he does not include
Hawaii.

Still,

it cannot be denied that the Laplace affair,

as well as the French occupation of the Marquesas and Tahiti,
had an impact upon Washington.

Kuykendall, Bradley, Faivre,

and Stevens have all asserted that the Tyler administration
was not unaware of French activity in the Pacific.

It is

clear that American policy in Hawaii, as defined by Tyler in
1842, was at least partially founded upon a suspicion of
French intentions.

It Is also clear that the activities of

the French consuls Dillon and Perrin increased American
concern for Hawaiian independence.
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In his declaration, Tyler had asserted that in spite
of the predominant American presence in Hawaii, the United
States would not seek "exclusive control over the Hawaiian
Government," but would be "content with its independent
existence."

He had warned, however, that the United States

would make "a decided remonstrance against the adoption
of an opposite policy by any other power."

Upholding

Tyler's warning, both the Taylor and Fillmore administra
tions had voiced to Paris their disapproval of the efforts
of Dillon and Perrin.

And although rumors of impending

French aggression prompted Hawaii to offer annexation to
the United States, the Fillmore administration refused to
consider such a project, thereby reaffirming American
dedication to Hawaiian independence.
But Fillmore's successor was not unsympathetic to the
idea of expansion.

In 1854, the eager American minister to

Honolulu negotiated a treaty of annexation with the native
Hawaiian government.

Van Alstyne and Blumenthal assert

that Anglo-French opposition was a prime factor in the
decision of the Pierce administration to reject annexation.
Their interpretation, however, is weak.

Although they

clarify Hawaii's position in the international affairs of
the day, neither Van Alstyne nor Blumenthal establishes
the degree of the commitment of Pierce and Marcy to annexa
tion, or even that the Anglo-French protests were considered
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in Washington.

In contrast, the majority of historians

have asserted that there were several obstacles, both
American and Hawaiian in origin, that prevented annexa
tion.

Whether or not Tyler intended to extend the Monroe

Doctrine to Hawaii,

it is clear that an independent Hawaii

served American interests, and that French opposition to
the half-hearted annexation project had little real impact.
So long as French representatives refrained from ambitious
attempts to increase their country's influence in the
islands, the United States remained content to respect
Hawaiian independence.
Obviously, American expansionism provided much of the
impetus behind Anglo-French efforts to prevent the possible
extension of the United States to Hawaii.

It was clear to

London and Paris that the United States was rapidly becoming
a major power, especially in the Pacific.

Even in distant

China the energy of American commercial expansion could not
be ignored.

But while France and England sought to protect

their interests in Hawaii from American dominance, the
three powers had basically the same interests in China and,
for the most part, cooperated with each other.

Throughout

the period, however, Washington avoided any official commit
ment to the aims of France and Britain in China.
There has been little disagreement regarding China's
role in the relations between Washington and Paris.

Most
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authors have maintained that American representatives in
China, although advocates of a more vigorous policy,

followed

the official policy as defined in 1843 and kept in effect
during the years before the American Civil War.

Only one

recent historian, John F. Cady, has challenged the prevalent
assumption that while the United States government declined
to join Britain and France in hostilities against the
Chinese emperor, American officials in China cooperated
closely with their European counterparts.
By 1843, it had become clear that the Chinese barrier
against foreign trade had been breached.

The "Opium War"

had ended, with Great Britain being the first European
power to receive extra-territorial rights by treaty.

Realiz

ing that once the first step had been taken China would be
pressed for similar concessions by other powers, Daniel
Webster determined to insure an American position in the
scramble.

On May 8, 1843, he instructed Caleb Cushing,

the newly appointed commissioner to China, to negotiate
with the emperor regarding American trading rights in China.
Webster set a precedent that was to guide American diplomats
in China for many years, and which prevented any real fric
tion between the United States and France.

The Secretary

instructed Cushing to avoid involvement in any controversy
which might arise between China and any European state.
Furthermore,

the minister was instructed not to express
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any sentiment which could give another government cause
for offense.83
In his survey of American diplomacy in the Far East,
Callahan presents what has become the standard interpreta
tion of United States relations with France in China,
He asserts that although Commodore Matthew C. Perry and
Peter Parker, the American consul in China during the midfifties, attempted to involve the United States in a co m
bined Anglo-French-American military front to coerce the
emperor into a revision of the 1843 treaties, the adminis
trations of both Pierce and Buchanan indicated their
determination to avoid the use of force.

The American

representatives in China, Callahan notes, were instructed
that although Washington sympathized with the aims of France
and England, they must not involve the United States in
hostilities.84
In his survey of American diplomacy in the Orient,
Foster supports Callahan's views.

The former is more

explicit, however, and his work is consequently more
revealing than Callahan's.

Foster reviews the relations

of Parker's predecessor, Robert McLane, with the French
minister, concluding that the two decided to "act in
concert in bringing pressure to bear upon the Chinese

8 3s e n . E x . D o c . (457), 28th Cong.,
p p . 1- 5.

2nd Sess., No. 138,

84Callahan, American Relations in the Far E a s t , pp. 99-100.

-170-

government to satisfy the existing grievances."

And in

so doing, he writes, "the American minister was conforming
to the spirit of his instructions from the Secretary of
State."85
Noting that Parker visited with the Foreign Ministers
of Britain and France before assuming his duties in China,
Foster contributes much to our understanding of American
policy in China.

He maintains that Parker participated in

a "free exchange of views as to the policy to be pursued
in China by the three maritime powers, and an informal
agreement

[was] reached that there should be cooperation

and harmony of action."

But when Parker reached China

and took up a scheme to acquire Formosa--plans were that
France was to get Korea and Britain Chusan^-Marcy rejected
the idea and informed Parker that "it did not in any way
harmonize with the peaceful policy at Washington."86
In 1856, hostilities broke out between the united
powers of France and Great Britain and the Chinese emperor.
Foster maintains that William B, Reed, P a rk e r’s replacement,
found no difficulty in cooperating with the two European
powers.

But there were limitations on R e e d ’s freedom.

Although Washington expressed its sympathy for the efforts

^ F o s t e r ,

American Diplomacy in the O r i en t, p. 216.

86 Ibid., pp.

221, 227-229.
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of France and Britain, Reed was authorized to cooperate
with the two powers only in peaceful endeavors.

87

Subsequent historians have largely confirmed the
Callahan-Foster viewpoint, adding little new information
in the process.

H.B. Morse notes that the French minister

in China, the Comte de Courcy, delayed his cooperation
with Parker.

According to Morse, however, this was due to

slow communications with Paris.

88

Tyler Dennett asserts

that because Parker was somewhat obnoxious, his efforts
toward cooperation offended the French and British min i s
ters.

Regrettably, Dennett does not pursue the point.

He

concludes that Washington rejected Parker's suggestions,
and relations with France and Britain in China remained
amiable.8^

In an essay on Lewis Cass, Buchanan's Secretary

of State, Lewis Einstein notes that minister Reed "smarted
under the inferiority of our position in stalking behind
England and France,

[and] suggested uniting with these

powers in a hostile movement against the Chinese."

In

Einstein's view, Cass recognized the wisdom of such a move,

87Ibid., pp. 231, 235.
88Hosea B. Morse, The International Relations of the
Chinese Emp i r e : The Period of Conflict. 1834-1860 (Shanghai:
Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., 1910), pp. 327-328,
89Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern A s i a : A Critical
Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to
C h i n a . Jap a n , and Korea in the Nineteenth Century (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1922), pp. 281-291.

-172 -

but believed that Congress would veto the idea.®^

Eldon

Griffin takes a different approach to American involvement
in China, but he reaffirms the view that relations between
the United States and France there were amiable.

"Had the

American government acquired significant territorial holdings
in the East," Griffin writes, "it would perhaps have been
obliged clearly to unify its policy with that of England,
France, and Russia."

But, he adds, in so doing, the United

States "could not have escaped the anxieties arising from
internal conflicts of interest among those powers.
Henry Blumenthal incorporates all of the above assessments
into his examination of Franco-American relations, and is
content to state that "ever since Webster's instruction
to Caleb Cushing,.

. .the United States did not wish

'to

enter into controversies between China and any European
state.'"

He concludes that American neutrality during the

Anglo-French war with China in 1856-1860 served as a
reminder to London and Paris that Washington intended to
pursue an independent policy with regard to C h i n a . ^

90Lewis Einstein, "Lewis Cass," in The American Secre
taries of State and Their Dip l o m a c y . ed. by Samuel F, B e m i s ,
Vol. VI (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 372.
^ E l d o n Griffin, Clippers and Cons ul s : American C o n 
sular and Commercial Relations with Eastern A s i a . 18541860 (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1938), p. 177.
^ B l u m e n t h a l , a Reappraisal, pp. 66-67.
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As mentioned earlier, Cady is the one author to
challenge the Callahan-Foster thesis.

In a 1954 work on

French imperialism in the Far East, Cady maintains that
France under Louis Napoleon pursued a militant policy in
the Pacific.
necessity,

While Louis Philippe consented, out of

to support French Catholics in the Far East, the

new emperor was indebted to the Catholic hierarchy for its
support of his coup d fe t a t .

But the significance of Louis

Napoleon's rule to French efforts in the Far East went
beyond a more vigorous support of Catholic missions.

Cady

writes:
. . .clerical support rendered the Prince
President vulnerable to clerical pressure on
on behalf1 of the protection of missionary
interests in the Far East.
The other
principal ingredient of Bonapartism, its
commitment to re-establishment of nationalist
prestige and empire as a condition of the
survival of the dynasty, also contributed to
the inevitable emergence of an imperialist
adventure in the Far East.93
Cady is quick to add, however,

that the policy of Louis

Napoleon confronted insurmountable obstacles in the Far
East.

France operated without a territorial base and su b

stantial commercial interests; also, naval mobilization
was difficult at best--all of which forced Paris to depend
on Great Britain for diplomatic support.94

93john F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in
Eastern Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 87.
94Ibid., p. 137.
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But Cady's real contribution to the historiography of
Franco-American relations regarding China lies in his
examination of the Parker mission.

Cady revives Dennett's

reference to Parker's belligerency and asserts that relations
between the United States on one hand and Great Britain on
the other suffered from mutual jealousy and suspicion.
According to Cady, France hesitated to cooperate with
Parker in his endeavor to convince the Chinese emperor to
revise

the 1843 treaties.

Courcy had informed Paris that

"nothing could be accomplished by making demands which the
Chinese were perfectly able to spurn."

Parker's attempts

at peaceful treaty revision, Courcy added, would "fail and
only add more grief and humiliation to the sad story of
Western relations with China."

Thus, Cady concludes- "by

the fall of 1856, the fumbling effort of Washington to take
over the diplomatic initiative in the Far East had spent
itself."

In subsequent preparations to force demands on

China for treaty revision, Cady claims, "London and Paris
understandably preferred to consult a de u x , with little
concern for Washington's views."95
It is interesting,

if not revealing, that only Cady

has challenged the Callahan-Foster interpretation of
Franco-American relations in the Far East.

95Ibid., pp. 157-159.

It seems that
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Cady is the only author to have searched extensively into
both French and American sources.

Blumenthal, who wrote

after Cady, fails to incorporate the latter’s findings into
his work.

The general assumption, then, is that the

American government, from 1843 on, cooperated passively
with France and Great Britain in the campaign to open
China to Western exploitation.

Cady has shown that France

and Great Britain were unimpressed by the Parker mission
and, because Washington would not condone a joint military
effort, generally ignored the United States.
the authors,

But all of

from Callahan forward, agree that Webster's

instructions to Cushing formed the foundation of American
diplomacy in China.

CHAPTER VI

THE CUBAN QUESTION

In the preceeding chapter, reference was made to Cuba
as the other goal of American expansionists during the
eighteen-fifties.

In fact, such axioms of "Manifest Destiny"

as propinquity and national security pointed more logically
to the acquisition of Cuba rather than of Hawaii.1

During

the first half of the nineteenth-century, the United States
had been content to allow Cuba to remain under Spanish
dominion.

In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams

had reassured Madrid that the United States would never
sanction any attempt to free Cuba from Spain.

But Adams

had also warned that the transfer of Cuba to either France
or Great Britain would be an unacceptable threat to the
security of the United States.2

By 1850, however, American

attitudes towards Cuba had changed.

The island had become

W e i n b e r g , Manifest Dest in y , pp. 190-197.
2See Adams's instructions to Hugh Nelson, American
minister at Madrid, April 28, 1823, Department of State:
Instructions to United States Ministers, Vol. IX, pp. 183243.
(Unpublished microfilm).
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politically unstable, as filibuster expeditions, originating
from the United States, challenged Spanish authority and
worked to foment revolution.

To many observers,

it seemed

doubtful that the island would long remain under Spanish
rule.

Insulted by the Northern abolitionists and fearful

that their political influence would decline, defenders
of the Southern slavocracy were further haunted by the
spectre of a collapse of Spanish rule in Cuba and the
emergence of a Negro republic.

Such a development, members

of the Southern oligarchy reasoned, would provide a base
for a general revolt of all black peoples held in bondage.
To prevent this, many prominent Southerns advocated the
annexation of Cuba by the United States.

Their ranks were

strengthened by the champions of "Manifest Destiny" doctrine
from other parts of the country.^
In Europe,

the Cuban question created a dilemma for

France and Great Britain.

Fearful lest Cuba be lost,

Spain sought the assistance of those two powers in 1845.
For six years, Paris and London demurred, demanding that
Spain first enforce her laws prohibiting the slave trade.
But in 1851, following the third and, although unsuccessful,

^See Basil Rauch, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 57-66; and
Amos A. Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soul£,
1855-1855 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), pp. 4-6.
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largest filibuster expedition of Narciso Lopez, France and
Britain reluctantly agreed to assist Spain.

A year later,

frigates of the French and British navies began to patrol
Cuban waters in search of renewed filibustering activity.^
Hoping to commit the United States to the status quo in
Cuba, France and Britain invited the administration of
Millard Fillmore to participate in a joint guaranty over
the island.

In reply, Secretary of State Edward Everett

asserted that although the United States did not covet the
acquisition of the island, the condition of Cuba was an
"American question."
continued,

The proposed convention, Everett

"assumes that the United States have no other

or greater interest in the question than France or England;
whereas it is necessary only to cast one's eye on the map
to see how remote are the relations of Europe, and how
intimate those of the United States, with this island."*’
The Cuban policy of the administration of Franklin K.
Pierce presented further problems for Paris and London.
Owing his election at least partially to a surge of expan
sionist sentiment stimulated by the disciples of "Young
America," Pierce formally advocated the acquisition of Cuba

^Ettinger, Soule, pp. 26-46.
^Sen. Ex. D o c . (660), 32nd Cong,, 2nd Ses s. , No. 13,
pp. 16-18.
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in his inaugural address.^

Pierce, and his Secretary of

State, William L. Marcy, at first delayed making a decision
as to the means by which Cuba would be acquired.

But early

in 1854, an American merchant vessel, the Black Warrior,
was seized in Havana by Spanish authorities without any
real justification.

The American minister in Madrid,

Pierre Soule, entered into negotiations with the Spanish
government, demanding an indemnity for the outrage.

Spain

delayed, and, acting on Soule's advice, Marcy authorized
the minister to attempt to purchase Cuba, and if Madrid
refused, to work to "detach" Cuba from Spain.
the Crimean War began in the same month.

Significantly,

As months passed

and no progress was made toward the purchase of Cuba, Marcy
instructed his ministers at Madrid, Paris, and London to
confer on the Cuban question.7

What has become known as

the Ostend "Manifesto" contains a review of the Cuban problem
including the Black Warrior crisis, an analysis of the p u r 
chase negotiations, and the following two paragraphs:
After we shall have offered Spain a price for
Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall
be refused it will then be time to consider the
question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain,
seriously endanger our internal peace and the
existence of our cherished Union?

^Nichols» P i e rc e , pp.

329-330.

7Learned, "Marcy," in Bemis, Vol. VI, pp. 202-203.
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Should this question be answered in the affirma
tive, then, by every law, human and divin e, we
shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we
possess the power; and this upon the very same
principle that would justify an individual in
tearing down the burning house of his neighbor
if there were no other means of preventing the
flames from destroying his own home.8
Although the conferring ministers did not conclude that
Cuba in the possession of Spain did indeed endanger the
"internal peace of the Union," the Ostend Manifesto could
easily be interpreted as an endorsement of the use of force
to acquire Cuba.
After a few days of deliberation, Marcy,

in November

of 1854, repudiated the recommendations of the Ostend dispatch
and censured its principal author, Soule.

But the spirit

of the Ostend Manifesto differed little from Marcy's instruc
tions to Soule in April, 1854.

This apparent shift in the

Cuban policy of the United States is vital to the historio
graphy of the Franco-American relations with respect to Cuba.
One group of historians explains the decision of the Pierce
administration to disavow any intention of forcibly acquiring
Cuba by pointing to the debilitating effect of the bitter
domestic strife of the fifties.

In their view, the Pierce

administration, despite the devotion of Democratic expan
sionists and Southern slaveholders to the acquisition of
Cuba, could not ignore the adamant opposition of abolitionists

8House Ex. Doc.
pp. 127-132.

(790), 33rd Cong.,

2nd Sess., No. 93
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and free soilers to the extension of slavery.

The uproar

caused by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820
and the accompanying congressional debate on the Kansas Nebraska issue seriously weakened the nation and prevented
any administration from acting with conviction in foreign
affa i rs .
To claim that the acrimonious controversy over the
Kansas-Nebraska Act prevented the United States from
acquiring Cuba, even at a time when Britain and France were
preoccupied with the Crimean War, is convincing, but of
relatively little significance to Franco-American relations.
Noting the impact upon European, and especially French,
opinion of the antics of "Young America" and of the revela»

tion of the Gstend Manifesto, a second group of historians
claim that Anglo-French protests also influenced the Pierce
administration to drop annexation.

The purpose of this

chapter, then, is to review the historiography of the Cuban
question with the intention of determining the validity
of the claim that the government of Louis Philippe, as an
ally of Britain, but also as an ideological opponent of
republicanism, contributed to the failure of the Pierce
administration to annex Cuba.
In an early article on the Cuban question,

Sidney

Webster maintains that Anglo-French intervention in the
island's affairs endangered American interests.

Although
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he wrote in 1893, Webster's study is more a memoir than an
historical analysis derived from primary sources.

He had

been a member of the White House inner circle during the
years of the Pierce administration, and his later writings
are marred by a pronounced bias in favor of Secretary
Marcy.

According to Webster, Anglo-French naval activities

around Cuba in 1852 and 1853 led Marcy to believe that
Spain's dominion over the island was faltering.

Because it

was essential that the United States prevent Cuba from
falling into the hands of France or England, Marcy and
Pierce decided to attempt to purchase the island.
Marcy doubted that Spain would be willing to sell.

But
The

promptness with which France and Britain had sent their
vessels to Cuba in 1852, Webster explains,

led the Secre

tary to believe that Spain was obligated never to transfer
the island to the United States.

Nevertheless,

in order

to uphold the Cuban policy of his predecessor, Edward
Everett, Marcy determined to make an attempt to buy Cuba.^
It is revealing of Webster's prejudice that no mention is
made of the spirit of acquisitiveness that so pervaded the
Pierce administration upon its entry into office.
Webster's predilection towards Marcy is further illus
trated by his review of the Ostend conference.

It is his

^Sidney Webster, "Mr. Marcy, the Cuban Question, and
the Ostend Manifesto," Political Science Quarterly, VIII
(1893), p p . 8-9.
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view that Marcy instructed his ministers at Madrid, Paris,
and London to confer so that the purposes of France and
Britain with respect to Cuba could be reviewed.

Nowhere

is there any mention of an intention, or even a desire,
on the part of Marcy or Pierce to acquire Cuba with force,
if necessary.

Thus, Webster sees no incongruity in Marcy's

repudiation of the Ostend recommendation that Cuba could
justifiably be wrested from S p a i n . T h i s

may in part be

due to the unavailability of documents; still, one doubts
whether Webster could ever have found fault with Marcy's
diplomacy.
While Webster leaves us in some doubt as to the
ultimate goal of the Pierce administration regarding Cuba,
James Morton Callahan clearly states that it was to acquire
Cuba, preferably by purchase, but by force, if necessary.
Depending for the most part upon published documents and
secondary contemporary accounts, Callahan asserts that
Anglo-French naval intervention in Cuba in behalf of Spain
constituted an open challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and,
as such, warranted a forcible American reaction.

Although

Everett had reasserted the principle of an American sphere
in his rejection of the tripartite guarantee of Cuban
status, Callahan claims that this did not suffice to protect

l ® I b i d . , p.

22.
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American interests.

Destiny pointed unmistakably to an

eventual acquisition of Cuba by the United States; neither
France nor Great Britain had a right to interfere.

Callahan

w r i te s:
The feeling that nature had made two continents
with separate interests Ted the American Govern
ment to reject the tripartite proposal.
The
United States had only a general interest in the
fate of Turkey; why should England and France
watch the fate of Cuba, which lay under America's
right arm?
In seventy-five years England, Spain
and Portugal had lost vast colonies.
The United
States had become large and peaceful; it had
needed territory and had purchased it. . . .If
necessary, the United States might in the future
acquire more t e r r i t o r y . H
Clearly, Callahan is guided by his belief that Britain and
France sought to thwart the natural expansion of the United
States and challenge American supremacy in the New World.
Like Webster, Callahan points to Anglo-French naval
activities around Cuba as boding ill for the United States.
"It was feared," he writes, "that both England and France
had made some sort of arrangement to sustain Spanish dominion
in Cuba."

But while Webster believes that these maneuvers

led Marcy merely to seek further information, and eventually
to authorize the Ostend conference for the same purpose,
Callahan asserts that the Pierce administration, encouraged

H j a m e s Morton Callahan, Cuba and International Relatiions
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1899), p. 233.
It is
of note that Callahan also stresses the Guizot-Polk exchange
of 1845 as a further example of the contrasting interests of
Europe and America.
See pp. 196-197.
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by developments in Europe, dedicated itself to the
acquisition of Cuba.

The Crimean War had begun in the

spring of 1854; furthermore,

"France had recently erected

an imperial throne--and some in the United States thought
it was over the crater of a volcano which would keep the
Emperor watching for his own safety."

Callahan concludes

with conviction that "a Continent was before us, and a
bright future.

Who could doubt that the Monroe Doctrine

would be enforced?"^2

One wonders if the enforcement of

the Monroe Doctrine meant the conquest of Cuba.
Reviewing Soule's mission to Spain, Callahan reaffirms
his view that France, in alliance with Britain, conspired
to prevent the United States from achieving its rightful
destiny by the purchase of Cuba.

Without mentioning

Soule's views on slavery, or his devotion to the "Young
America" movement, Callahan notes that the minister c o m 
plained to Marcy that Spain was under the influence of
France.

Soule further asserted that since Louis Napoleon

opposed the American acquisition of Cuba, he was shunned
by the Spanish government.

Callahan also accepts Soule's

claim that France and Britain interfered with the Black
Warrior negotiations.

12Ibid., pp.

Soule, Callahan writes,

261-265.
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said that the interference of England and
France in the recent disturbances in Cuba
"may have emboldened Spain" to experiment
upon the patience of the United States, but
that they could not influence us to deviate
from a course of justice to United States
citizens and of honor to our flag.13
Consistent with Callahan's assertion that the AngloFrench intervention in Cuban affairs merited a determined
American response, and that the two powers had no right to
meddle with the destiny of the United States in the New
World,

is his explanation of the failure of annexation.

In his view, only domestic complications prevented Pierce
from procuring Cuba for the United States.

Marcy publicly

renounced the recommendations of the Ostend Manifesto,
not because Washington feared France and England would
intervene if it was decided to eject Spain from Cuba, but
rather, Callahan writes, because "the excitement which
grew out of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation rendered it
impossible to secure the annexation of Cuba by any war
which the slavery expansionists might have inaugurated
for that purpose."!^
Granted, Callahan's interpretation has many deficiencies,
not the least of which is his assumption that France and
Great Britain without hesitation sent their naval forces to
Cuba in order to frustrate the expansion of the United

l^ibid., pp.

268-269.

l^Ibid., pp. 274-278.
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States.

Also, he neglects to examine the foibles of

S o u le ’s character, and what impact, if any, his activities
had upon Pierce's Cuban diplomacy.

Still, Callahan has

made a valuable contribution to the historiography of the
Cuban question.

He makes the significant observation

that the Cuban policy of the Pierce administration under
went a transition between the inauguration and the fall
of 1854.

Although he neglects to analyze Marcy's

instruction to Soule and the other conferring ministers,
Callahan at least recognizes the contrast between the
professed aims of the Pierce administration in 1853 and
the rejection of the Ostend recommendation that the United
States,
Cuba.

if necessary, could rightfully eject Spain from
Beyond the obvious impact of the Kansas-Nebraska

furor, Callahan suggests that another factor in this
transition may have been Secretary Marcy's early artificial
enthusiasm for the annexation of Cuba.
he writes,

"Marcy pretended,"

"to believe that the condition of the island

was alarming--that England was endeavoring to control its
future by inducing Spain to take steps toward the emancipa
tion of the slaves, and that France had guaranteed Cuba to
Spain on these conditions."

According to Callahan,

domestic problems, when combined with the termination of
Marcy's dissembling to favor annexation, negated any
chance that the United States would acquire Cuba in the

-188-

15
eighteen-fifties.
Callahan's influence upon later historians has been
substantial.

John H. Latane, Elizabeth Brett White,

and C.A. Duniway all repeat his assumption that Britain
and France, with the intention of containing American
expansionism,

intervened enthusiastically in Cuba.

Like

Callahan, each of these historians views the Anglo-French
patrolling as sufficiently serious to warrant Everett's
rejection of the tripartite proposal and the revival of
the Monroe Doctrine.

According to Latane, for example,

Everett's refusal to endorse the tripartite idea con
stituted a direct protest against the Anglo-French
intrusion.

Latane further echoes Callahan when he

examines the diplomacy of Marcy.

He notes that in Marcy's

instruction to Soule, the Secretary emphasized the danger
presented to the United States by the presence of British
and French naval forces in the waters around Cuba.
the interests

In

of American security, Latane concludes,

Marcy could not allow Cuba to fall to another power.

X6

Unlike Callahan and Latane, White intimates that the
crisis in American-Cuban diplomacy caused by Anglo-French
intervention did not emanate solely from the offensive

15Ibid., p. 274.
1 f\

John H. Latane, The United States and Latin America
(Garden City: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1921), pp. 97-99.
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nature of that intrusion.

She points out that Everett's

predecessor and close friend, Daniel Webster, realized
the impassioned reaction that the combined naval opera
tions would cause in the United States, and that this
would harm Washington's relations with the intervening
European powers.

Webster, she writes, believed "that

the difference between the government of American and
that of European states is of a type to create mutual
suspicion and aversion; and that knowledge of this
creates in American a jealousy of European interference."
Since the theme of her work is American opinion of
France, White concludes that French intervention in this
case, then, could not fail to produce some irritation, if
not worse consequences."

17

White adds that the Cuban

affair was but one incident in a list of grievances causing
the American people to look at France and her emperor with
a critical and suspicious eye.

18

In an essay on Webster's career as Secretary of State,
Duniway summarizes Callahan's thesis regarding the Cuban
policy of France and Great Britain.

He writes:

l^white, American Opinion of France, pp. 136-137,
18ibid., p. 142.
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Great Britain and France viewed with serious
alarm the repetition of filibustering attacks
upon Cuba, which the United States had not
prevented.
They ordered their squadrons in
the West to repel by force any and all
attempted invasions of Cuba.
Notification
that this had been done alarmed in turn the
United States. 19'
None of the above authors even hint that France and
Britain viewed the propserous Cuban slave trade with
disgust, or that such an abhorrence of human bondage
at first delayed, then limited Anglo-French backing
of Spanish rule in Cuba.
Foster Stearns first challenged Callahan's assump
tion that France and Britain plotted to frustrate American
expansion by their intervention in Cuba.

Writing in the

same volume as Duniway, Stearns notes that the French and
British ministers protested that Everett had over-reached
to their naval intervention by his rejection of the
tripartite plan and his assertion of the principle of an
American sphere.

He adds, however, that Everett could

not be swayed by such protestations, despite their justifica
tion, for he had a larger purpose in mind than merely
challenging the intervention.

According to Stearns,

Everett was seeking to formulate the fundamental p r i n 
ciples of a foreign policy that future administrations
could adopt.

Thus, although Stearns intimates that the

19Duniway, "Webster," in Bemis, Vol. VI, p. 106.
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United States had little reason to object to Anglo-French
patrolling of Cuban waters--unfortunately, he does not
mention why--he is of the opinion that consideration of
this would not have softened Everett'e pronouncement.
Not only did the Monroe Doctrine have to be upheld, but
it also had to be interpreted as applying to Cuba.^^
So although Stearns takes a different approach, his
conclusion is identical to Callahan's.
To this point, Callahan's interpretation has remained
basically unaltered.

White is important in that she

demonstrates that much of the crisis over Cuba was due
to American suspicion of Europe, and especially the
government of Louis Napoleon.
vague to be of much use.

But her findings are too

Henry Barrett Learned demon

strates that this failure to reevaluate Callahan's findings
can be credited to a lack of evidence.

He is the first to

make extensive use of both State Department archives and
private correspondence.

Through his research, Learned

became aware of the significance of the period between
April and November of 1854.
Soul£,

if necessary,

On April 3, Marcy instructed

to work "to detach" Cuba from Spain;

at the end of November, Marcy repudiated the Ostend report,
which incorporated just such a provision, and censured

20poster Stearns, "Edward Everett," in ibid., pp. 135136.
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Soule.

In order to explain this peculiar transition,

Learned found it necessary to assess the relative
impacts of domestic and foreign attitudes upon the
Pierce administration.

For that reason, his essay

merits close attention.
In spite of the dissimilar philosophies of Fillmore
and Pierce, Learned asserts that the new administration
adopted Everett's Cuban policy.

Everett's rejection of

the tripartite proposal revived the Monroe Doctrine,
since 1845 a Democratic article of faith, and "made a
bold and clear assertion of the United States as the
leading power of the Western World."

What advocate of

American expansionism could find fault with this?
Learned is quick to add, however, that Everett's stand
did not commit the Pierce administration to refrain from
intervention in Cuba.
guarantee, he writes,

The rejection of the tripartite
"left the problem of Cuba's destiny

open to such arrangement as might be deemed desirable by
any future administration,"

But Marcy and Pierce made no

decision regarding Cuba for a year after the inauguration.
Still, the Cuban question did not go unnoticed; Marcy on
several occasions urged his ministers at Madrid, Paris,
and London to discover, Learned writes,

"any signs of a

changing attitude on the part of the British, French,
and Spanish governments towards the United States in
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respect to our relations with Cuba."
adds that Marcy,

Significantly, he

’’aware that the Cuban question remained

in an unsettled state, was open to suggestions."21
Learned is not the first to assert that the opinions
of Soule influenced Marcy.

Callahan notes that Soule's

suspicion of the intentions of France and England regard
ing Cuba led Marcy to authorize the Ostend meeting.

But

Callahan accepts Soule's analysis of the European scene
without reservation.

In his view, Soule judged the motives

and policies of the Great Powers accurately; hence, Marcy
was correct to act upon Soule's recommendations.

While

Learned agrees that Soul&'s dispatches influenced Marcy,
he adds that the m i n is te r’s view of European affairs was
clouded by a profound prejudice.

Soule held strong

opinions regarding Cuba, slavery, and the empire of Louis
Napoleon which should have precluded his appointment.

A

native Frenchman expelled from his home country during
the eighteen-twenties for revolutionary activities,
eventually settled in New Orleans.

Soule

The mercurial Latin

rose swiftly in Louisiana politics, and reached the United
States Senate in 1847.

Learned stresses that in the

process, Soule became a loyal advocate of the slavocracy,
and concurrently, the acquisition of Cuba.

His appointment

21Learned, ’’Marcy," in ibid. , Vol. VI, pp. 184-185.
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to the Madrid post was solely political.22
The policy of watchful waiting ended in April of
1854.

At that time, Learned writes,

"the administration,

acting through Marcy, advocated a definite change of
policy.

. .it was decided to recur to the project of

trying to purchase Cuba from Spain."

According to

Learned, the affair of the Black Warrior had some influence
in causing the shift of policy.

That incident made it

clear that for American relations with Cuba to stabilize,
reform was necessary.

But, he emphasizes that it is easy

to exaggerate "the affair of the Black Warrior as being
the essential and impelling factor in the situation."

23

Also prominent in the Secretary's mind at the time,
Learned writes,

"was the idea that England and France

together might be involved in instigating Spanish insolence
towards the United States,"

Not surprisingly, the man

behind Marcy's thinking was Soule.

Just prior to the

Black Warrior crisis, Learned points out, Soule had inti
mated to Marcy that Spain, because of domestic problems,
might be receptive to a transfer of Cuba to the United
States.

Accepting Soule's recommendations, Marcy author

ized the minister to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba.

22Ibid. , pp. 176-177.
23Ibid. , pp. 187-188.

-195-

But of far greater significance, Learned continues, Marcy
also instructed Soule that if Spain proved unreceptive
to an offer, "'you will then direct your efforts to the
next most desirable object, which is to detach that
island from the Spanish dominion and from all dependence
on any European power.'"

24

The ambiguity of the phrase

"to detach" did not escape Learned;

it is his view that

it caused Soule "to advance blunderingly ahead for
several more months."2^

Unlike Callahan, and also Webster,

both of whom find little fault in Marcy's diplomacy,
Learned assigns to him the responsibility for what trans
pired at Ostend and Aix-la-Chapelle.
A further motive behind the authorization o„f the
ministerial conference, according to Learned, was Marcy's
distrust of France.

Neglecting to explain why, Learned

notes that Marcy doubted Britain would oppose the cession
of Cuba to the United States, but was uncertain as to the
Cuban policy of Louis Napoleon.

With the hope of obtain

ing more information regarding French policy, Marcy suggested
in his pre-conference instructions that "the French govern
ment, less responsible to public opinion than that of
England, and unchecked by an effective parliamentary

24Ibid., pp. 191-193.
25Ibid., p. 203.
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influence, had

'already indicated a tendency to intermeddle

in the affairs of the American Government.'"26
respect, Learned corroborates White;

In this

after the pathetic

failure of the Second Republic, and the subsequent rise
of Louis Napoleon, Americans viewed France as governed
by an autocratic and reactionary emperor hostile to the
cause of republicanism.
When the three ministers met at Ostend, their primary
mission was to suggest alternative approaches to the
Black Warrior negotiations--or so Marcy believed.
Learned claims, however, that because of the ambiguity of
the word "detach" in Marcy's April instructions to Soule,
the conferring ministers endorsed what appeared to be a
forcible acquisition of Cuba.2^
The Ostend dispatch arrived in Washington on No v e m 
ber 4, 1854.

For nine days, Pierce and his cabinet c o n 

sidered its recommendations.

According to Learned, their

eventual decision amounted "to a sharp repudiation of an
ideal which went back in origin to the notable letter of
April 3, 18 54," in which Marcy had instructed Soule to
seek "to detach" Cuba from Spain if the purchase negotia

tions failed.

Regarding the portion of the report which

could be construed as an endorsement of force, Marcy

26Ibid. , p. 202.
^ Ib i d . , p. 193.
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"declined to admit any such inference, as wholly unwar
ranted."

Marcy then informed Soule, Learned adds, that

conditions in Cuba presented little menace to the United
States;

existing problems could be eliminated through

discreet negotiation.28
The reasons behind the decision to disavow the
Ostend Manifesto is a troublesome subject for historians.
Learned asserts that the reply "looks very much like a
mode of helping the Pierce administration out of confusion."
Lacking a more precise interpretation, Learned offers the
following:
Obviously, there was no man able or strong
enough to guide this particular phase of our
foreign affairs in a straight-forward and
high-minded way.
Politics, sectional strife,
and animosity over the domestic issue of
slavery were at the bottom of the mismanage
ment of the phase.
That such an explanation is disappointing, Learned concedes.
The historian, he writes, "must admit himself mystified,
regretful that there are no records of discussions in the
Cabinet over the momentous days from November 4 to 13.1,29
Despite his admission of a certain degree of ignorance,
Learned believes that domestic opinion led Marcy and
Pierce to reject the recommendations of the Ostend Manifesto.

28Ibid,, pp.

210-211.

29Ibid., pp.

211, 216.
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He found no solid evidence to support the claim that AngloFrench protests were a factor.

In this respect, he is in

basic agreement with Callahan.
In his authoritative biography of Pierce, Roy F.
Nichols suggests an alternative explanation for the
decision to disavow the Ostend Manifesto.

The Pierce

administration, Nichols explains, grossly misjudged the
European attitude toward the United States in general
and Cuba in particular.

When the Crimean War began in

1854, it seemed to many Americans that the United States
could acquire Cuba with impunity.

Pierce and Marcy,

Nichols continues, relied on this when they authorized
Soule, if Spain should refuse to sell, to work to "detach"
Cuba from Spain.
Nichols writes:

But the chance for success was dim.
"Neither Pierce nor his associates

comprehended the reputation which the United States had
acquired in the European chancellories, nor what strong
containing forces these antagonists could bring to bear
upon the so-called "Manifest Destiny" of the republic."

7(]

It is significant that Nichols fails to define the

•^Nichols, Pierce, p. 347.
The first edition of
N i c h o l ’s biography appeared in 1931.
Although the author
terms the second edition "completely revised," his inter
pretations with respect to the Cuban matter remained
basically unaltered.
A.A. Ettinger, whose work on the
Soule mission appeared in 1932, refers to Nichols often
and reaches much the same conclusion.
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"strong containing forces" that Britain and France could
have used during the Crimean War to oppose the annexation
of Cuba.
Nichols also points to other factors that contributed
to the repudiation of the Ostend Manifesto and the censure
of Soule.

In the first place, Marcy's devotion to the

expansionist mission had never equalled Pierce's.

"Pierce

had started out under the influence of Young America,"
Nichols writes, "but Marcy and experience had gradually
been toning him down."3^

Thus, by the time the Ostend

dispatch reached the President's desk, caution prevailed
over ambition and campaign promises.

According to

Nichols, the failure to keep the Ostend recommendations
secret also persuaded Marcy and Pierce to retreat.

The

most widely read American journal in Europe, the New York
Hera l d, had "announced that the three conferees had
advised the government to declare,

in effect,

'that our

safety demanded and our interests required we purchase
Cuba at once.'"32

Furthermore, Nichols agrees with

Learned that the conferences at Ostend and Aix-la-Chapelle
aroused the Pierce administration to fear the possible
consequences in Europe if the Ostend report were accepted.

3-*-Ibid. , p. 330,
32Ibid., p. 360.
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All this, when combined with the recent Democratic set
back at the polls, led to the denial that the United
States might forcibly acquire Cuba, and to the censure
of Soul^, thereby removing a prime irritant in American*Z T

European relations.
At this point, a short review is in order.

In

spite of his many faults, Callahan isolates a develop
ment essential to an understanding of Franco-American
relations regarding Cuba.

He points out that the p r e s 

ence of French and British vessels in Cuban waters,
followed by the tripartite proposal, made it necessary
for Secretary Everett to either reject the proposition
and assert the Monroe Doctrine, or to allow American
predominance in the Western Hemisphere to wane.

In

Callahan's view, destiny had unmistakably allotted Cuba
to the United States; only domestic turmoil prevented
annexation during the Pierce administration.

Fundamental

to Callahan's interpretation is his assumption that at
the first opportunity Britain and France eagerly rushed
to aid Spanish rule in Cuba,

intending also to thwart the

natural expansion of the United States.

None of the

historians reviewed so far have challenged this assumption.
With the exception of Learned, historians have ignored

35Ibid., p. 368.
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the impact of Soule upon the Cuban policies of both
France and the United States.

That the provocative

Soule might have offended the government of Louis
Napoleon, causing Washington's Cuban policy to be viewed
with suspicion, Callahan never suggests.

Learned does

make a point of Soule's personality, but his greatest
contribution was made in his emphasis of the ambiguity
of the phrase "to detach" Cuba.

Like Callahan, Learned

offers only a general explanation of the rejection of
the Ostend Manifesto --domestic turmoil negated the
possibility that Cuba could be acquired at that time.
But Learned also notes that the Cuban policy of France
troubled Marcy, and that the Paris government was upset
over the Ostend conference.

Although Nichol,s also

believes that domestic strife influenced the decision to
postpone annexation, he further suggests that AngloFrench protests against annexation had an impact upon
the Pierce administration.
One other aspect of Nichol's work deserves mention.
He devotes much effort to demonstrate the influence of
the "Young America" movement upon American foreign policy.
He claims that Pierce's espousal of the precepts of
"Young America" caused the President to misjudge the
attitudes of France and Britain towards an American
acquisition of Cuba.

A.A. Ettinger expands this idea,
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asserting that "Young America" did indeed have an impact
upon the Cuban policy of the United States.

In connec

tion with this, Ettinger challenges Callahan's interpre
tation of the intervention of France and Great Britain
in Cuban affairs.
Unlike Callahan, Ettinger claims that Anglo-French
naval activities around Cuba were not intended to be a
barrier against American expansion.

Ettinger stresses

that Spain's plea for Anglo-French assistance had been
rejected repeatedly since 1845.

Until the last spectacular

Lopez expedition in 1851, London and Paris had insisted
that before they would intervene, Spain must agree to
end the slave trade in Cuba.

Only with reluctance did

the two nations finally consent to defend Spanish rule
in Cuba.

Not without some difficulty, London and Paris

reached an accord, which, in the aftermath of the Lopez
debacle, "led directly to Anglo-French intervention in
American-Spanish affairs, to the extent of issuing orders
to their respective navies, as well as attempting direct
diplomatic negotiations with the United States, on behalf
of Spain.
When France and Britain determined to seek American
acceptance of a mutual guarantee of Cuban status, Secre
tary of State Webster, for reasons of health, delayed.

34Ettinger,

Soule, pp.

26-33, 41.
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After further delay, Webster's successor, Everett,
issued his rejection of the plan, while incorporating
Cuba in the Monroe Doctrine.

Everett's policy statement,

Ettinger asserts, most upset Sartiges, the French
ambassador to the United States.

Seeking reassurance,

Sartiges went above Everett to the White House.
President Fillmore reaffirmed Everett's stand,
distressing the French envoy.

But
further

Of this, Ettinger writes:

What the Frenchman most regretted was "the
emphasis which President Fillmore placed on
the necessity in which Spain may find itself
of selling Cuba to the United States, and
the declaration which he makes of the right,
which the United States reserves to itself,
of acquiring, by right of conquest, that
island in the first war which arises between
it and Spain."35
If the Cuban policy of a Whig administration so disturbed
the French, then there can be little doubt regarding the
Paris reaction to President Pierce's predilection for
expansion and his appointment of "Young America" men to
diplomatic posts.
Nichols points out that Pierce misjudged the European
attitude toward an American acquisition of Cuba.

Ettinger

agrees, emphasizing Soule's appointment to Madrid as the
outstanding example of Pierce's awkward handling of inter
national affairs,

Before his appointment, Soule had

55Ibid., pp. 81-83.
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demonstrated by a provocative speech on the Senate floor
that he lacked the essential quality of any diplomat-namely, that one's public views be palatable to his
assigned government.

In his oratory, the Louisiana

Democrat argued for the annexation, by whatever means
necessary, of Cuba.

He further accused France and

Britain of plotting to prevent its consummation.
Naturally, the South and "Young America" rejoiced over
Soule's pronouncement.
a different course.

In Europe, however, opinion took

Ettinger writes:

.■ . .abroad, these views met with a distinctly
hostile reception.
Soule's attacks on Great
Britain and France, both for their tripartite
proposals and as to their colonizing methods,
made him persona non grata in London and Paris,
while his pronounced annexationist views,
together with his aludation of Lopez, earned
him the hatred of Madrid and Havana, *6
But in the eyes of Europe, Soule's advocation of annexation
constituted only a part of his disagreeable nature.
Ettinger also emphasizes his identification with George N.
Sanders, spokesman for "Young America," as well as his
devotion to republicanism everywhere.

He writes:

Soule's deep interest in the liberal movement
in Europe, which had reached its zenith in the
uprising of 1848, had been given full expression
in his oratorical support of the French efforts
of that year; and it was fostered by the sub 
sequent visits to the United States of Louis
Kossuth. . . .Soul6 and Sanders. . .soon became
the genii of the wing of the Democratic party

S^Ibid., p. 100.
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which, in 1852, was to prove a thorn in the
flesh o f the President in his Cabinet and
diplomatic appointments, and which was known
as ’’Young America"; its ideal of American
geographical boundaries being once defined
as "East by sunrise, West by sunset, North
by the Artie Expedition, and South as far
as we darn p l e a s e !" This association, more
perhaps than any other, colored Soule's
concepts, due to its dual doctrine of
encouraging European republicanism and
asserting the American expansionist policy
of manifest destiny in Cuba.37
It is little wonder, then, that Soule's appointment
elicited protest from foreign ministers stationed in
Washington,

But of all, Ettinger notes, "the French

were the most voluble."38
Both enroute to, and while at Madrid,

Soule demon

strated that his prejudice against European conservatism
and his opinions regarding Cuba would continue unmitigated.
It is Ettinger’s belief that Soul e’s various activities
did much to set French opinion against the United States,3®
Although the Crimean War hindered the Anglo-French
alliance from accomplishing all that it might have desired

3 ?Ibid,, pp. 118-119.
58Ibid., pp. 156-157.
3®0ne example of Sou le ’s conduct deserves notice.
Before reaching Madrid, Soul£ stopped in Paris,
On his
own initiative, he attempted to persuade the Foreign
Minister that France should desert her British ally.
Soule failed, and Marcy officially disavowed his actions,
but not for the last time.
Ibid., pp. 181-187, 198-199,
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to do for Spain, the two powers still found time to p r o 
mote a settlement of the Black Warrior problem,

and never

did they abandon hope of preventing an American acquisi
tion of Cuba.

In agreement with Nichols, Ettinger asserts

that Pierce and his advisors misjudged the European
attitude toward the Cuban question.

In spite of the

numerous troubles in Europe, he writes,
that the three nations

"it became clear

[France, Britain, and Spain] would

present a united diplomatic front to the United States,"40
The increasing resentment felt by European govern/

ments against the antics of Soule put Marcy in an untenable
position.

Like Learned, Ettinger notes the significance

of the period between Marcy's instructions to Soule and
his receipt of the Ostend report.

During that period,

Marcy had not only become aware of an increasing hostility
in Europe toward the United States, but he also had come
to regret Soule's appointment.

The Ostend dispatch merely

forced the Secretary into a decision.

Relying on Marcy's

support because of his instruction to "detach" Cuba,
necessary,

Soule "saw but one duty: the acquisition of

Cuba, sans ethics, sans legality, sans expediency,
anything,"

if

sans

Ettinger further stresses the significance

of SouTe's covering letter to the Ostend M an i f e s t o ,

4 0 Ibid., pp.

262-263.

He
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writes:
Soule was. . .the first to admit in official
correspondence his frank willingness to fight
to obtain Cuba, and he was quite convinced
that a war with Spain would not draw Great
Britain and France, for both would decline
to interfere, the former because of AngloAmerican trade, the latter on account of
the Crimean War and European politics.41
But by November of 18 54, Marcy had become immune to Soule's
appraisals of European politics, however accurate they may
have been.
According to Ettinger, the repudiation of the "detach
Cuba" clause of April is logical.

As do Nichols and

Learned, he points out that the expose by the Herald
and the results of the November elections were two factors
in the decision.

But Ettinger continues, emphasizing also

Marcy's disgust at Soule's revolutionary activities in
Spain and free-lance behavior.

Furthermore, the denial

of the Ostend Manifesto, as well as the censure of Soule,
"saved the United States from a conflict with an AngloFrench-Spanish alliance, the creation of which had been
deterred by Spain's stubborn refusal to enforce her antislavery trade treaties, and by the Crimean War."

While

Nichols only intimates this, Ettinger is quite explicit.42
In support of this last assertion, Ettinger notes

43-Ibid., p. 369.
42Ibid., pp.

381, 501.
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the reaction of the French minister, Sartiges, to the
repudiation of the Ostend Manifesto.

He writes:

This brilliant representative of France saw
clearly the fact that Pierce and Marcy were
’’brusquely abandoning their agents after
having authorized them to proceed," and he
clearly understood the implied doctrine of
seizure, and M a r c y ’s resultant embarrassment
which led him to disavow Soule.43
Ettinger concludes that the decision to repudiate the
Ostend Manifesto and to censure Soule acted as a slave
on Franco-American relations.
Basil Rauch repeats the emphasis given by Nichols
and Ettinger to "Young America" as a significant factor
in European-American relations regarding Cuba.

But unlike

Ettinger, Rauch believes that the boisterous movement had
a definite impact upon American foreign policy even before
the election of Pierce.

The professed goals of "Young

America" did not go unnoticed in Europe; hence, Rauch
suggests that the clamor for the annexation of Cuba by
Fillmore's opponents contributed to the Anglo-French idea
to propose the tripartite plan.

He writes:

The desire of American for Cuba was increasing
while the popularity and strength of the a d 
ministration and the Whig party waned.
Plans
for new filibuster expeditions became secondary
only to the "Young America" fervor to secure
in the 1852 election a new administration that
would annex Cuba.
Spain anxiously sought aid

4 3 Ibid., p. 396.
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in preserving her island against the expan
sionist opponents of the Fillmore adminis
tration.
Rebuffed in her latest attempts
to ally France and Britain to her Cuban
interest, she could only await the outcome
of British and French efforts to commit the
United States, through the anti-expansionist
Fillmore administration, to a renunciation
of future possession of the island,44
When Everett rejected the Anglo-French proposal and r e 
asserted American predominance in the Caribbean,
and London were disappointed;

Paris

still, they remained firm

in their determination to prevent an American acquisition
of Cuba.

During the height of the pre-inaugural debate

on Cuba, Fillmore sounded a timely warning that, Rauch
claims, became only too clear to Pierce and his advisors
in late 1854.

Fillmore, Rauch writes,

annexation would.

"warned that

. .be a very hazardous measure.

. . .

The internationalism preached by Young American would
combine all Europe against the United States."4'’

But

that such a realization did indeed lead Pierce and Marcy
to repudiate the Ostend Manifesto, Rauch never quite
claims.

Instead, he believes that M a r c y ’s use of the

phrase "to detach" in his instructions to Soule was an
oversight, and that the rejection of the Ostend dispatch
corrected that error.4^

44Rauch, American Interest in C u b a , p. 173.
45Ibid., p. 239.
46Ibid., pp.

281-283.
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Although Nichols, Ettinger and Rauch all point to
the influence of "Young America" upon European opinion,
they fail to demonstrate conclusively that Anglo-French
protests contributed to the repudiation of the Ostend
Manifesto.

Nichols and Ettinger mention that the Crimean

War encouraged the Pierce administration, and especially
Soule, to seek to acquire Cuba, but, at the same time,
they seem to assume that France and Britain could have
acted forcibly in both the Caribbean and the Black Sea.
On the one hand, they note the validity of Soule's belief
that the time was right for the United States to acquire
Cuba, and on the other hand, they assert that Marcy and
Pierce could not ignore the possibility of European inter
vention against annexation.

This is a crucial weakness,

and it has led one historian to revive Callahan's viewpoint
that domestic strife defeated the expansionist yearnings
of the Pierce administration.
In his study of divisive politics of the fifties,
Allen Nevins maintains that the furor over the KansasNebraska legislation precluded the annexation of Cuba.
He asserts that the Pierce administration sought diversion
from its domestic embarrassments in the Cuban venture, but
adds that "an administration which blunders in home affairs
is likely also to blunder in foreign affairs."

Tracing

the evolution of the Cuban policy of Pierce and Marcy,
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Nevins asserts that it was an exercise in futility.

He

writes:
. . ,in obedience to the rule that a precipitate
temper always defeats itself, by its Kansas
foray the Administration had gone far toward
cancelling any Cuban venture.
To millions of
Northerners, slavery expansion on the breezy
Western plains was bad enough without joining
it to slavery expansion in the opulent
Caribbean. . .after the fateful January of
1854, an aggressive movement southward would
utterly have wrecked the Democratic Party in
the North, and divided the country into two
mutually hostile halves.47
Nevins acknowledges that the activities of Soule and "Young
America," as well as the publication of the Ostend dispatch
offended Europe, but he hastens to add that the hottest
attacks came from the American freesoil press.48
Agreeing with Nevins, M a r c y ’s biographer,
Spencer,

Ivor D.

sheds some light on the internal politics of the

Pierce administration,

Without M a r c y ’s knowledge,

Spencer

notes, Pierce had indirectly hinted to Soule during the
Black Warrior negotiations "that he was about to abandon
Soule."

But at the same time, Spencer adds, Marcy "was

as impotent as before."

When the Ostend dispatch reached

Washington, Marcy finally regained control over the
diplomacy of the Pierce administration.

Spencer asserts

^ A l l e n Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union, Vol. II:
A House Divided (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947),
pp. 347-348.
48Ibid., pp. 362-363.

that the uproar caused by the publication of the Ostend
recommendations had a profound influence on the Secre
tary.

He writes:
Marcy was deeply perturbed.
While there was
no thought of accepting the advice of the
"Manifesto," its terms were soon known in
substance to the press, bringing the admin
istration in the public eye to its lowest
point of its term.

As a result, Spencer concludes, "when the Cabinet debated
the recommendations from Ostend,
win a complete victory."

. . .Marcy was able to

Through Marcy's efforts, the

Ostend dispatch was repudiated and Soule was

c e n s u r e d .

^9

Nowhere does Spencer claim that Anglo-French protests
prompted Marcy to disavow the Ostend dispatch.
In contrast to Nevins and Spencer, Henry Blumenthal
maintains that concern for foreign opinion played a most
vital role in the Cuban diplomacy of the United States.
His study is noteworthy in two ways: not only does he
reaffirm Ettinger's assertion that Everett's pronouncement
surprised especially the French, but he also places the
entire Cuban episode within the rivalry of international
politics.

The tone of Everett's message, Blumenthal

writes,

49Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils, pp.

326-332.
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. . .surprised French statesmen as much as
the refusal to underwrite the perpetual
neutrality of Cuba.
They saw in this
immoderate interpretation of the Monroe D o c 
trine an attempt to substitute for general
principles of international law an exclusively
American law.50
As a result, France became determined to resist an A m e r 
ican acquisition of Cuba.
When Marcy disavowed the Ostend dispatch,

it was in

recognition of French, and to some extent British, opposi
tion to annexation.

But preservation of the Cuban status

quo was not without a price.

Blumenthal writes:

Counting on time to remove European obstructions
from the course of America's life-lines, Marcy
yielded temporarily to superior force.
But
France and Britain had only won a Pyrrhic
diplomatic victory, bought at the cost of
America's growing mistrust of Europe.51
But what of the Crimean War?

Blumenthal appears to assume

that, in spite of their European distractions, France and
Britain could have wielded a "superior force" to prevent
the annexation of Cuba.

He also ignores the domestic

difficulties of the Pierce administration.
Clearly, the view that Anglo-French protests against
the Ostend recommendation that the United States could
justifiably "wrest" Cuba from Spain persuaded the Pierce

50Blumenthal, A Reappraisal, p. 56.
53-Ibid. , p. 57,
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administration to postpone annexation is extremely weak.
Blumenthal is the only historian to claim that the threat
of European military intervention forced Pierce and
Marcy to reject the Ostend Manifesto and to repudiate
Soule.

Nichols and Ettinger suggest that French and

English opposition,

stimulated by the activities of

Soule, may have been a factor in the decision to disavow
all intention of acquiring Cuba, but they fail to
document this.

In spite of its seventy years of existence,

Callahan’s interpretation that the Kansas-Nebraska co n
troversy so weakened the country as to preclude any
ambitious schemes abroad is still convincing,

if not

revealing, to the student of Franco-American relations.
And yet, in their attempts to discover the role played
by France and Great Britain in the Cuban question, Learned,
Nichols, Ettinger, and Rauch have shown that the Cuban
diplomacy of the United States resulted in a deterioration
of Franco-American relations.

It cannot be denied that

France--France and Louis Napoleon being one and the
same--was deeply offended by the activities of "Young
America."

When the American government appointed men

like Pierre Soule to official posts abroad, and they then
proceeded to advance the cause of international republican
ism, there is little doubt that Franco-American relations
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suffered.

Unfortunately, by emphasizing the impact of

the "Young America" spirit on Napoleon Ill's opinion
of the United States, these historians are led to stress
the role of France in Cuban affairs.

Conspiciously

absent in all of the authors reviewed is a detailed
examination of the attitudes of Great Britain, without
whom France could never effectively oppose American
expansion.

British policy with respect to Central A m e r 

ica has been extensively and skillfully examined; a
similar treatment of British policy with respect to Cuba
during the fifties might shed much light upon FrancoAmerican relations.

CHAPTER VII

FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
SANTO DOMINGO AND CENTRAL AMERICA

Although Cuba dominated the diplomacy of France and
the United States in Latin America during the eighteenfifties, a civil war in Santo Domingo and the question
of a Central American canal route presented potential
problems to policy-makers in Paris and Washington.

It

is true, however, that the Haitian-Dominican conflict,
in spite of the vigorous competition among French,
American,

and British agents, did not become a crucial

issue in Franco-American relations.

It is also true that

the quest for a canal route involved primarily England
and the United States, Napoleon III remaining content
that the British confront the republic.

Nevertheless,

these two issues are important to an understanding of
Franco-American relations during the fifties.

In both

areas, France and the United States exhibited some of
the same policy considerations that governed their actions
in more spectacular controversies,
Moreover,

such as Cuba and Texas.

it is precisely because the Haitian-Dominican
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struggle and the search for a canal route did not fire
the passions of American public opinion that these two
issues cast light upon the nature of Franco-American
diplomatic relations.
A former French and Spanish colony, Santo Domingo
attracted international attention in 1843, when white
property owners revolted against their black Haitian
governors and established the Dominican Republic on
the eastern half of the island.

Immediately, the Haitians

set out to regain their lost territory and to reassert
their dominion over the rebels.

Fearing defeat by the

numerically superior Haitians, the Dominican government
turned for aid to France, which .had long been involved'
in the affairs of the island and had once before defended
the white population against a black uprising.
as Dexter Perkins writes,

Although,

"the Dominican pear was ripe

for assistance to supplement her colonial empire.
Nursing a dltente with Great Britain, Guizot feared that
London would object to the establishment of any form of
French colony in Santo Domingo.

Also, the French minister

could not ignore a large Haitian debt to France, which
probably would be lost if Paris were to aid the Dominican
government.

Significantly,

the Polk administration,

occupied with continental expansion, remained silent

-
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toward Dominican affairs during the mid-forties.^
Through five years of sporadic but bloody warfare
the Dominican Republic held on.

But in 1848, following

a series of defeats, a panic-stricken Dominican Congress
renewed its plea for aid.

Desperate,

the Dominicans

consulted not only French, but British and American
agents as well.

No longer could the United States ignore

developments in the troubled island; inevitably,

Santo

Domingo became an issue in Franco-American relations.^
The historiography of Franco-American relations with
respect to Santo Domingo centers around the unusual
tripartite agreement of 1850.

By that accord, the United

States, in apparent violation of its doctrine of two
spheres, agreed to cooperate with France and Great Britain
in an effort to mediate the bitter civil, war.

With the

death in 1852 of its principal American advocate, Daniel
Webster, the tripartite agreement ended in dismal failure.
And with the inauguration of the Democratic Pierce in
1853, American policy in Santo Domingo appeared to shift
from cooperation with France and Britain to a pursuit of

^Perkins, Monroe Doc tri ne, p. 257; Sumner Welles,
N a b o t h 1s Vi n e y a r d : The Dominican Repu bli c. 1844-1924
(New York: Payson and Clarke, 1928), Vol. I, pp. 66-76.
^Charles Callan Tansill, The United States and Santo
Domi ng o. 1793-1873 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1938), pp. 130-131; Welles, Naboth's Vi n e y a r d . I, p. 91.
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nationalistic goals.

During Pierce's administration,

Secretary of State Marcy sent General William L. Cazneau
to Santo Domingo to offer recognition in return for the
cession of a potential coaling station at Samana Bay.
The idea of an American protectorate over the vulnerable
nation also received passing consideration.

French and

British representatives, however, successfully persuaded
the Dominicans to avoid any quid pro quo agreement with
the United States, and the Cazneau mission ended in
failure.
The student of Franco-American relations with respect
to Santo Domingo is confronted with three basic problems.
First, it is a primary concern for historians to determine
what factors prompted the Whig administration of Millard
Fillmore to ignore established American foreign policy
and to allow European powers to intervene in the internal
affairs of an American state.

The paradox is even more

striking when one considers that the same administration
which participated in a joint intervention in Santo
Domingo refused to do so in Cuba.
cerns the Cazneau mission.

The second problem co n

Here, it is not so important

for historians to determine what factors induced Pierce
to seek an acquisition of territory in Santo Domingo-his expansionist predilections have been outlined else
where in this thesis--as to evaluate the impact of the
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attempt upon Franco-American relations.

And because of

the successful Anglo-French effort to frustrate the
Cazneau mission,

the historian is also confronted with

the problem of French policy in the island and its
effect upon American plans.
In an early review of Dominican-American relations,
Mary Treudley offers disappointingly few answers to
these questions.

On one point, however, she is clear.

She emphasizes that the initial American involvement in
Dominican affairs came as a direct result of suspicion
of French aims.

Treudley notes that as the fortunes of

war turned against the Dominican Republic in 1848, the
United States began to realize the vulnerability of the
youthful nation to European intervention.

In 1849,

Secretary of State Clayton dispatched Benjamin E. Green
as a special agent to the besieged country.

G r e e n ’s

official mission was to determine the stability of the
Dominican government in preparation for its recognition
by the United States.

Treudley asserts, however, that

G r e e n ’s real purpose was to prevent the establishment of
a French protectorate over the Dominican Republic.

She

concludes that on the eve of the tripartite pact, di s
trust of the French involvement in Santo Domingo was a

determinant of American

policy.^

There can be little doubt that the deep French
involvement in Dominican affairs, when coupled with the
crisis of the civil war, gave Washington cause for
concern.

As Treudley demonstrates, evidence of this

abounds in State Department correspondence.

But what

influence did this have upon the American decision
to enter into the tripartite agreement?
Treudley is vague.

On this point,

She acknowledges that not only did

participation in the agreement conflict with traditional
American foreign policy, but also that Washington permitted
France and Britain to take the initiative.

According to

Treudley, joint action seemed inevitable, for some manner
of intervention was deemed necessary to restore peace to
the troubled island.

And if the racially embittered war

could be ended, the threat that France would utilize the
Dominican plight to acquire territorial concessions would
be diminished.

She writes:

The American government seems to have been
earnest in its desire to bring about peace
in Santo Domingo in order to restore p r o s 
perity to the island and to lessen the danger
of European intervention.
That England and
France were as desirous as the United States
of an amicable settlement was considered false
by the American agent [Green]. Both nations

3Mary Treudley, The United States and Santo Domi ngo.
1789-1866 (Reprinted from The Journal of Race Development.
Worcester, Mass., 1916), p. 236.
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had more to gain bv a continuance of disorder
within the island.
This is plausible, but quite weak.

Fundamental to

Treudley's interpretation is her assumption that u n i 
lateral American intervention would fail to end the
Haitian-Dominican war.

She merely states, without

documentation, that the Fillmore administration regarded
joint action as inevitable.

And except for Green's

dispatches, which alone are not sufficient, Treudley
offers no evidence to support her claim that by consent
ing to the tripartite plan the United States hoped to
lessen the danger of European involvement in Santo Domingo.
Treudley is even more sketchy regarding the policy of
the Pierce administration toward Dominican affairs.

At no

time does she attempt to assess the degree in which Pierce
aspired to acquire Dominican territory.

Hence, her

assertion that French and British opposition frustrated
the expansionist schemes of the United States in Santo
Domingo is, in spite of its validity, quite weak.

She

merely concludes that "the American government was quite
as unwilling as the Dominican to incur the hostility of
the great European powers and so allowed itself to be
blustered out of its plans by threats of force.

4 Ibid., pp.

238-240.

^Ibid., pp.

244-252.
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In his history of the Dominican Republic,

Sumner

Welles rectifies some of Treudley's shortcomings.
Through extensive research into the Dominican archives,
Welles offers a persuasive explanation for the decision
of the Fillmore administration to enter into the
tripartite pact.
Upon reading Treudley, one is led to the conclusion
that the United States, suspicious of French intentions
in Santo Domingo from the outset, agreed to the tripartite
effort as a means of thwarting a possible French acquisi
tion of the island.

Although Welles agrees that rumors

of French schemes stimulated American interest in Santo
Domingo, he is quick to note that Washington received
reassurance from Paris that the desires of its agents to
acquire Dominican territory were unsanctioned.

True,

the Dominican Congress in 1849 passed a resolution request
ing France to accept a protectorate.

But to the dismay of

the ambitious French representatives, Paris disavowed any
intention of accepting the

p ro p os a l.

^

The Dominican govern

ment, hinting at the possibility of annexation to the
United States, then turned to the newly arrived Green.
Since he had no authority to accept such an offer, Green
could give the Dominicans no encouragement.

^Welles, Naboth's V i n e y a r d , I, pp.

He told the

78-91.

-224-

Dominican government that the United States preferred the
country to remain independent, urging that they seek
American recognition by treaty.

Disappointed, the

Dominicans again turned to France.

Learning of this,

Green sought out the French consul, who informed him
that the Paris government had refused to accept a
protectorate over the Dominican Republic.

Thus assured,

Green proceeded to present his credentials and began
negotiations for recognition.
It should be noted here that later historians have
confirmed Welles's claim that the United States had little
reason to fear that France would acquire Dominican terri
tory.

Dexter Perkins, the preeminent student of the

Monroe Doctrine, agrees with Welles that French agents
in Santo Domingo negotiated with the Dominican government
for concessions in the hope that Paris would consent.
Perkins adds that there was even some annexationist
propaganda in France itself.

But, he writes,

"at no

time were the responsible authorities at the Quad d'Orsay
anxious to add the Dominican Republic to the French
colonial responsibilities."^

7Ibid., pp. 100-102.
^Perkins, Monroe Doc trine. p. 254.
Other histor
ians who have noted the reluctance of the French govern
ment to acquire Dominican territory are Tansill, United
States and Santo D o m i n g o . pp. 130-131, 133; Rayford W.
Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States
with Hai t i , 1776-1891 (Chapel Hill: University of North
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According to Welles, the primary goal of American
policy in Santo Domingo was to insure the independence
of the Dominican Republic,

It is his belief that this

consideration prompted the Fillmore administration to
accede to joint mediation.
interests

Because of the legitimate

of France and Great Britain in Santo Domingo,

Welles states, Secretary of State Webster concluded
that the only means of securing Dominican independence
lay in cooperating with the two in joint mediation.®
The tripartite agreement remained in force for two
rather disappointing years.

It is not without some

regret that Welles notes the ending of that effort.
With Web s te r’s death and the shifts in American
diplomacy caused by the demands of domestic politics,
Welles asserts that the honorable policy of "disinterested
assistance" in Dominican affairs was cast aside.

In

its place, the Pierce administration sought to acquire
Samana Bay and even considered the annexation of the
entire Dominican Republic.

But due to the efforts of

French and British representatives, this "Manifest

Carolina Press, 1941), pp. 245-246; Ludwell Lee Montague,
Haiti and the United States. 1714-1958 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1940), pp. 57-58; Blumenthal, A
Reappraisal. p. 49.
®Welles, Naboth's V i n e y a r d , I, pp. 107-108.
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Destiny" impulse of the United States suffered a setback.1®
In contrast to his earlier work, Welles provides little
documentation for this claim.

Like Treudley, he fails

to define the extent of Pierce's commitment to expansion
in Santo Domingo.

It is also significant that Welles

later became the foremost advocate of the "Good Neighbor"
principle, declaring that noninterference and equality
should be the keystones of Washington's Latin American
policy.11

Writing on the policies of the Pierce admin

istration in Santo Domingo, then, Welles uses the term
"Manifest Destiny," with all of its imperialistic implica
tions, to describe an unde ined and undocumented yearning
for Dominican territory.

Subsequent authors have taken

Welles to task on this issue, suggesting that in effect
the Dominican policy of the Pierce administration differed
little from that of the Fillmore administration.1^

As a student of the Monroe Doctrine, Perkins takes a
special interest in the Haitian-Dominican conflict.

As

10Ibid., pp. 140-153.
11While Under Secretary of State during the adminis
tration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Welles was a firm
believer in mutual cooperation between the United States
and the countries of Central and South America.
See his
article, "New Era in Pan-American Relations," Foreign
A f fai rs , XV (April, 1937), pp. 448-449.
l^See Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp. 272-274; Tansill,
United States and Santo Dom ing o. pp. 135-136.

"221 -

noted earlier, he agrees with Welles that although the
plight of the Dominican Republic presented an opportunity
to France for expansion, the French government refused
to sanction such an endeavor.

Perkins emphasizes, h o w 

ever, that American insistence that France respect the
Monroe Doctrine did not contribute to the reluctance of
the Guizot ministry to add part of all of the Dominican
Republic to its colonial possessions.

Rather, Guizot,

fearful of alienating Great Britain and worried that the
Haitians would refuse to pay their debt, instructed the
French consul-general that France would not accept a
protectorate.

Neither in 1844 nor in 1849, Perkins

concludes, did the attitudes of Washington have much
influence on French policy in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic.^
Like Welles, Perkins asserts that the Fillmore ad 
ministration sought only to secure the independence of
the Dominican Republic, and for that reason it did not
object to the efforts of Britain and France to end the
civil war.
agreement,

During the existence of the tripartite
for example, the representatives of France

and England,

"by virtue of a threat of blockade.

. .

extracted from the Haitian potentate the promise of a

13Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp.

254-261.
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truce for one year."

Obviously, the Fillmore adminis

tration did not interpret the Monroe Doctrine as a blanket
embargo on all European involvement in the New World.
Perkins writes:

"The complacency, therefore, with which

the Whig administration not only looked on, but encouraged,
the action of France and Great Britain in Santo Domingo,
shows how little devoted it was,
to the principles of

1823

in any abstract sense,

."-^

But it can hardly come as a surprise that a Whig
administration would be circumspect in its conduct of
foreign affairs, and avoid the application of a general
principle to a specific case.

And although, as Perkins

notes, the policies pursued by France and Great Britain
in. Santo Domingo were in clear violation of the Polk
Doctrine,
about it.

the Democratic Pierce administration did little
Granted, it did not adopt the cooperative

spirit that prevailed during the Fillmore administration.
Perkins states that the newly elected Pierce administra
tion "proceeded to interest itself without delay in the
question of Santo Domingo."

Appointed early in 1854,

Cazneau was instructed to offer recognition in return
for Samana Bay.

The Dominican government eagerly accepted

the offer and a draft treaty, providing for the cession of
Saman^i Bay, was drawn up.

l^Ib i d ., pp. 266-267.

At this point, however,

the
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French and British ministers in the island became alarmed
and persuaded the Dominican president to revoke the p r o 
vision dealing with the bay.

The ministers reminded

President Pedro Santana, Perkins writes, that France
and Britain "had extended their protection to the
Dominican government,.

They could do so no longer if

the republic were to subinfeudate itself to the United
States.”

Although Cazneau warned the French and British

representatives that they had violated the Monroe Doctrine,
Perkins concludes that Washington accepted the defeat
without protest and officially rebuked C a z n e a u . ^
In their attitudes toward the application of the
Monroe Doctrine to European intervention in Santo Domingo,
then, Perkins sees little real difference between the
Fillmore and Pierce administrations.

Although one sought

to bring about peace in the island through tripartite
mediation, and the other sought to strengthen the
Dominican Republic through a reciprocal treaty, neither
objected to French and British involvement in the affairs
of Santo Domingo.
There is one drawback, however, to the Perkins
interpretation.

Because no American government, from

Polk to Pierce, ever voiced an objection to European

ISlbid . t pp.

267-273.
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intervention in Santo Domingo, he suggests that the
Monroe Doctrine was ignored.
disagrees.

Charles Callan Tansill

In his opinion, the American governments

from 1849 to 1860 patiently sought to realize the
ultimate goal of the Monroe Doctrine.

He asserts:

From the American point of view the situation
in the Caribbean was seriously involved.
In
accordance with the Monroe Doctrine it was the
desire of the American Government constantly
to diminish European control and steadily to
magnify American influence in that r e g i o n .16
According to Tansill, there was one constant that
guided the relations of the United States with France in
Santo Domingo--namely, the destiny of Samana Bay.

As he

demonstrates from some original research in the diplomatic
correspondence of Secretary Clayton, even the Whiggish
Taylor administration harbored a desire to acquire Samana
Bay.

Acting upon reports that the Dominican government

had offered to cede the bay to the French in return for
protection against the Haitians, Clayton sent new instruc
tions to Green.
Tansill writes,

"From the tenor of these instructions,"
"it is evident that Green was not only

entrusted with the duty of defeating foreign schemes for
securing Samana Bay but was further expected to prepare
the Dominican Government to cede this very bay to the

l^Tansill, United States and Santo Dom i ng o, p. 135.
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United States.”

But the Dominicans offered annexation

instead, and Green,

for the want of specific instructions

on that subject, could only suggest negotiations in
preparation for recognition.

Whereupon the Dominican

government, Tansill continues, addressed identical notes
to the representatives of France,

the United States, and

Great Britain, requesting joint mediation.

"The matter

thus became an international affair,” Tansill concludes,
"and for the next two years these three powers exacted
pressure upon the emperor of Haiti in favor of a c o n 
ciliatory policy towards the Dominican Rep ubli c.
With the abandonment,

for various reasons, of the

effort at joint mediation in 1852, Tansill asserts that
the policies of France and the United States returned to
competition for concessions.

During the short tenure of

Edward Everett as Secretary of State, and throughout the
Pierce administration, rumors of French intrigues were
rife.

Tansill acknowledges that the French foreign office

assured Minister William Rives "that the rumored occupa
tion of Samana Bay by a French squadron was nothing more
than a fable from begining to end.”

Still, the United

States could not afford to ignore the French presence in
Santo Domingo and, during the Pierce administration,

l?lbid., pp. 133-136.
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resumed negotiations with the Dominican government for a
reciprocal commercial treaty.

Like Perkins, Tansill

believes that Washington's attempt to enhance the
American position in Santo Domingo through a favorable
trade agreement with the Dominican government might have
succeeded had it not.aspired to acquire Samana Bay.

In

any case, the opposition of the French and British
representatives proved effective.

In the aftermath of

the furor over the Ostend Manifesto, along with the
domestic unrest stirred by the Kansas-Nebraska debates,
the Pierce administration, Tansill writes, had no desire
"to adopt an aggressive policy that would again invite
the sharp opposition of the European powers."

18

In Tansill's view, the basic consideration that
governed American policy in Santo Domingo from 1849 on
did not betray the ideal of the Monroe Doctrine.
various administrations of the United States,

The

in spite

of repeated French denials of any intention of acquiring
Dominican territory, distrusted the French involvement in
that besieged country and consistently sought to lessen
it.

Suspicion that the Dominicans might cede Samana Bay

to the French in return for assistance led the Democratic
Marcy to attempt to acquire that bay in return for

18Ibid., pp. 172-175,

202-204.
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recognition of the Dominican Republic.

Nevertheless,

Tansill agrees with Perkins that the United States, unable
to pursue an aggressive policy in Santo Domingo, had
little real impact upon affairs in that island.

Since

the tripartite idea had originated in the Dominican
Republic, the United States could do little else but
agree.

To be sure, the tripartite plan was perhaps less

offensive to the sensibilities of the Whig Fillmore
administration than to its successor.

Yet, as Treudley

and Welles have suggested, even the Democratic Pierce
administration witnessed without objection the defeat
of its Dominican policy by French and British agents.
Perkins and Tansill,

through their more extensive r e 

searches, substantiate this.
That even the expansionist Pierce administration
had relatively little influence in Dominican affairs is
reaffirmed by the works of three later historians.
Writing on Haitian-American relations, Ludwell Lee Montague
outlines the nature of Anglo-French opposition to the
signing of a treaty between the United States and Santo
Domingo in which Samana Bay would be included:
Anglo-French propaganda to the effect that the
United States would seize the country, thrust
the natives aside, and enslave the blacks,
created an uproar among the Dominicans; direct
Anglo-French menaces persuaded their Congress
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to reject not only the least [of Samana Bay]
but also a commercial treaty that would have
embodied recognition.19
In a similar vein, Rayford W, Logan notes that even
during the tripartite mediation Paris was convinced that
the United States would seek to acquire territory in Santo
D o min go , and for that reason hoped to commit the United
States to a recognition of the independence of Haiti.

20

In his survey of Franco-American relations, Henry Blumenthal suggests another factor aside from Anglo-French
opposition that contributed to the defeat of the Dominican
policy of the Pierce administration.

Had it not been for

certain clauses in the proposed treaty involving racial
discrimination inimical to the interests of the Dominicans,
Blumenthal explains, the Pierce administration could have
acquired Samana Bay in 1854,

Still, Blumenthal does

acknowledge that throughout the fifties the United States
and France continued to compete for Samana Bay, while
Great Britain maneuvered to prevent either from acquiring
it, 21
At first glance, it would appear that several inter
pretations of American policy toward the French involvement

19Montague, Haiti and the United States, p. 60,

?n

*uLogan, Diplomatic Relations of the United States
with Hai t i , pp. 260-261.
^ B l u m e n t h a l , A Reappraisal, pp. 48-49.
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in Santo Domingo have been offered.

According to Treudley,

the United States strongly suspected that France would
capitalize upon the Haitian-Dominican conflict to supple
ment her colonial empire.

In her view, Washington co n

sented to participate in the tripartite pact in order to
bring about peace in Santo Domingo, thereby lessening
the danger of European intervention.

Welles, however,

notes that the United States had ample knowledge of the
reluctance of the Paris government to pursue an aggres
sive policy in Santo Domingo.

It is his belief that the

United States, until 1853, was committed to the honorable
policy of securing the independence of the Dominican
Republic, and since France and Britain had legitimate
interests in Dominican affairs, Webster rightly agreed
to tripartite mediation,

But both Treudley and Welles

see a contrast between the Dominican policy of the Taylor
and Fillmore administrations on one hand, and that of the
Pierce administration on the other.

They intimate that

after 18 53, Franco-American relations deteriorated over
the Dominican issue.

Yet, as Perkins demonstrates,

neither the Taylor, the Fillmore, nor the Pierce adminis
trations saw fit to apply the Monroe Doctrine to Santo
Domingo.

Tansill has pursued this point, asserting that,

in effect, American Dominican policy from 1849 to 1860
was consistent.

He interprets the American desire to
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acquire Samana Bay and to attain a commercial treaty with
the Dominican Republic as a patient,

restrained effort

to lessen European influence in the island.

That his

policy received a setback in the mid-fifties was reflec
tive of the inability of the United States to control
affairs in Santo Domingo without a determined interven
tion.

Even the militant Pierce administration accepted

this, and voiced no objection to the defeat of its
Dominican plans.

As a result, Santo Domingo failed to

become a serious issue in Franco-American relations.
Because Great Britain dominated the concerns of
American policy-makers with respect to a Central American
canal route, that issue also had little impact upon
Franco-American relations.

But this does not mean that

France ignored developments in Central America.

Several

authors have stressed that both Guizot and Louis Napoleon
were not averse to the possibility that France might play
a role in the realization of such a canal.22

Lewis

Einstein has demonstrated, however, that the United States
had no reason to fear the prospect of French involvement
in the quest for a canal route.

France had assured

22See Perkins, Monroe Doc tr in e. p. 159; Gerstle
Mack, The Land Div id ed : A History of the Panama Canal
and Other Isthmian Canal Proiects. (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1944), pp. 178-179.
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Washington, Einstein notes, that it had no designs on
Central America.

During the fifties, Paris remained

true to this promise, totally refraining from any inter
ference ,23
The one blemish on this record of noninvolvement
occurred in 1855,

One Felix Belly, a French journalist

much intrigued by the idea of a canal route, at first
verbally, then by a filibuster to Central America,
challenged the Monroe Doctrine.

But Dexter Perkins

points out that the French government had nothing to do
with M. Belly's extraordinary activites.
remained unconcerned;

The United States

events in Central America did no

harm to Franco-American relations.

24

The basic consideration behind French policy towards
a Central American canal route is best explained by Henry
Blumenthal.

Because the taming of America's "Manifest

Destiny" spirit had been an aim of French policy since
the forties, France welcomed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The United States had acknowledged the legitimacy of the
British presence in Central America; France could gain
nothing by intervention, Blumenthal

c o n c l u d e s .

25

23Einstein, "Cass," in Bemis, Vol. VI, p. 353.
24perkins, Monroe D o ct ri ne, pp. 245-247.
For a
review of Belly's activities, see Cyril Allen, "Felix
Belly: Nicaraguan Canal Promoter," Hispanic American
Historical R e view, XXXVII (February, 1957) , pp. 46-59.

25’
Biumenthal, 4 Reappraisal. p. 59.
Hamilton, Tpvl or , Vol. II, p. 374,

See also
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One student o£ French interest in the Caribbean
area, however, doubts whether Louis Napoleon ever ab a n 
doned his long-held desire to build a canal across
Central America.

W. Adolphe Roberts suggests that the

French emperor resorted to an indirect means to fulfill
his dream.

According to Roberts, Napoleon's ill-fated

adventure in Mexico during the sixties stemmed from a
passion not only to control that country and establish
a Catholic monarchy, but also to construct a canal at
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Nicaragua depression,
or the Isthmus of P a n a m a . ^

Roberts fails to fully

substantiate this claim, but that Louis Napoleon's
diplomacy in Mexico was not unrelated to his overall
attitude towards the New World cannot be doubted.
Although neither Santo Domingo nor the Canal q u e s 
tion became crucial to Franco-American relations, the
policy of France in the Dominican Republic, as well as
the sentiment of Louis Napoleon with respect to a Central
American canal make it clear that the interests of France
in the New World were at odds with the Monroe Doctrine.
But Cuba was the focus of the "Manifest Destiny" doctrine
during the fifties; neither the Fillmore nor the Pierce
administrations viewed Anglo-French involvement in Santo
Domingo and Central America

as inimical to the interest

of the United States,
Adolphe Roberts, The French in the West Indies
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill C o ~ 1947), p. 253.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In any historiographical study, one can pursue two
themes.

The first concerns the research of the historians

under discussion.

Obviously, the writing of history is a

cumulative process.

Either previously untouched sources

are used to support a new interpretation, or well-known
sources are analyzed anew, causing the historian to
challenge an established viewpoint.
knowledge is altered.

Gradually, historical

This process, although somewhat

unappealing to the layman, is of interest to any serious
student of history, and is a worthy goal of historio
graphical study.

But historiography can also be reviewed

with another, perhaps more stimulating, goal in mind.
By analyzing the historiography of a subject,
possible to shed new light on that subject.

it is often
If while in

the process of an historiographical analysis one isolates
the interpretation of a single historian, or of a "school"
of historians, one can demonstrate the weaknesses or
emphasize the strengths of that particular viewpoint.

This

serves both to elucidate a copfused subject, and to clear
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the path for a new interpretation.

Granted, these two

branches of historiographical research are related.
the sake of clarity, however,

For

it is convenient to separate

them here.
With respect to source material, historians of
Franco-American relations from 1828 to 1860 have made
a fairly consistent advance away from the polemics of
American expansion.

The dependence of earlier historians

on the American accusations of European intrigue in the
New World as proof of a foreign threat to the United
States, for example, has been successfully challenged.
Adams,

Smith, and Rives were the first to explore foreign

archives, and as a result they establish that Aberdeen's
"Diplomatic Act" made no provisions for Anglo-French
military intervention in Texas.

The historians of the

Lone Star Republic have further shown that the Texas
leadership purposely aroused fears of European designs
to encourage support for annexation in the United States.
Likewise, Nasatir and Graebner demonstrate that France
had little serious desire to acquire California and p r e 
ferred an American to a British acquisition of the p r o 
vince.

As a result, the Guizot-Polk exchange has come

into new focus.

Merk redefines the meaning of Guizot's

address and emphasizes the partisan background of Polk's
declaration, reaffirming Reeves's earlier view that
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Polk was plotting to acquire California and that his
speech was a campaign document.
A similar process has taken place in the histori
ography of the Cuban and Hawaiian questions.

In both

cases, recent research into French archives proves that
France, even though allied with Great Britain, had little
intention of challenging the American acquisition of
these insular domains.

Although there is some specula

tion that Anglo-French protests persuaded the Pierce
administration to postpone the annexation of Cuba and
Hawaii, this is undocumented and fails to take into
account the Crimean War.

But perhaps it is easy to ove r

emphasize this process of historical evolution,

for it

is so basic to the principles of the writing of history.
Also, it should be noted that one recent historian,
Blumenthal, asserts that France and Britain forced the
United States to accept the "realities of power politics"
and drop the annexation of Cuba and Hawaii.

Because this

writer believes that a general frame of reference is
essential for one to understand Franco-American relations
from 1828 to 1860, the second goal of historiographical
study is emphasized in this conclusion.
When trying to understand the diplomatic relations
between two countries, one searches for constants,

for

predictable guidelines that influence policy decisions
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and give some meaning to international affairs.

To be

sure, individual governments may react differently to a
principle of foreign policy, but it cannot be denied
that within the relations of any two powers there are
forces, however elusive and subtle, that consistently
influence their policies with respect to each other.
In the case of France and the United States from 1828
to 1860, any attempt at generalization is somewhat
hazardous.

For, as the historians of the Cuban question

have demonstrated, domestic concerns can at times severely
limit alternatives abroad.

Nevertheless, one historian

has suggested that Franco-American relations during the
three decades prior to the American Civil War can be
viewed through the perspective of the Monroe Doctrine.
It is the belief of Dexter Perkins that Monroe's 1823
declaration defined a basic conflict between France and
the United States that progressively deepened until
Napoleon III undertook his ill-fated venture into Mexico.
He w r i t e s :
In the struggle of the nineteenth century between
democracy and older governmental forms, between
the spirit of the Old World and the New, the
decisive point, in a sense, is the begining of
the decade of the sixties.
In the period of
sixty years since the begining of the century
the democratic spirit had won as yet only partial
and indecisive victories in Europe.
In England
the middle classes had been admitted to power by
the Reform Bill of 1832; but in France the
rising democratic tide, which engulfed the
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Orleans monarchy in 1848 and swept to power
the republicans of that same year, soon
ebbed again, and, using the mechanics of
democracy to aid his rise to authority,
Louis Napoleon, half genius, half scheming
politician, established a semi-authoritarian
regime which for some years at least e x 
pressed largely his own will and purpose.
. . .The issue of the Civil War. . .gave
opportunity for a European sovereign to offer
a most serious challenge to the position of
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
The intervention of the French in Mexico is
an episode of the first significance in the
clash between the system of the Old World
and the system of the New.l
Reviewing the historiography of Franco-American relations
from 1828 to 1860, this writer believes that Perkins's
emphasis on the ideological dichotomy between France and
the United States, defined by Monroe in 1823 and made
concrete by the expansionism of the forties and fifties,
is justified.
Most Americans reacted enthusiastically to the revolu
tions of 1830 and 1848, interpreting them as inspired by
the example of the American political system.

But as

Rhodes, White, Gazley, and Curti have shown, this initial
euphoria soon vanished.

The claims controversy dispelled

any notion that the July Monarchy would seek to better
relations with the United States, and the coup d*etat of
Louis Napoleon reaffirmed American disillusionment with
the Second Republic.

Relations between the prevalent

^Perkins, History of the Monroe Doctrine, p. 108.
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governments of France and the United States, as Blumenthal
and Remond suggest, were dominated by suspicion and ideo
logical conflict.
But it was the expansion of the United States that
made clear the conflict between the political sympathies
of Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon and the vigorous,
self-confident republicanism of ante-bellum America.
True, the historians of American continental expansion
have dismissed the idea that contemporary fear of French
intervention in the New World warranted a forcible response.
Furthermore, Merk, Graebner, and Sellers, in taking issue
with Perkins’s interpretation of the Guizot-Polk exchange,
have reaffirmed the earlier interpretation of Reeves that
Polk's speech was intended primarily for domestic consump
tion.

Still,

it i

clear that G u izo t’s desire to see a

"balance of forces" in the New World conflicted, albeit
symbolically, with Polk's use of the Monroe Doctrine to
defend the American acquisition of California, Oregon, and
Texas.

And in spite of some ambiguity, caused no doubt

by the domestic strife of the volatile fifties, the
historians of the Hawaiian and Cuban questions also have
demonstrated that the controversy over the annexation of
these islands by the United States did contribute to the
ideological gap between France and the United States.

-245-

This is especially true with regard to the Cuban question,
where the activities of the ’’Young America" movement so
irritated Louis Napoleon.
Significantly, historians have clearly shown that
only where the Monroe Doctrine, whether formally in the
case of Polk in 1845 and Everett in 1852, or informally
in the case of Tyler in 1843, was applied to an area and
used to complement American expansionism did the ideological
conflict between France and the United States become
apparent.

In Santo Domingo, where both France and Great

Britain worked successfully to counter American attempts
to acquire Samana Bay, the Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan
administrations quietly accepted their defeat.

Apparently,

the destiny of the United States was not ’’manifest" in
Santo Domingo; hence, the Monroe Doctrine was ignored.
The historiography of Franco-American relations from
1828 to 1860 is sorely deficient in one respect.

Only

Henry Blumenthal has devoted an entire monograph to the
subject.

But Blumenthal’s work is disappointing.

His

evidence is often weak and it appears, especially with
regard to Cuba, Hawaii, and Santo Domingo, that he ignores
the findings of recent historians.

The intent of his

study is to dispel the belief that France and the United
States enjoyed close ties, stemming from the Treaty of
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Alliance of 1778 and interrupted only briefly during
the Maximilian episode.

Although he demonstrates that

France and the United States were far from allies during
the years 1828-1860, Blumenthal fails to accomplish much
more.

A good many of Perkins's findings have been

challenged, clearing the path for a serious, detailed
reassessment.

Blumenthal fails to fulfill this need.
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